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CORPORATE SECRECY, THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS, AND THE

DISCLOSURE OF ONGOING
NEGOTIATIONS
J. Robert Brown, Jr.*
Few disclosure issues cause more trepidation and anxiety among corporate officials than the disclosure of ongoing negotiations, whether negotiations over prospective sales contracts, aquisitions, mergers, or other material
developments. Most major arms length agreements are preceded by a period
of negotiations tln t typically take place behind a veil of secrecy. Disclosure
is often delaye' : ntil an agreement has been reached. Corporate officials
fear that premature disclosure may result in a competitive disadvantage or
may jeopardize continuation of the negotiations.'
The often legitimate corporate predilection for secrecy, however, cannot
be viewed in isolation; it must be juxtaposed against the disclosure philosophy of the federal securities laws.2 These laws dictate that, under certain
Assistant Professor of Business Administration, Franklin & Marshall College; Counsel, Stevens & Lee; B.A. 1978, College of William & Mary; J.D. 1980, University of Maryland
School of Law; M.A. 1984, Georgetown University; Law Clerk 1981-1982, Honorable Frank
M. Johnson, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; Attorney, Office of
the General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., 1984-86. The
views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the author's colleagues, including those on the staff of the Commission. The author would
like to thank Sherry Stephen for her many hours of typing and Beth Blechman for her longstanding support that helped make this Article possible.
1. See generally Greenawalt & Noam, Confidentiality Claims of Business Organizations,
in BUSINESS DISCLOSURE: GOVERNMENT'S NEED TO KNOW 378 (H. Goldschmid ed. 1979).
2. A principal purpose of the federal securities laws was to ensure that investors had
sufficient information to make informed investment decisions. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933) ("The purpose of these
sections is to secure for potential buyers the means of understanding the intricacies of the
transaction into which they are invited."); see also 78 CONG. REC. 2931 (1933) ("The theory
upon which [the 1933 Act] has been drawn is to give the public complete information as to the
security offered for sale .... ") (statement of Rep. Wolverton). Articulated another way, the
laws were meant "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); accord, Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
As the House Report to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat.
74 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), noted:
No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges
*
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circumstances, the public be apprised of all material developments. The
concept of materiality is sufficiently broad to encompass ongoing
negotiations.3
The difficulty in reconciling the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws with the corporate need for secrecy has caused much judicial
consternation. Some courts have shown a marked hesitancy to impose liability for nondisclosure of ongoing negotiations, even where the federal securities laws seem to so dictate.4 Viewing disclosure as potentially harmful to
without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the
securities he buys or sells. The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the
theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just
price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open
market, so the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation
of the markets as indices of real value. There cannot be honest markets without
honest publicity.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 99-109.
4. In fairness, part of the judicial hesitancy to require disclosure of speculative information may have been a similar hesitancy evinced by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Historically, the Commission prohibited the use of speculative information such as projections
and appraisals in agency filings. See Guidelines for the Release of Information, Securities Act
Release No. 5180, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,192 (Aug. 16,
1971) (companies should avoid making projections, forecasts, or predictions in any prospectus). See also Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W.
3512 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1987) (No. 86-860) ("Historically, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has discouraged the disclosure of financial projections and other 'soft' information
such as asset appraisals .... "); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enter., 744 F.2d 978, 985 (3d Cir. 1985)
("The reasons underpinning the SEC's longstanding policy against disclosure of soft information stem from its concern about the reliability of appraisals, [and] its fear that investors might
give greater credence to the appraisals or projections than would be warranted ....

"); Re-

source Exploration v. Yankee Gas & Oil, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1983) ("The
rationale for omitting such information is that it is apt to create more potential for misunderstanding than enlightenment.").
Contrary to the interpretation of some courts, however, the Commission did not consider
projections and appraisals inherently misleading. Instead, the agency was concerned primarily
with the use of soft information in documents filed with the Commission. See Statement by
the Commission on Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act
Release No. 5362, (1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,211, at 82,666 (Feb. 2,
1973) ("It has been the Commission's long standing policy generally not to permit projections
to be included in prospectuses and reports filed with the Commission."). While the Commission does not and cannot pass on the merits of any prospectus or filing or otherwise attest to its
accuracy, see the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 23, 48 Stat. 74, 87, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77w (1982), the mere fact that a document is filed with the Commission may give it added
weight in the eyes of shareholders. By prohibiting the use of soft information in filings, it
appears that the Commission was not trying to deny shareholders access to the information,
but was trying to avoid attributing to such speculative information the added weight that
might accrue from its inclusion in a filing.
By the mid-1970s, the Commission reversed its long-standing position with respect to the
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shareholders and stressing the corporate need for secrecy, several recent decisions have, under the rubric of materiality, sought to severely curtail the
instances in which ongoing negotiations must be disclosed. These courts
have held that, absent an "agreement in principle," ongoing negotiations are
immaterial as a matter of law.' Moreover, the term "agreement in principle" has been narrowly construed. In the context of a merger or a change in
control, an "agreement in principle" exists only if the parties have agreed
upon the share price and the post-merger corporate structure.6 The effect of
these decisions is to impose a rigid, bright-line test for determining the materiality of ongoing negotiations.
These cases contain faulty analysis and overbroad dictum. The courts go
to great lengths to stretch and contort the federal securities laws in order to
avoid imposing liability for nondisclosure. Typically, these courts accept
without challenge the contentions that disclosure of the negotiations will
damage the negotiation process and mislead investors. Although propitious
sounding, these arguments are often incorrect. Moreover, even where correct, they do not always justify nondisclosure. While few would gainsay at
least the occasional need for secrecy, secrecy must nevertheless sometimes
give way to the need for disclosure.7
Judicial unanimity on the subject, however, does not exist; not all courts
agree with the use of a bright-line test. Instead, some courts use an analysis
that examines the materiality of the ongoing negotiations on a fact-intensive,
use of projections and appraisals in filings and began affirmatively to encourage their use. See
Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release
No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,756 (Nov. 7, 1978). Regulation S-K, the standard instructions for all periodic filings under the integrated disclosure system, encourages the use of projections. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1986); see also Regulation S-K,
item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1986) (forward-looking information may be included in management's discussion and analysis); Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.11-03 (1986) (financial
forecasts permitted in lieu of pro forma consolidated statement of income). In addition, the
Commission has adopted safe harbor rules governing the use of projections. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (1986). It adopted such rules in Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117 (June 25,
1979), see also Plaine v. McCabe, 790 F.2d 742, 752 (9th Cir. 1986) ("There is authority that
information regarding financial projections such as those [in this case] should have been disclosed."); Flynn, 744 F.2d at 978 (recognizing that companies may sometimes have a duty to
disclose appraisals). See generally Note, The Safe HarborRulefor Projections. Caveat Projector, 11 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 345 (1980).
5. See Greenfield v. Heublein, 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189
(1985); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600
F. Supp. 678, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1985); see also Sulzer v. Associated Madison Cos., [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,053 (M.D. Fla. May 10, 1985).
6. Heublein, 742 F.2d at 757.
7. See infra notes 195-232 and accompanying text.
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case-by-case basis.8 These courts balance the magnitude of the prospective
agreement against the probability that an agreement will result. Using this
type of analysis, negotiations may be material long before an agreement in
principle is reached.9
The materiality of negotiations issue has come under intense scrutiny by
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"), the federal
agency primarily responsible for administering and enforcing the federal securities laws. Through enforcement actions" ° and participation in cases as
amicus curiae," the Commission has taken an increasingly resolute stance
with respect to the appropriate test for determining the materiality of ongoing negotiations. Among other things, it has reaffirmed the probability/
magnitude test and expressly rejected the conclusion that negotiations preceding an agreement in principle are immaterial as a matter of law.' 2
Judicial and administrative treatment of ongoing negotiations has sown
considerable confusion. Moreover, as discussed in this Article, the Supreme
Court recently has agreed to decide the appropriate standard for determining materiality of ongoing negotiations. The sensitivity of negotiations, the
uncertainties imposed on companies seeking to conform to the disclosure
requirements of the federal securities laws, the more aggressive posture by
the Commission, and the consideration by the Supreme Court, all suggest
the need for a thorough examination of this issue, a task to be undertaken in
this article.
I.

DUTY TO DISCLOSE

Most of the cases to date discussing liability for nondisclosure of ongoing
8. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
9. See infra notes 125-237 and accompanying text.
10. The Commission recently litigated the issue in an enforcement proceeding in SEC v.
Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,004 (S.D.N.Y. April 16,
1985) (insider trading case). The materiality of ongoing negotiations has also been at issue in
other insider trading cases brought by the Commission. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., 531
F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
11. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Levinson v.
Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir.) (No. 84-3730), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 2516 (U.S. Feb.
23, 1987) (No. 86-279) [hereinafter Levinson Brief]; see infra note 277 and accompanying text;
Memorandum of Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Michaels v. Michaels,
767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986) (No. 85-752) [hereinafter
Michaels Memorandum]; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 107 S. Ct. 267 (1986) (No. 86-279); Memorandum
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., Nos. 86-1611/1727
(7th Cir. 1986)..
12. See Michaels Memorandum, supra note 11, at 2 n. 1; Levinson Brief, supra note 11.
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negotiations have focused on the materiality of the negotiations.13 Yet even
if negotiations are material, liability for nondisclosure is not automatic. Instead, liability will attach only if a duty to disclose exists. The mere fact that
information is material does not of itself give rise to a duty to disclose. Despite the longing of some commentators 4 and the isolated musings of particular courts," it no longer can be seriously argued that publicly traded
companies are subject to a general duty to disclose all material developments.' 6 The halcyon days when the imposition of a general duty to disclose
under rule l0b-517 seemed a "small step" away have ended."8 Courts have

rejected that notion and, despite past hints to the contrary, the Commission
appears to have conceded that no such duty exists. 9 The imposition of a
general duty to disclose must now await action by either the Commission or
Congress.2 °
13. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 449 (1976); see infra notes 100-01.

14. See Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation'sAffirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO.
L.J. 935, 937 (1979); Talesnilk, CorporateSilence and Rule lOb-5: Does a Publicly Held Corporation Have an Affirmative Duty to Disclose?, 49 DEN. L.J. 369, 412 (1973).
15. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 519
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
857 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Issen v. GSC Enters., 538 F.
Supp. 745, 751 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
16. See, e.g., Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1204 (3d Cir. 1982); Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976); Warner Communications, Inc. v. Murdoch, 581
F. Supp. 1482, 1489 n.12 (D. Del. 1984).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
18. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1366 (1966).
19. See Levinson Brief, supra note 11, at 8-9; Michaels Memorandum, supra note 11, at 3
n.2 ("Thus, in general, if a company does not trade in its own stock, and neither issues a public
statement about corporate developments, nor allows word to leak into the market, it need not
disclose even material negotiations."). In the past, the Commission had emphasized the need
for "prompt" disclosure of material developments but had always stopped short of imposing a
general duty to make such disclosures. See, e.g., Public Statements by Corporate Representative, Securities Act Release No. 6504, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,120B (Jan. 13, 1984); Disclosure of the Impact of Wage and Price Standards, Securities
Act Release No. 6001, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3059B (Nov.
29, 1978); Adoption of Amendment to Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5511, [19731974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,834 (July 3, 1974); Disclosure of the
Impact of Possible Fuel Shortages on the Registration and Reporting Provisions of the Federal
Securities Laws, Securities Act Release No. 5447, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,607 (Dec. 20, 1973); Notice to Registrants Engaged in Long-Term Contracts
of the Need for Disclosure of Material Information, Securities Act Release No. 5263, [19721973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,852 (June 22, 1972); Timely Disclosure of
Material Corporate Developments, Securities Act Release No. 5092, [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,915 (Oct. 15, 1970); Publicity Concerning Petroleum
Discoveries, Securities Act Release No. 5016, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 77,753 (Oct. 20, 1969).
20. See Brown, Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 GEO.
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Notwithstanding the absence of a general duty, the federal securities laws
do require affirmative disclosures in certain specified circumstances. 2 ' Broad
disclosure obligations are imposed under the antifraud provisions. In addition, the Commission has adopted a myriad of specific disclosure requirements, some of which expressly mandate disclosure of ongoing negotiations.
A.

Antifraud Provisions

By prohibiting fraudulent misstatements, the antifraud provisions in the
Securities Act of 19332 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193423 to a large
degree ensure the accuracy and completeness of public statements or filings.
Moreover, the antifraud provisions also prohibit certain persons from trading while in possession of material nonpublic information. Persons with information obtained as a result of their position as a corporate insider or
information misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust and confidentiality
cannot trade until the information has been disclosed and disseminated to
the market.2 4 The antifraud provisions, therefore, do not require informational parity, but rather focus upon informational disparities that are inherently unfair.
Under the antifraud provisions, companies are subject to a duty to disclose material developments in these general circumstances. First, under the
duty to "disclose or abstain," 2 5 trading while in possession of material nonWASH. L.J. 741, 817 (1985) (discussion of the Commission's authority to adopt a rule impos-

ing a general duty to disclose).
21. This Article does not address the disclosure obligations imposed by the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (Amex), and National Association of
Security Dealers (NASD). Essentially, these self-regulatory organizations impose a general
duty to disclose all material developments. See New York Stock Exchange Manual A-2, reprinted in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,513 (1984); American Stock Exchange Company
Guide § 401 (1984), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 23,124a (1985); National Association of
Securities Dealers Manual, Schedule D, pt. II, § (B)(3)(b). In addition, regional exchanges
require or encourage rapid dissemination of material corporate developments. See Boston
Stock Exchange Rules of the Board of Governors, Supplement to Chapter XXVII, reprintedin
CCH Boston Stock Exchange Guide 2265 (1984); Midwest Stock Exchange Rules, art. SSVVIII, rule 7 interpretation .01, reprinted in CCH Midwest Stock Exchange Guide 1898 (1984).
While the Amex and NYSE may suspend trading or delist for violations and the NASD may
restrict access to the NASDAQ quotation system, a private right of action for violations does
not appear available for violation of these rules. See State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor
Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981).
22. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(b)(b)(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
23. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(k)(k) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
24. See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 314-18 (6th Cir. 1976); Fischer v. Plessey Co., 559 F. Supp. 442, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
25. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 742 (E.D. Va.
1980) ("A corporate insider trading in stock of the corporation for his own account by the use
of nonpublic information is thus under a duty to disclose all material facts to the prospective
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public information is prohibited unless the information is first disclosed and
disseminated to the market.26 As a result, whenever material negotiations
are taking place, neither corporate insiders nor the issuer may trade in the
securities of that company until the negotiations have been made public and
the market has had sufficient time to react. Since the duty to disclose or
abstain is triggered by a purchase or sale, the definition of these terms is
critical. Courts have construed the terms expansively, defining them to include transactions not usually considered to be a purchase or sale. 27 Given
the breadth of these definitions, companies sometimes will find themselves
unsuspectingly subject to a duty to disclose or abstain.28
A duty to disclose under the antifraud provisions also exists when necessary to prevent a statement, in light of the circumstances under which it is
made from being so incomplete as to be misleading. 29 As one court expurchaser or seller."). The disclose or abstain rule is derived from an interpretation of the
antifraud rules, particularly rule lOb-5. The Commission's classic articulation of the principle
appears in In re Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
26. Under the principle of "disclose or abstain," the duty to disclose exists as long as the
person to whom the duty is owed retains some investment discretion over whether to consummate the purchase or sale. The duty ceases once the parties to the transaction are committed
"in the classical contracting sense." Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876,
890-91 (2d Cir. 1972). In at least one case, a court found that the duty continued for almost a
two year period. See Grigsby v. CMI Corp., 590 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 765
F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1985). There, plaintiffs executed contracts in 1980 to sell their shares in a
subsidiary of defendant, CMI Corporation. Before closing the sale, CMI sued for rescission.
The parties ultimately settled the case in 1982. The district court held, and the Ninth Circuit
agreed, that the duty to disclose on the part of CMI continued through the 1982 settlement.
Until then, plaintiffs had the option of confessing judgment and rescinding the agreements, "an
option they could have exercised on the basis of information disclosed in 1982." Id. at 831; see
Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982).
27. See Rathborne v. Rathborne, 683 F.2d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1982) ("This court has consistently held that a statutory purchase or sale for the purposes of rule lOb-5 may in some cases
encompass transactions that bear little resemblance to conventional common law purchases
and sales."); Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Courts applying section
10(b) and rule lob-5 have defined 'sale' broadly so as to extend the panoply of the 1934 Act to
those who may not be sellers in the common law sense.").
28. Brown, supra note 20, at 761-72.
29. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). As the Commission has stated: "Corporate releases which disclose personnel changes, the receipt of new contracts, orders and other favorable developments but do
not even suggest existing adverse corporate developments do not serve the public needs and
may violate the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ....
Securities
Act Release No. 5092, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,915, at
80,036 (Oct. 15, 1970): See also In re Fidelity Fin. Corp. & Fidelity Savs. & Loan Assoc.,
Securities Act Release No. 18,927, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,239
(July 30, 1982) (press release disclosing company's losses was misleading for not disclosing the
"severity of the situation").
Moreover, under the "buried facts" doctrine, a filing may disclose all material information
but still be misleading if important information is not sufficiently highlighted. See, e.g., Gould
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plained: "A duty to speak the full truth arises when a defendant undertakes
to say anything.", 30 Avoiding an incomplete disclosure may sometimes require affirmative disclosures, including the disclosure of ongoing negotiations. Once disclosure occurs, obligations to ensure the continued accuracy
of the statements may also arise. Courts have held that a duty exists to
correct "alive" statements that become misleading, a duty which may sometimes necessitate additional affirmative disclosures. 3'
Finally, a duty to disclose may arise where material information is disclosed to select individuals who trade on the basis of the information or tip
the information to others who trade. Under these circumstances, an issuer
may have a duty to disclose the information to the market as a whole. This
duty arises, for example, whenever news about material corporate developments has leaked to the person in the marketplace and that leak can be
traced to the issuer.3 2 Unusual activity in a company's stock at the same
time material undisclosed developments are taking place may provide constructive notice that persons inside the issuer have leaked material nonpublic
v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Smallwood v. Pearl Brew-

ing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d
1281, 1297 (2d Cir. 1973) ("While 'corporations are not required to address their stockholders
as if they were children in kindergarten,' it is not sufficient that overtones might have been
picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts.") (quoting Richard v. Crandall,
262 F. Supp. 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
The Commission recently brought an administrative proceeding against B.F. Goodrich for
disclosures that, while arguably accurate as a factual matter, were materially incomplete and,
therefore, misleading. See In re B.F. Goodrich, Exchange Act Release No. 22,792, [1985-1986
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,958 (Jan. 15, 1986). Goodrich disclosed in a
press release that it had repurchased over 1 million shares for, among other things, use in
funding employee benefit plans. A similar disclosure was made in Commission filings, including an annual report filed on form 10-K and a proxy statement. Goodrich failed to mention,
however, that the shares were repurchased from Carl Icahn, a noted greenmailer, at a substantial (25%) premium. The Commission concluded that omission of the amount of the premium
and of the identity of the seller violated rules governing disclosures in form 10-K's and proxy
statements. Id. See also Vartain, S.E.C Signal on "Greenmail, "N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1986, at
D8, col. I.
30. First Va. Bancshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
952 (1977); accord Whitbread-(US) Holdings, Inc. v. Rothschild, 630 F. Supp. 972, 977
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
31. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979); cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see also Greenfield v.
Heublein, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1325, 1336 (1983); SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 247 F.
Supp. 470, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
32. See, e.g., State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir.
1981); Zuckerman v. Harnisch-Feler Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also In
re Sharon Steel, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18,271, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,049 (Nov. 19, 1981).
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information to select individuals, thereby triggering an affirmative duty on
the part of the issuer to make disclosures to the entire market.
The antifraud provisions, therefore, may sometimes compel disclosure of
ongoing negotiations. When material negotiations are taking place, disclosure will normally be a precondition to any trading by insiders. Further,
disclosure is required if a public statement would otherwise be misleading
but for mention of the negotiations. For example, a statement by the target
company about the yield of corporate debt instruments designed to promote
the bonds as investments may be misleading absent disclosure of the merger
negotiations; negotiations that if successful may cause a material drop in the
value of the debt.33 Likewise, denial of negotiations while negotiations are
underway will also be misleading. Finally, a loosely worded statement that
negotiations are not taking place might continue to be considered "alive," at
least for a short time after issuance, and need to be updated or corrected
once negotiations commence.
B.

Commission Filing Requirements: Line Item Disclosures

Pursuant to rulemaking authority, the Commission has adopted broad
line item disclosure requirements that require the disclosure of specified information under certain circumstances. 34 Unlike the antifraud provisions,
33. See generally Prokesch, Merger Wave: How Stock and Bonds Fare, N.Y. Times, Jan.
7, 1986, at Al, col. 1; Farrell, Takeovers and Buyouts Clobber Blue-Chip Bondholders, Bus.
WK., Nov. 11, 1985, at 113; Forsyth, Bad Grades: Takeovers Teach a Costly Lesson to Bond
Holders, BARRON'S, Feb. 24, 1986, at 24.

34. Although the Commission has adopted rules imposing affirmative obligations to disclose certain information, a private right of action will not necessarily exist for violations of the
rules. See In re Penn Cent. Secs. Lit., 494 F.2d 528, 540 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding no private
right of action exists under § 13(a) of the Exchange Act); accord Phillips v. TPC Communications, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 696, 698-99 (W.D. Pa. 1982). Even without a private cause, violations
of Commission imposed disclosure requirements may be actionable under the antifraud provisions. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1982)
(failure to make disclosures required by 17 C.F.R. § 240.17b-17 (1986) actionable under antifraud provisions), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1983). But see State Teachers Retirement Bd.,
654 F.2d at 852 (violation of disclosure requirement imposed by NYSE held not to be actionable under antifraud provisions). Even if potentially actionable under the antifraud provisions,
however, noncompliance with a Commission disclosure requirement will not automatically
lead to liability. For example, a violation of rule lob-5 also requires a showing of scienter and
materiality. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock,
Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1985). Whether the failure to disclose
information specifically required by a Commission rule is always material has not been resolved. See Goldstein, Donnelly, & Wurczinger, Disclosure of a PotentialChange in Corporate
Control, 19 SEC. & COMM. REG. 133, 142 (1986) (noting that cases brought for violations of
Commission disclosure requirements do not look to "the materiality analysis in the antifraud
cases," but employ a "narrower focus" and simply attempt to determine whether the disclosures at issue "fully and accurately comply with the specific line item requirements"). While
not all line item disclosure requirements would be necessarily material under the standard set
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the line item disclosure requirements imposed by the Commission are intended to provide a certain degree of informational parity among investors.
These requirements essentially insure that all investors have certain specified
information deemed necessary for informed decisionmaking, such as
whether to buy or sell securities, execute a proxy, or tender in response to a
tender offer. Of course, individual investors do not always read or comprehend the often arcane and technical jargon that appears in Commission filings. Nonetheless, the information is normally highly relevant to analysts
and sophisticated investors and, in an efficient market, will be reflected in the
price of a company's shares.
The securities laws provide the Commission with exceedingly broad, almost plenary, authority to impose affirmative disclosure requirements. 35
Under the Securities Act, companies issuing securities registered are subject
to substantial disclosure requirements.36 Similarly, under the Exchange Act,
publicly traded companies generally must file annual reports, quarterly re-

ports, 37 and current reports reflecting certain material developments."

In

addition, substantial disclosure requirements attach in connection with the

solicitation of proxies,

9

the acquisition of more than five percent of the

forth in TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 449 (1976), see infra note 100, an argument
can be made that because investors have an expectation of receiving the information, its omission would be material.
35. See § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982).
36. See § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1982) (requiring filing of registration in connection with
offering of securities). The disclosure requirements for a registration statement are contained
in Regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1986). See also Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1986)
(requirements for financial disclosure).
37. Section 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982). Publicly traded companies must file annual
reports with the Commission within 90 days of the end of the fiscal year. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.13a-l, 240.15d-1, 249.310 (1986). Annual reports are typically filed on form 10-K. See
17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1986). Companies must file quarterly reports on form 10-Q within 45
days of the end of every quarter except the fourth. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13, 240.15d-13,
249.308a (1986).
38. Current reports on form 8-K must be filed within 15 days after the occurrence of
certain specified events. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-11, 240.15d-11, 249.308a (1986). These events
are (1) a change in control of the registrant, (2) the acquisition or disposition of a significant
amount of assets, other than in the ordinary course of business, (3) bankruptcy or receivership,
(4) changes in the registrant's certifying accountant, and (5) under certain circumstances, resignation of the registrant's directors. In addition, item 5 of form 8-K requires a company to
report any other event or development "of material importance to security holders." See Item
5, Form 8-K.
39. The proxy rules apply to companies with securities traded on a national exchange or
registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982). In general, such companies cannot solicit proxies unless the solicitation is preceded by or accompanied with a proxy
statement. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3 (1986). The requirements for proxy statements are set
forth in Regulation 14a, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-l to -102, and Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101 (1986). Proxies sent in connection with the annual meeting of shareholders at
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stock of a publicly traded company, 4° and tender offers. 4 The contents of
the documents disclosing this information are carefully specified by the
Commission.4 2
The Commission has adopted a number of line items that expressly call
for the disclosure of negotiations. In general, they arise in the context of a
change of control. This information is generally deemed necessary to enable
shareholders to make informed investment decisions about whether to
tender their shares or approve a merger or leveraged buy-out. Such Commission-imposed disclosure requirements include:
Item 3(b), Schedule 14D-1. Bidders making a tender offer for publicly
traded companies must make certain disclosures on Schedule 14D- L" Item
3(b) of the Schedule expressly requires disclosure of any "contacts, negotiations or transactions" between the target and bidder concerning a "merger,
consolidation or acquisition; a tender offer or other acquisition of securities;
an election of directors; or a sale or other transfer of a material amount of
assets."" In adopting this disclosure requirement, the Commission noted
which directors are to be elected must be accompanied or preceded by an annual report. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1986); see also Ash v. GAF Corp., 723 F.2d 1090, 1094 (3d Cir. 1983)
(annual report was sent by third class mail four days before proxy).
40. A statement containing the information required in a Schedule 13D must be filed with
the Commission and delivered to the issuer within 10 business days of the acquisition of shares
of any class of outstanding equity securities of a publicly traded company if, following the
acquisition, the purchaser beneficially owns greater than 5% of the outstanding shares. 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1986). In some instances, large shareholders
may be eligible for the reduced disclosure requirements contained in Schedule 13G. See rule
13d-l(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(c) (1986); see also § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (1982) (requiring certain institutional investment managers to file reports disclosing share ownership within
45 days of the end of the calendar year).
41. A company making a tender offer for a publicly traded company must file a statement
containing the information required in a Schedule 14D-1 as soon as practicable after the date
of the offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a) (1986); see Schedule 14D-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100
(1986); see also infra note 43.
42. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1986) (detailed instructions for contents of
registration statements under the Securities Act and periodic filing requirements under the
Exchange Act); Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1986) (detailed instructions for financial
statements filed with the Commission).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a) (1986). A Schedule 14D-1 need be filed only where the
tender offer is for a class of equity securities described in § 14(d)(1) of the Williams Act. 17
C.F.R. § 14d-l(a) (1986). Section 14(d)(l) extends to any
class of any equity security which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or
any equity security of an insurance company which would have been required to be
so registered except for the exemption contained in section 781(g)(2)(G) of this title,
or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment company registered under
the Investment Company Act of 1940 ....
Id. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
44. Item 3(b), Schedule 14D-1; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1986) (special instructions for
complying with Schedule 14D-l). In adopting this requirement, the Commission stated that
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that the item "was intended to provide security holders with more meaningful disclosure concerning certain material events occurring prior to the
tender offer which can have a material effect on a shareholder's investment
decision concerning the tender offer." 4 5
Item 3, Schedule 13E-3. An issuer or affiliate engaging in a "going private" transaction must file a Schedule 13E-3.46 If the Schedule is filed by an
affiliate of the issuer, Item 3 of the Schedule requires disclosure of "any contacts, negotiations, or transactions" between the issuer and the subsidiary
concerning a merger, consolidation, or acquisition; a tender offer for or other
acquisition of securities of any class of the issuer; an election of directors of
the issuer; or a sale or other transfer of a material amount of assets of the
issuer or any of its subsidiaries.47 Disclosure must also be made of any contacts or negotiations concerning such transactions between affiliates of the
issuer and between the issuer (or its affiliates) and any nonaffiliated person
Item 3 recognized that a tender offer may not be an isolated event in the corporate
histories of the bidder and the subject company. Disclosure concerning certain
events which occurred, either directly or indirectly, between these parties in the recent past is material to an investment decision by a security holder in the context of a
tender offer.
Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Tender Offer, Exchange Act Release No.
13,787, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,256, at 88,376-77 (July 21,
1977).
45. Tender Offers-Notice of Proposed Rules and Schedules, Exchange Act Release No.
12,676, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,659(III)(J), at 86,701 (Aug.
2, 1976) (proposing item 3 of Schedule 14D-l). The Commission did not adopt item 3 as
originally proposed, but instead attempted to narrow the disclosure requirements. As the
Commission indicated in the adopting release, "[tihe scope of the persons affected ... by Item
3(b) was more precisely defined and the types of events within the purview of that sub-item
was modified." Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Tender Offer, supra note 44.
The Commission further explained that:
The changes in item 3 were intended to reduce, to the extent feasible, the burden
placed on the bidder by such disclosure, while at the same time furnishing sufficient
information concerning past contacts, negotiations and transactions to the shareholders of the subject company to assist them in making an informed investment decision.
Id.
46. Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1986).
47. Item 3(b), Schedule 13E-3; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1986) (general instructions for
filing Schedule 13E-3). The proposing and adopting releases contain little insightful discussion
of the requirements. In the proposing release, the Commission noted only that:
The disclosure that would be required by proposed Item 3 would pertain to contacts,
negotiations or transactions which occurred since the commencement of the issuer's
third full fiscal year preceding the date of the initial filing of this schedule by the
issuer or affiliate engaging in the rule 13e-3 transaction.
Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release
No. 14,185, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,366, at 81,366-67
(Nov. 17, 1977). The item was not discussed in the adopting release. See Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release No. 16,075, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,166 (Aug. 2, 1979).
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that would have a direct interest in the matters. The identity of the person
that initiated the contacts or negotiations must also be disclosed.
Item 6, Form S-4 and Form F-4. With respect to certain mergers and
other business combinations, a registration statement must be filed on Form
S-4 or, in the case of a foreign registrant, on Form F-4.48 Item 6 of both
forms requires disclosure of certain negotiations. Specifically, disclosure
must be made of "any past, present or proposed material contracts, negotiations, transactions or similar contacts between the registrant and the company being acquired. ' '49 As the Commission noted in the adopting release,
Item 6 "is designed to elicit information about: (1) possible conflicts of interest and (2) facts relating to transactions such as pretakeover transactions
or purchases by the registrant of significant blocks of the securities of the
company being acquired." 5 °
Item 504, Regulation S-K. Issuers filing registration statements under the
Securities Act generally must conform to the requirements of Item 504 of
Regulation S-K.5" Under Item 504, registrants must disclose the purposed
use of the funds from the sale of securities. In the event that the registrant
intends to use such funds to acquire another business, disclosure must be
made of the identity of the business and must include a description of the
"status of any negotiations" with that business.5 2
Item 7, Schedule 14D-9. Item 7 of Schedule 14D-95 3 is the only line item
requiring the disclosure of negotiations to generate an appreciable amount of
interpretative lore and case law. Following a tender offer, the management
of a target company normally recommends to its shareholders whether to
accept or reject the offer. The recommendation must be made on a Schedule
48. Item 6, form S-4; 17 C.F.R. § 239,25 (1986); Item 6, form F-4, 17 C.F.R. § 239.34
(1986) (registration form for business combinations by foreign registrants).
49. Business Combination Transactions-Adoption of Registration Form, Exchange Act
Release No. 21,982, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,418, at 62,072
(April 23, 1985).
50. Id. In proposing item 6, the Commission noted that "[t]he proposed item is substantially similar to information required by the Commission's tender offer rules," Business Combination Transactions-Proposed New Registration Form, Exchange Act Release No. 20,944,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 83,627, at 86,840 (May 24, 1984).
Interestingly, merger proxy statements are not subject to the same disclosure requirements.
Although a merger proxy must disclose substantial information about the merger, the instructions do not expressly require disclosure of either past negotiations between the merging companies or negotiations with other possible merger candidates. See item 14, Schedule 14A, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1986) (information required in Schedule 14A proxy statement).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 229.504 (1986). Registration statements filed on forms S-1, S-2, S-3, and
S-18 must include a response to item 504 of Regulation S-K.
52. Id.; see also Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328 (Mar. 3, 1982) (adopting item 504).
53. Item 7, Schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1986).
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14D-9.5 4 Item 7 of the Schedule requires disclosure of "any negotiation...
being undertaken or underway . . .in response to the tender offer," if the

negotiations relate to certain extraordinary events such as a merger reorganization, the purchase, sale or transfer of a material amount of assets, a tender
offer, or a material change in the existing capitalization or dividend policy.55
In addition, the Schedule must be amended "promptly" in the event of material changes,5 6 effectively requiring management of the target to continually
update the Schedule. The commencement of negotiations constitutes a material development that must be disclosed in an amendment.
As originally proposed, Item 7 called for a description of "any negotiation
or transaction being undertaken" concerning certain extraordinary events. 57
In proposing the requirement, the Commission explained that "[e]fforts by
the subject company such as those described in proposed Item 7 can have a
determinative effect on the outcome of a tender offer and therefore are material to a security holder who is faced with making an investment decision by
a tender offer." 5 8 Following the proposal, some commentators complained
that the disclosure of ongoing negotiations might, in certain circumstances,
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(a) (1986).
55. Item 7(a) provides:
CERTAIN NEGOTIATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS BY THE SUBJECT
COMPANY
(a) If the person filing this statement is the subject company, state whether or not
any negotiation is being undertaken or is underway by the subject company in response to the tender offer which relates to or would result in:
(1) An extraordinary transaction such as a merger or reorganization, involving
the subject company or any subsidiary of the subject company;
(2) A purchase, sale or transfer of a material amount of assets by the subject
company or any subsidiary of the subject company;
(3) A tender offer for or other acquisition of securities by or of the subject company; or
(4) Any material change in the present capitalization or dividend policy of the
subject company.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1986). In addition, the instructions to item 7 further explain:
If no agreement in principle has yet been reached, the possible terms of any transaction or the parties thereto need not be disclosed if in the opinion of the board of
directors of the subject company such disclosure would jeopardize continuation of
such negotiations. In such event, disclosure that negotiations are being undertaken
or are underway and are in the preliminary stages will be sufficient.
Id.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(b) (1986); see Exchange Act Release No. 16,623, 3 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 24,2841, at 17,759 (Mar. 5, 1980) ("once a schedule 14D-9 has been filed it must be
updated to reflect material changes.").
57. Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,935, at 81,235 (Feb. 5, 1979).
58. Id. at 81,236 n.106.
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chill the bidding process and dissuade competing offers.59

Concluding that the "major developments referred to in item 7 can be one
60
of the most material items of information received by security holders,"
the Commission decided to retain the disclosure of ongoing negotiations.
Nevertheless, reflecting the concern of commentators, the Commission indi-

cated in adopting the disclosure requirement that companies could, under
certain circumstances, withhold information concerning the identity of the
parties to the negotiations or the terms under discussion. Under Item 7, a
company may withhold the identity of the other party and the terms under
discussion "[i]f no agreement in principle has yet been reached" and "in the
opinion of the Board of Directors [of the target] such disclosure would jeopardize continuation of the negotiations." 6 Nonetheless, even under these
circumstances, the target company must disclose that "negotiations are be59. Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,373 (Nov. 29, 1979). As the Commission noted in the release:
The proposal was criticized by commentators who were concerned that it would
elicit premature disclosure of negotiations with competing bidders which could dissuade them from making an offer. Commentators argued that security holders would
be prevented from obtaining the highest price for their securities. In addition, concern was expressed that such disclosure may, either innocently or fraudulently, induce security holders to reject a tender offer on the basis of an unjustified inference
that a competing bid is imminent.
The Commission recognizes that premature disclosure of the matters contemplated by the proposal may be detrimental to the interests of security holders. The
effective representation of the interests of security holders may at times require management to maintain confidentiality during the formative stages of negotiations.
Id. at 82,594.
60. Id.
61. Instruction to item 7, supra note 55. As the Commission explained in the release
adopting item 7:
While the proposal would have required the subject company to describe negotiations in response to a tender offer which related to or would result in the specified
events, new Item 7(a) requires a statement as to whether negotiations are being undertaken or are underway with respect to such events without requiring detailed disclosure. An instruction has also been added to Item 7(a) which clarifies the extent of
the disclosure required with respect to negotiations. The instruction provides that, if
an agreement in principle has not been reached, the possible terms of any transaction
or the parties thereto need not be disclosed if in the opinion of the Board of Directors
of the subject company such disclosure would jeopardize continuation of such negotiations. In such event, disclosure that negotiations are being undertaken or are underway and are in the preliminary stages will be sufficient. Thus, security holders will be
apprised that such negotiations are being held without the subject company's having
to furnish disclosure discouraging further negotiations .... It should be noted that
Item 7 is not exclusive. Thus, in a particular case, requirements such as those imposed by Section 14(e) of the Act may dictate the disclosure comprehended by either
paragraphs (a) or (b) of Item 7 at an earlier time or in greater detail than contemplated by the item.
Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, supra note 59, at 82,594-95.
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,,62

ing undertaken or are underway and are in the preliminary stages.
Until recently, Item 7 represented a relatively dormant provision, generating little case law. The Commission had brought only a few injunctive enforcement proceedings under the provision, none of which contained any
significant discussion of Item 7.63 A pair of private actions were slightly
more illuminating. In Gulf Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 64 Gulf Oil Company vigorously resisted efforts by Mesa Petroleum Company to acquire the
company. Following a tender offer by Mesa, Gulf had filed a Schedule 14D9 recommending that its shareholders reject the offer and disclosing that its
legal and financial advisors had been authorized to "explore all alternaThe Schedule did not reveal that Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO)
tives.
had contacted Gulf over a possible business combination in the inevitable
litigation arising from the attempted acquisition. Mesa contended that Gulf
violated Item 7 by omitting the contacts with ARCO from the Schedule.
The district court acknowledged that contacts between the two companies
had occurred. In the period immediately preceding Mesa's offer, ARCO had
expressed interest in a possible merger with Gulf. Gulf initially informed
ARCO that it had no interest in the proposal. Subsequently, however, Gulf
became more amenable to the proposition but indicated that any merger
would require detailed discussions. No such discussions or negotiations,
however, had ever taken place. The district court concluded that, from the
time of Mesa's offer through Gulf's filing of the Schedule 14D-9, nothing
occurred that "could accurately be described as negotiation.",66 Moreover,
even if negotiations could be said to have occurred, the discussions commenced prior to the Mesa offer and were not "in response" to the tender
62. Instruction to item 7, supra note 55.
63. See SEC v. Grumman Corp., Civ. Act. No. 81-3685, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. June 18,
1984) (concluding that failure to disclose merger negotiations violates rule 14d-9 notwithstanding defendant's protestations that the "discussions... were preliminary and inconclusive and
not reportable under Schedule 14D-9."); In re Heights Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No.
20,354, 29 SEC Docket 106 (Nov. 7, 1983). In Heights, the Commission made an oblique
reference to the failure of Heights to disclose, in a Schedule 14D-9, negotiations with a third
party for a right of first refusal to the exercise of warrants for its stock. The release did not
state that the nondisclosure actually violated the requirements in item 7, but simply noted that
"[n]egotiations... of this kind are required to be disclosed in filings on schedule 14D-9 ... if
entered into in response to a tender offer." Id. at 107 n. 1. Based upon the facts set forth in the
release, an argument could be made that disclosure was not required. Discussion over the
right of first refusal commenced in the fall of 1982, months before the January 1983 tender
offer. Id. Thus, while negotiations were ongoing during the pendency of the tender offer, they
do not appear to have been commenced "in response to" the offer and would, therefore, not
seem to be subject to disclosure in item 7. See infra note 67.
64. 582 F. Supp. 1110 (D. Del. 1984).
65. Id. at 1115.
66. Id. at 1119.
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offer.67

68
The breadth of Item 7 again arose in Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co.
Following an unfriendly tender offer by Mobile Corporation, Marathon Oil
Company filed a Schedule 14D-9 recommending that shareholders oppose
the offer. The Schedule also disclosed that the board had considered "exploring and investigating" a number of possible responses to the tender offer,
including "a business combination between [Marathon] and another company."' 69 At the time Marathon filed the Schedule 14D-9, however, the company had done more than just consider the possiblity of a business
combination. It had contacted thirty to thirty-five companies in an effort to
locate a "white knight" and had in fact commenced negotiations with U.S.
Steel. Approximately one week after Marathon filed the Schedule, U.S. Steel
announced an agreement to acquire Marathon.7 °
Plaintiffs, representing the class of Marathon shareholders that sold shares
after the filing of the Schedule 14D-9 but before announcement of the agreement to merge, brought suit alleging that Marathon had violated the antifraud provisions by not disclosing the negotiations with U.S. Steel. In
determining the level of disclosure required under the antifraud provisions,
the Sixth Circuit looked to the requirements of Item 7. Relying in part upon
what it perceived to be Commission policy, the court held that Marathon's
disclosure in Item 7 of the Schedule 14D-9, of the possibility of a merger or
other business combination was adequate for purposes of the antifraud pro-

67. Id. Item 7 only requires the disclosure of negotiations that occurred "in response to"
a tender offer. Neither the rule nor the proposing and adopting releases define the phrase. As
a result, a number of interpretive issues may arise. First, an argument can be made that nego-

tiations will be "in response to" a tender offer only if commenced after an offer has actually
been made. Thus, negotiations commenced in anticipation of an offer would not be subject to

disclosure. Alternatively, the phrase "in response to" may require disclosure of any negotiations commenced after the target becomes aware that a tender offer will be made, even though
no offer has actually gone forward. Thus, for example, once a bidder communicates to the
target its intent to make an offer by a certain date, any negotiations commenced thereafter

would be "in response to" an offer and subject to disclosure.
Requiring the disclosure of negotiations commenced before a tender offer actually occurs
may create some uncertainty. It will require analysis of whether the target knew or should

have known that an offer was about to occur. Conceivably, negotiations commenced after a
target was placed on notice of the bidder's intent to acquire control by the bidder's public

statements would be treated as "in response to" a tender offer for purposes of item 7. A target
could, therefore, have a duty to disclose negotiations anytime it becomes aware that the bidder

has taken a "substantial step" towards a tender offer. See rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3
(prohibiting trading by persons aware that the bidder has taken a "substantial step" toward a
tender offer).
68. 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).

69. Id. at 236.
70. Id. at 237.
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visions. 7 As the Sixth Circuit concluded:
The SEC and the courts have enunciated a firm rule regarding a
tender offer target's duty to disclose ongoing negotiations: so long
as merger or acquisition discussions are preliminary, general disclosure of the fact that such alternatives are being considered will
suffice to adequately inform shareholders; a duty to disclose the
possible terms of any transaction... arises only after an agreement
in principle, regarding such fundamental terms as price and structure, has been reached.72
Because the disclosure was considered sufficient for purposes of Item 7, it
was considered sufficient for purposes of the antifraud provisions.
The court's reasoning, however, suffers from a number of weaknesses.
First, the court's conclusion does violence to the plain language of Item 7,
which explicitly requires the affirmative disclosure of negotiations commenced in response to a tender offer. The U.S. Steel/Marathon negotiations
were "in response" to an offer; Mobil's bid apparently acted as the direct
catalyst for the negotiations. Given the affirmative disclosure obligations, a
laundry list of possible alternatives or actions was simply inadequate.
Second, in interpreting the provision, the court mischaracterized the Commission's position. The Commission had never indicated that a list of alternatives would suffice when actual negotiations were taking place. Indeed,
while purporting to provide the Commission's views, the court cited no
Commission pronouncements. The Starkman court never cited or examined
the proposing and adopting releases for Item 7. Rather, it cited only three
inapposite cases decided after the adoption of Item 7. These cases addressed
the materiality of negotiations under the antifraud provisions, not the disclosure requirements of Item 7.73 The court's failure to examine the proposing
and adopting releases is particularly striking since the meaning of Item 7 is
first and foremost a question of statutory construction. Had the court undertaken such an examination, it would have been clear that Marathon had a
duty to disclose the existence of the negotiations and that a laundry list of
potential alternative courses of action was insufficient.
The instructions to Item 7 did allow Marathon some discretion to withhold both U.S. Steel's identity and the terms under discussion. However,
omission of these facts was predicated upon a finding by the target's board of
71. Id. at 243.
72. Id.
73. The court cited Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983);
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982). In all of these cases the courts determined
the materiality of negotiations for purposes of the antifraud provisions.
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directors that such disclosure would jeopardize continuation of the negotiations. Nothing in the opinion suggests either that the board made such a
finding or that disclosure would have caused the requisite harm. Indeed, an
argument could be made that disclosure would have benefited shareholders.74 Even had such findings been made, however, Item 7 mandated disclosure that negotiations were taking place, something Marathon failed to do. 7 ,
Following the Starkman decision, the Commission issued an order in an
administrative proceeding implicitly rejecting the Sixth Circuit's reasoning. 76 The proceeding arose out of the fiercely fought takeover contest between Revlon and Pantry Pride. In August 1985, Pantry Pride made an
any-and-all tender offer for Revlon, offering $47.50 per share of common
stock. Revlon's management filed a Schedule 14D-9 opposing the offer. In
response to Item 7 of the Schedule, the company stated that it "may undertake negotiations" but that currently "no negotiations have been undertaken
77
with third parties."

In September, following an announcement that Revlon intended to repurchase ten million shares, Pantry Pride withdrew its initial offer and announced a new offer at $42 per share, contingent upon ninety percent of the
outstanding shares being tendered. On September 24, Revlon's management
issued a second Schedule 14D-9, again opposing the offer. In response to
Item 7, the Schedule 14D-9 for a second time revealed that Revlon "may
undertake negotiations., 78 Revlon, however, omitted the statement contained in the earlier filing that no negotiations were currently taking place.
74. Additional disclosure may have enticed other white knights to enter the fray. Addi-

tional competition among bidders for a target inevitably inures to the benefit of shareholders.
See infra note 217.
75. In general, the Commission has explicitly required the disclosure of negotiations in
filings associated with a change of control. Yet, as noted, issuers and affiliates making an

issuer tender offer and companies filing a merger proxy are not expressly required to disclose
ongoing negotiations. See supra note 50. Nor is such disclosure expressly mandated in a

Schedule 13D. Item 4 of Schedule 13D requires disclosure of the purpose of acquisition of the
shares and any plan or proposal concerning the target. Item 6 mandates disclosure of "any

contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships." Neither, however, expressly mention negotiations. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1986). The existence of ongoing negotiations
relating to the target would seem to be highly relevant both to shareholders and to the market

in assessing the significance of a Schedule 13D filing.
76. In re Revlon, Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(June 16, 1986).

84,006

77. Id. at 88,143. As with many fiercely contested takeover battles, the Pantry Pride/
Revlon struggle spawned a substantial amount of litigation, including proceedings in federal

court, see Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 804 (D. Del. 1985); state court, see
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 505
A.2d 454 (Del. 1985); and before the Federal Reserve Board, see Final Interpretive Rule of
Regulation 6, 51 Fed. Reg. 1771, 1772 (Fed. Reserve 1986).
78. Revlon, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 88,144.
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Eight days later, on October 2, Revlon disclosed in a press release that it was
considering a number of alternatives to the Pantry Pride offer, including a
leveraged buy-out. The following day, Revlon amended the Schedule 14D-9
to reveal a definitive merger agreement with Forstmann Little & Company, a
firm specializing in leveraged buy-outs, and a sale of its domestic beauty
group to Adler & Shaykin. Undaunted by the announcement, Pantry Pride
increased its offering price and, after a critical court victory, ultimately succeeded in acquiring control of Revlon. 79
The Commission brought an administrative action against Revlon contending that Revlon had failed promptly to amend the Schedule 14D-9 once
negotiations with Forstmann Little and Adler & Shaykin had commenced.
The Commission found that negotiations among Revlon, Adler & Shaykin,
and Forstmann Little had begun "as of the time period from the evening of
September 26 to September 29. ' ° As the Commission concluded, by September 26,
the parties had established contact, had begun and concluded their
initial reviews of confidential financial information, had retained
counsel to discuss between and among themselves the structure
and timing of the acquisitions, and had discussed the percentage of
equity to be offered [Revlon's CEO] and the Revlon management
group. Shaykin presented an offer to Revlon, Lazard and Forstmann Little on September 29 which, although rejected, became the
basis upon which the parties negotiated, including discussions that
night and the next day among counsel for the parties over the
structure of the Shaykin proposal and the Forstmann Little
LBO."'
Because the commencement of negotiations constituted a material change in
circumstances, Revlon was required to promptly amend the Schedule 14D79. Pantry Pride succeeded after the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a decision by the
chancery court invalidating certain lock-up options issued by Revlon to Fortsmann Little. See
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

92,357 (Del. S. Ct. Nov. 1, 1985). In part, Pantry Pride's efforts to acquire Revlon acted as a
catalyst for the Federal Reserve Board's decision to issue an interpretative ruling concerning
the use of high yield debt instruments, more commonly called "junk bonds," to finance a
tender offer. Pantry Pride had originally intended to fund the acquisition of Revlon through a
combination of junk bonds and bank loans. Revlon filed a petition with the Federal Reserve

Board asserting that Pantry Pride's financing package did not conform with the margin requirements contained in Regulation 6, 12 C.F.R. § 207 (1986). The Federal Reserve Board
never acted on the petition, see 51 Fed. Reg. 1771 (1986), but did issue an interpretation of the
margin requirements, concluding that "debt securities, issued by [a shell corporation] to finance the acquisition of [the] margin stock of a target company, are indirectly secured by [the]
margin stock" for purposes of the restrictions on lending in the margin regulation. Id.

80. Revlon, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 88,146-47.
81.

Id. at 88,147.
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Although Revlon had amended the Schedule on October 3, the Commission concluded that, under the particular facts of the case, i.e., a fast
moving, fiercely contested tender offer in a highly sensitized market, the
amendment was not prompt. Instead, "Revlon should have disseminated
the information [about the negotiations] at least before the market opened on
September 30 and simultaneously amended its Schedule 14D-9 .. .
While the reasoning in Revlon is somewhat terse, two important conclusions can be gleaned from the Commission's opinion. First, in contrast to
the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Starkman, the Commission implicitly concluded that ongoing negotiations had to be expressly disclosed in Item 7; a
laundry list of possible actions would not suffice.8 4 Thus, consistent with the
antifraud provisions, negotiations could become subject to disclosure in the
Schedule before an agreement in principle is reached.
Second, the Commission clarified the definition of "prompt" for purposes
of amending the Schedule. The Revlon release emphasized that, in filing an
amendment, consideration had to be given to "the market's sensitivity to the
particular change of fact triggering the obligation to amend, and the effect
on the market of the filing person's previous disclosures." 5 Given the fierceness of the contest for control and the sensitivity of the market, an amendment was required as soon as practicable. In Revlon's case, "as soon as
practicable" meant three days after negotiations commenced and less than a
day after one of the parties made an offer.
Although adding teeth to the disclosure requirements in Item 7, portions
of the Commission's opinion seem inconsistent with the instructions to the
Schedule. In connection with Pantry Pride's first and second offers, Revlon's board determined that, in connection with negotiations with other prospective bidders, disclosure of either the terms under discussion or the
identity of the other parties would jeopardize continuation of the negotiations. As a result, in both the first and second Schedule 14D-9, Revlon indicated that even if negotiations commenced, the terms and identities would
9.82

82. See rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1986) (requiring "prompt" amendment of
schedule in event of material change).
83. Revlon, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 88,147.
84. Id. at 88,146-47. The Commission never referred to the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Starkman. By not expressly disagreeing with the decision, even though the reasoning in RevIon is clearly at odds with Starkman, the Commission avoided the deluge of criticism that
followed In re Carnation, Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801 (Jul. 8, 1985). In Carnation, the Commission disagreed with
the Third Circuit decision in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985). See infra notes 246-47.
85. Revlon, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 88,146 (quoting In re Cooper Laboratories Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 22,171, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,788, at 87,526 (June 26, 1985)).
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86
not be disclosed until an agreement in principle had been reached.
While the instructions to the Schedule permit companies to withhold information about terms and identity upon a determination by the board that
disclosure will jeopardize the negotiations, the determination by the Revlon
board was made in the abstract. At the time of its determination, no negotiations were underway.8 7 This interpretation allows a company's board to
make a generic determination that disclosure of terms and identities before
negotiations commence will jeopardize their continuation. Avoiding disclosure in this way appears inconsistent with the instruction to Item 7. As
noted in the release adopting the Schedule, Item 7(a) and the instruction
represented an attempt to balance the shareholders' need for information
against the subject company's continued need for secrecy. 8 Determinations
that negotiations will be jeopardized by disclosure before negotiations commence assumes that disclosure will always be harmful. Item 7, however,
appears to contemplate circumstances in which such disclosure will not be
harmful. Thus, the determination of harm normally would need to be made
on a case-by-case basis, once negotiations have commenced or at least appear
imminent. Absent extenuating circumstances then, Item 7 does not appear
to permit the type of generic finding of harm made by the Revlon board
prior to the commencement of negotiations. Nevertheless, the order in Revlon seems to have accepted the board's determination of possible harm in the
abstract.8 9

C. Commission Requirements.: Other Material Information
In addition to specific line item disclosure requirements, Commission
rules contain a catch-all provision that requires the inclusion in filings of any
additional information "necessary to make the required statements, in light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading." 9° Thus,
86. Revlon, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 88,143-44.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
89. As the Commission concluded:
Compliance by Revlon with Rule 14d-9(b) required the filing of an amendment and
the public dissemination of information disclosing the fact that negotiations were
underway and were in preliminary stages (but not the terms of the possible transactions or the parties thereto) as soon as practicable after negotiations had commenced.
Revlon, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 88,147 (emphasis added).
90. 17 C.F.R. § 230.408; 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1985); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1985)
(prohibiting solicitations with proxy material that omit "any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in
any earlier communications ... which has become false or misleading."). The Commission
has defined "material" under the 1933 and 1934 Acts as information "to which there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance." 17 C.F.R.
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even where no line item specifically requires disclosure, Commission filings
may still, under some circumstances, need to include a discussion of ongoing
negotiations if a filing would otherwise be misleading absent disclosure.
For example, a merger proxy showing assets at book value may be considered misleading if negotiations concerning the sale of assets show that they
have appreciated substantially. In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,9 General Outdoor Advertising Company had entered into negotiations for the
sale of several plants and had received a number of "firm offers" at prices
substantially more than book value. A merger proxy filed by General Outdoor disclosed the book value of the assets but omitted information relating
to their appreciated value. Noting that the securities laws imposed no duty
to disclose asset appraisals, the Second Circuit acknowledged that negotiations and " 'firm offers' [to acquire plants] may well stand differently." 9 2
Disclosure of the firm offers would have indicated to shareholders that the
book value of the plants was a substantial underestimation of their true fair
market value.

93

Similarly, in Friedlanderv. Barnes,94 Dorchester Gas Corporation's management, although considering a possible leveraged buy-out,9 5 issued a proxy
statement disclaiming "knowledge at the present time of any specific effort to
accumulate the Company's securities or to obtain control of the company.",9 6 Ten days later, the company issued a press release acknowledging
that a private company was considering the acquisition of Dorchester
through a leveraged buy-out and that discussions had taken place with
Dorchester's management over possible participation in the acquisition.9 7
Plaintiffs, persons who had sold Dorchester's stock after issuance of the
proxy statement, filed suit alleging that the proxy statement and the subse§ 230.405 (1985); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1985). This definition was derived from the Supreme
Court's decision in TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). See infra note 100 and

accompanying text.
91. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). See also United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co.
v. Clevite Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,691 (N.D. Ohio
June 17, 1968) (failure to disclose second merger offer violated rule 14a-9).

92. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1294. The court discussed only the omission of "firm offers."
Although discussions occurred that did not rise to the level of firm offers, see id. at 1294 n. 14,
the court apparently did not treat them as subject to disclosure.
93. Although clearly troubled by the omission, the court did not actually hold that the

omitted information was material. Instead, it found the proxy misleading for failing to disclose
the company's plan to aggressively sell the General Outdoor plants following the merger. Id.
at 1295.
94. 622 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see Friedlander v. Barnes, 104 F.R.p. 417
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
95. Friedlander,622 F. Supp. at 631-32.

96. Id. at 631.
97. Id.
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quent release were misleading. In analyzing the issue on a motion to dismiss, the district court appeared to agree that the proxy statement may have
been misleading. The district court held that the press release, acknowledging the possibility of a leveraged buy-out, did not necessarily cure the misstatements in the proxy. The court noted that the press release failed to
disclose the extent of management's participation in, or sponsorship of, the
leveraged buy-out. Because this failure may have amounted to a material
omission, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.9"
In summary, under the federal securities laws, no obligation exists to provide the public with information concerning ongoing negotiations absent a
duty to disclose. Moreover, the instances where a duty arises are limited.
Through foresight and care, therefore, a company can often prevent occurrence of the particular circumstances that would trigger a duty to disclose.
II.

MATERIALITY

The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws only require disclosure of material information.99 Thus, even where a duty to disclose exists,
liability for nondisclosure will not exist if the ongoing negotiations were immaterial. Determining the materiality of nonspeculative information involves a relatively straightforward analysis. Information is material if there
is a "substantial likelihood" that "a reasonable shareholder would consider
it important" in making an investment decision. " The information need
98. Id. at 631-33. Similarly, in SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), the failure to disclose negotiations rendered a proxy statement misleading. Parklane
had leased property from the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). Desiring to regain use of the
property, the FRB offered Parklane $500,000 to terminate the lease, an offer later increased to

$800,000. Parklane counter-offered for $1.2 million, but the offer expired without any action
by the FRB. Id. at 482-83. Some months later, Parklane issued a proxy statement in connection with a "going private" transaction, id. at 481, stating that "there are no negotiations at
present" with respect to the FRB lease. Id. at 482. Two weeks after the proxy was issued and
ten days before the shareholders meeting, Parklane and an agent for the FRB met. The agent
indicated that he would recommend to the FRB that it accept Parklane's $1.2 million offer.
Id. at 483. The court agreed that the single meeting constituted material negotiations and that

Parklane had an obligation to amend the proxy and disclose the negotiations. Id. at 485-86.
99. The antifraud provisions speak only to material information. Whether the line item
disclosure requirements are always material is unresolved. See supra note 34.

100. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The lower court in TSC
Indus. had defined materiality to include "all facts which a reasonable stockholder might consider important." Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., 512 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 1975). Other
courts had defined the term to include all facts that a reasonable investor would consider in
making an investment decision. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 60304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d
1281, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court ultimately declined to adopt either defini-
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only be important to an investor; it is unnecessary to determine how
important.
Determining the materiality of speculative information such as ongoing
negotiations, however, requires a more subtle analysis. The risk that an
agreement will never be reached or a transaction never consummated increases the difficulty of the analysis. As an initial matter, the resulting agreement must be material. If the resulting agreement is immaterial, the
negotiations likewise will be immaterial, regardless of how advanced. 0 '
Whether an agreement is material may depend in part upon one's vantage
point. A merger agreement, for example, will inevitably be material to the
shareholders of a target company because it both spells the demise of the
target and may involve the payment of a substantial premium. 1°2 At the
tion, opting instead for a standard that fell in between the two formulations. See TSC Indus.,
426 U.S. at 448-49.
Although TSC Indus. involved proxies, courts have applied the same test for determining
materiality in cases interpreting Exchange Act § 10(b). See, e.g., Harkavy v. Apparel Indus.,
571 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Hassig v. Pearson, 565 F.2d 644, 649-50 (10th Cir. 1977);
Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978);
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 562 F.2d 1040,
1048-49 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d
236, 248 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Wheat v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874, 876
(5th Cir. 1976). The same standard has also been applied in cases involving § 14(e) of the
Exchange Act. See MacFadden Holdings, Inc. v. J.B. Acquisition Corp., 802 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.

1986).
101. 5A A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5, § 61.04[c][ii], at 3219 (2d ed. 5th rev. 1985) ("Negotiations cannot be material, regardless of the stage to which
they have progressed, unless the related transaction would be material if consummated."). For
example, in Grigsby v. CMI Corp., 765 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1985), the defendant company,
while negotiating a possible merger, purchased all of the outstanding shares of its subsidiary.
Plaintiffs, shareholders of the subsidiary, alleged that the failure to disclose the merger negotiations violated the antifraud provisions. The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded that the
merger discussions at issue were immaterial since the resulting merger agreement was also
immaterial. In finding the merger agreement immaterial, the court reasoned that there was no
reason to expect a merger agreement with the parent to affect the value of the subsidiary,
stating that "there is no blanket rule that the acquisition of a parent makes a subsidiary more
valuable." Id. at 1374.
102. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. The materiality of an agreement to target
shareholders in the change of control context can be illustrated by the size of the premium
typically offered by bidders. A study by the Office of the Chief Economist at the Commission
of the 148 successful tender offers occurring from 1981 through 1983 revealed that target
shareholders received an average premium of 63.4% above the pretakeover market price in
any-or-all offers, 55.1% in two-tiered offers, and 31.3% in partial tender offers. See Two-Tier
Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs, Exchange Act Release No.
21,079 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,637, at 86,916 (June 21, 1984).
Others have placed the premium between 49% and 73%. See Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers
and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345 (1980); Jarell & Bradley, The Economic
Effects of Federal and State Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. LAW & ECON. 371, 373
(1980); see also Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 10
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same time, the agreement may not be material to the shareholders of the
bidder, particularly if the bidder has a practice of acquiring companies and
the target is relatively small."13 As a result, omission of such an agreement
(1983) ("The thirteen studies [discussed in the article] indicate that targets of successful takeover attempts release substantial and statistically significant increases in their stock prices.").
103. While target shareholders typically receive a substantial premium for their shares, see
supra note 102, the advantage of a takeover to the shareholders of the bidder is less apparent.
One study determined that the share prices of the bidder company increase an average of only
three to four percent following the announcement of a tender offer. See Advisory Committee
on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations, at 7 n.6 (July 8, 1983). Other researchers have
been even less ebullient about the return to shareholders of the bidding company, concluding
that the "returns to successful bidding firms in mergers are zero." Jensen & Ruback, supra
note 102, at 22 (emphasis in original) (although noting a "small positive abnormal return" for
successful bidding firms in tender offers); see also Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth, 8 J. OF FIN. EcON. 105 (1980); Malatesta, The Wealth Effect
of Merger Activity and the Objective Functionsof the Merging Firms, 11 J. OF FIN. EcON. 155
(1983).
The lack of a premium for shareholders of the bidder may be explained by a number of
factors. Acquisition of the target may generate no immediate gain to the bidder, particularly
where competitive bidding drives up the price of the target. In addition, the absence of an
increase in share price may sometimes be related, at least in part, to the relative size of the
target and bidder. Bidders in the United States are typically much larger than the target.
Gain to the bidder, if any, may be slight when measured as a percentage of the bidder's total
market value. See Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins, Jr., The Gains to Bidding Firmsfrom Merger,
S1IJ. FIN. ECON. 121, 138 (1983) ("Regression analysis indicates that the relationship between
the bidding firm's cumulative excess return and the relative size of the target firm's equity is
positive and statistically significant.").
A recent and provocative study of acquisitions in Canada supports the proposition that the
premium on the bidder's shares is related to the bidder's market value in relation to that of the
target. See Eckbo, Mergersand the Marketfor CorporateControl: The CanadianEvidence, 19
CANADIAN J. OF ECON. 236 (May 1986). The study of more than 1900 Canadian acquisitions
noted that, unlike firms in the United States, "Canadian bidder and target firms are frequently
of approximately the same asset size." Id. at 238. The study revealed that "target and bidder
firms listed on the [Toronto Stock Exchange] on average earn large and significant gains from
takeover activity." Id. at 258.
If the relative size of the target is an important factor in determining whether the acquisition
will affect share prices of the bidder, smaller bidders acquiring larger targets might be expected
to show large gains in their share prices. The successful acquisition by Pantry Pride of the
substantially larger Revlon supports this hypothesis. Through early August, Pantry Pride
closed at prices between $7 and $7.50. On August 14, the Wall Street Journal reported rumors
of an impending offer by Pantry Pride for Revlon. The day the article appeared, Pantry
Pride's share prices closed at $8, up five-eighths, an increase of more than 8%. Over the next
three months, as Revlon resisted the attempted acquisition, Pantry Pride's closing share prices
fluctuated between $5.87 and $7.62. In early November, however, Pantry Pride successfully
overcame Revlon's resistance after the Delaware courts invalidated lock-up options issued by
Revlon. At the end of November, Pantry Pride closed at $9. From the day before the article
in the Wall Street Journal appeared announcing the impending offer through the end of November, Pantry Pride's share prices increased approximately 22%. See generally supra notes
76-86 and accompanying text.
Statistics demonstrating little movement in the price of a bidder's shares as a result of an
acquisition do not, of course, support the proposition that a merger or tender offer is never
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from a press release or filing may be a material misstatement for the target
but not for the bidder.
Furthermore, the term "negotiation" itself can cause confusion."° Generally, contacts not reaching the level of negotiations are treated as immaterial. Negotiations, however, often defy easy catagorization and may take on
a myriad of forms. Particularly in the change of control context, preliminary or exploratory contacts often precede actual negotiations. Bidders may
make inquiries to determine whether a prospective target is interested in negotiating an agreement; a target may make available certain material, nonpublic information such as unreleased earnings or income forecasts to assist
a number of prospective bidders in determining whether to go forward with
the acquisition. In most circumstances, these types of preliminary contacts
will not be treated as negotiations."5 The point at which these preliminary
contacts become negotiations is, however, unclear. Nevertheless, that task
often confronts the courts requiring them, as an initial step, to determine
whether contacts rise to the level of negotiations.
Once both sides have indicated some interest in a possible agreement and
material to the bidder. Obviously, in individual cases, a bidder's share prices may undergo a
substantial increase (or decrease) as a result of an acquisition. Moreover, an acquisition may
be material even if little or no price movement occurs in the period immediately surrounding
the announcement. What these statistics demonstrate, however, is the heightened difficulty in
applying the Texas Gulf Sulphur balancing test to merger negotiations, see infra note 107 and
accompanying text, when it is the bidder that has the duty to disclose. Most cases involving
the materiality of merger negotiations involve misstatements or omissions by the target or
insiders of the target. In those cases, it is quite clear that the resulting agreement not only will
be material but that it is so important to the target that negotiations become material at a very
early stage. Contrast this with the situation confronted by the bidder. First, the final merger
agreement or tender offer may not be material. If not, the negotiations preceding the acquisition likewise will not be material no matter how far advanced. See supra note 101; but see
Levinson v. Basic, 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 2516 (U.S. Feb. 23,
1987) (No. 86-279). This is true even though the negotiations will be material to the target. If,
on the other hand, the acquisition is material to the bidder, the relative importance of the
acquisition will often be much smaller to a bidder than a target. Unlike a target that goes out
of existence as a result of the acquisition, the bidder obtains a subsidiary or division that may
or may not represent a significant portion of its assets or revenues. Since the stage at which
negotiations cross the materiality threshold depends upon the relative importance of the acquisition, negotiations often must be more advanced for bidders than for targets before becoming
material. See infra notes 106-07.
104. Relying on Webster's Dictionary, one court defined negotiations as "'a conferring,
discussing, or bargaining to reach an agreement .... ' " SEC v. Parklane Hosiery, 422 F.
Supp. 477, 483 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DicTIONARY (unabridged 2d ed. 1970), aff'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977)). Lest one look
askance at the court's reliance on a dictionary to define such an important term, see Schreiber
v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (1985) (majority relying in part on Webster's
Dictionary to define "manipulation" in the Williams Act).
105. See infra notes 166, 168.
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discussions proceed past the exploratory stage, the contacts generally have
risen to the level of negotiations. Moreover, negotiations need not be evidenced by face-to-face bargaining sessions between high level officials of the
target and bidder. Intermediaries are often used in the negotiation process.
For example, an investment banker or other intermediary acting on behalf of
the bidder may make the initial contact with a prospective target company.
A target interested in a merger or friendly takeover may provide the investment banker with information necessary to assess the efficacy of the acquisition, including, in some cases, nonpublic information. In some cases, followup meetings between the target and the intermediary may occur that involve
discussions of important matters such as price and post-acquisition structure. Conceivably, therefore, the parameters of an agreement, if not the
agreement itself, can be negotiated without officials of the bidder and target
ever meeting face-to-face. While preliminary contacts by an intermediary
will normally not be considered negotiations, a bidder or target that uses an
intermediary to advance the negotiating process may be treated as engaging
in negotiations. The critical element is a mutual expression of interest in an
agreement and that can be done either through an intermediary or

directly. 06
Even if the resulting agreement will be material and the contacts can be
characterized as negotiations, the analysis is not complete. An inherently
speculative concept, the materiality of ongoing negotiations requires a balancing of the magnitude of the final agreement against the probability an
agreement will result.'" 7 Under this balancing test, the more rudimentary
106. See Parklane Hosiery, 422 F. Supp. at 483 (negotiations between lessee and agent for
lessor held material where lessor and lessee never met directly). As the Commission has noted:
"[T]he term 'negotiations' includes not only final price bargaining, but also applies to substantive discussions between the parties or their legal and financial advisors concerning a possible
transaction." In re Revlon, Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
84,006, at 88,146 (June 16, 1986).
107. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Corp., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); see infra text accompanying notes 125-60.
The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the materiality of speculative informa-

tion, although it recently considered whether to grant certiorari in a case addressing the issue.
See Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985) (materiality of asset appraisals), cert. de-

nied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986). At the request of the Court, the Solicitor General of the United
States filed a brief expressing his view on the petition for certiorari. Because the case turned in
large part on Commission regulations relating to the disclosure of oil and gas assets, and because cases were pending in other circuits that arguably presented "broader, yet more sharply
focused, questions concerning the obligation to disclose soft information," the Solicitor General recommended "that the Court deny certiorari here and await a case of more general significance in which to consider such questions." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
9, Radol v. Thomas, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986) (No. 85-1030).
Notwithstanding any specific pronouncements by the Supreme Court, the test in TSC Indus.

for determining materiality should be applicable to both speculative and nonspeculative infor-
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the negotiations, i.e., the earlier their stage, the more important the final
agreement must be before the negotiations will be considered material.
Although easily stated, the balancing test can be extraordinarily difficult
to apply, at least with any certainty. Both "magnitude" and "probability"
are elusive terms. Assessing magnitude requires some determination of the
degree of importance of the resulting agreement, an imprecise task at best.
Simply determining that the agreement would influence the investment decision of reasonable shareholders is not enough. Would investors consider the
resulting agreement to be marginally, moderately or highly important? Only
after the importance of the agreement has been assessed can it be balanced
against the probability an agreement will occur.
Probability essentially requires examination of the stage of the negotiations to determine whether an agreement is likely. Stated another way, the
issue turns upon the remoteness of a final agreement. '1 8 Here again, difficult
issues arise. Actually determining the likelihood of a final agreement would
require a subjective inquiry into the minds of the negotiators. Unable to do
this, courts must resort to objective indicia of an impending agreement.
Thus, they focus on such factors as direct contacts between high level management of the parties, discussions of important terms, particularly price, the
hiring of a third party such as an investment banker to provide assistance in
assessing the viability of an acquisition, and efforts by one of the parties to
acquire the necessary financing for an acquisition. Nonetheless, while objective factors provide some indicia of probability, the presence of particular
factors and their relative importance vary from case-to-case. 10 9
An effect of the balancing test is uncertainty. Given its fluid and factintensive nature, court decisions provide practitioners with little guidance or
comfort. The relevance of a particular holding may be limited because subsequent cases often involve different fact patterns. As will be explored, the
uncertainty of the test has encouraged a number of courts to supplant this
mation. That is, speculative information that would not influence the investment decision of a
reasonable shareholder will not be material. Because its relative worth is more difficult to
judge, however, the materiality of speculative information requires a more complex analysis
that takes account of the information's inherent uncertainty. The Texas Gulf Sulphur balancing test, therefore, does not represent an alternative formulation to TSC Indus., but instead
contains the analysis necessary to apply the TSC Indus. standard to speculative information.
108. See Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (lst Cir. 1966).
109. One court has described materiality as an "elusive concept," noting that "[w]hether or
not any particular fact is material is a determination which clearly cannot be made in a vacuum. Each individual case must be viewed as a discrete set of circumstances and judged on its
own unique facts." SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
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case-by-case, fact-intensive analysis with a bright-line test; a test that can
present problems even more troublesome than vagaries of the balancing test.
A.

Early Case Law

The materiality of ongoing negotiations has troubled the courts and Commission for over forty years. Ward La France Truck Corp., 110 the first rule
lOb-5 violation investigated by the Commission, involved persons trading
while in possession of information regarding a prospective takeover. The
issue also arose in one of the first private cases brought under the rule."'
These early opinions, however, contained little insightful discussion.
The first cases affording a more plenary treatment of the materiality of
ongoing negotiations arose in the early and mid-1960's. List v. Fashion Park,
Inc. 112 and Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 3 illustrate the early judicial approach to
the issue. In List, a union representative told the board of directors of Fashion Park, a financially troubled company, that an unidentified party was interested in buying the company." 4 Following the union official's discussion
with the board, the directors adopted a resolution authorizing corporate officials to "seek to negotiate a sale or a merger" of Fashion Park with the
unidentified party." 5 Ten days after the board meeting, the union official
revealed the identity of the interested company and, shortly thereafter, negotiations were commenced between the two companies. Approximately one
month after adoption of the board resolution, the companies reached a preliminary agreement to merge." 16
Plaintiff, a former shareholder of Fashion Park, sold 5,100 shares in the
company to a director before any public announcement had been made
about the merger. He filed suit alleging that the director had violated the
antifraud provisions by failing to disclose that the board had resolved to
merge or sell the company. The district court dismissed the suit and plaintiff
appealed. The Second Circuit noted that the salient issue was whether the
board resolution and the subsequent disclosure of the identity of the poten110. 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (insiders aware that there was "considerable probability a liquidation of the company would occur could not trade). The Commission articulated its views on
the case in a report published under Exchange Act § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982). See infra
note 240.
1ll. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457, 458 (D. Del. 1947).
112. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). See Current DevelopmentsCorporations-Security Exchange Act-Duty to Disclose Under Rule lob-5, 37 U. COLO. L.
REv. 508 (1965) (analysis of List).
113. 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966).
114. List, 340 F.2d at 460.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 462.

1986]

Corporate Secrecy

tial acquiror were "material facts that should have been disclosed to plaintiff." 17 Declining to find them material, the court reasoned that, at the time
plaintiff had sold his shares, the prospect of a merger was "too remote to
18
have influenced the conduct of a reasonable investor."'
That give and take negotiations had not occurred at the time plaintiff sold
his shares was crucial to the court's reasoning. At the time the board had
authorized the negotiations, it had received little more than an expression of
interest, an inquiry, from an unknown acquiror. Even after learning the
identity, corporate officials had no opportunity to assess the acquiror's interest in a merger or to determine whether a merger was practical or otherwise
viable. Essentially, therefore, all the board had was an unsolicited expression of interest made indirectly through a union official. The Second Circuit
had no difficulty concluding that, given the uncertain nature of any possible
merger agreement and the lack of any actual bargaining, the board's resolution and the identity of the prospective purchaser was immaterial.
The situation in Rogen v. Ilikon Corp.,1 9 however, was markedly different. Defendant, Ilikon Corporation, had been trying to develop a method of
fabricating aluminum cans. Plaintiff, the largest shareholder in, and an officer of, Ilikon, played an instrumental role in the early development of the
aluminum can process. Plaintiff, however, had a contumacious relationship
with the company causing the Ilikon Board to terminate his employment.
Following termination, plaintiff decided to withdraw completely from the
company and to sell his shares back to the company. Plaintiff, therefore,
executed a purchase agreement with the company. Unbeknownst to plaintiff, Ilikon had begun negotiating a licensing agreement for the aluminum
fabrication process with Reynolds Metal Company. By the time plaintiff
had agreed to sell his shares, two meetings had been held between Ilikon and
Reynolds and the terms of a possible agreement (although not the price) had
been discussed. Officials of the two companies had also exchanged a number
of phone calls and letters. The negotiations ultimately terminated when
Reynolds insisted that the licensing agreement be exclusive.
Plaintiff filed suit, contending that the negotiations over the licensing
agreement were material and that their nondisclosure violated the antifraud
provisions. Reversing the district court's dismissal of the case, the First Cir117. Id. at 464.
118. Id.; see James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 264 F.2d
445, 450 (7th Cir.) (finding negotiations over the sale of assets not material, the court stated
that "the most that can be said of Gulf's situation at the time it purchased plaintiffs' shares...
was that it was anxious, as it had been for several years, to sell the... property, and that it had
hopes, perhaps with some reason, of consummating a sale"), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959).
119. 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966).
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cuit concluded that a factual question existed as to the materiality of the
negotiations. The court of appeals noted that the negotiations had advanced
considerably, with Reynolds evidencing a serious interest in the fabrication
process. Moreover, the failure to reach an agreement resulted not from
problems with the process but from the terms of the license. The Court
deemed the discussions to be material both because they had advanced to the
stage where an agreement was possible and because the negotiations tended
to confirm the viability of the fabrication process. 120
In analyzing the materiality of the negotiations, the courts in Rogen and
List did not resort to bright-line tests or other artificial constructs. Both
performed fact-intensive analysis, carefully assessing the importance of the
negotiations to the particular plaintiffs and the probability that the negotiations would culminate in a final agreement. In List, there had been no actual
negotiations at the time plaintiff sold his shares, rendering the possibility of a
final agreement complete conjecture. That a final agreement was eventually
reached had no bearing on whether the negotiations were material at the
time plaintiff sold. By contrast, in Rogen, actual give and take negotiations
had taken place over a licensing agreement for the company's only significant asset. Although not by any means certain, some possibility of a final
agreement existed at the time plaintiff sold his shares. The ultimate collapse
of the negotiations did not alter the analysis or conclusion.' 2 ' Given the
overall importance of a licensing agreement concerning such a critical asset,
the court had little difficulty concluding that the negotiations had advanced
far enough to be of interest to reasonable investors in determining whether to
22
sell their shares. '
List and Rogen, in some respects, however, represent easy cases. Both
involved former officers who sold their shares back to the company or to a
corporate insider. Given the preexisting relationship between the buyer and
seller, the importance of the undisclosed negotiations (i.e., their materiality),
was readily apparent. Intimately aware of the company's financial problems,
the plaintiff in List seemed unlikely to be dissuaded from selling his shares at
a premium over market by such vagaries as an unidentified company expressing some interest in merging with List Fashion. Rogen, however, involved a
former president selling his shares back to the company. Aware of the technological deficiencies in, and the untried nature of, the fabrication process,
the plaintiff would certainly have been influenced in determining whether to
sell his shares and the selling price by information that a major company
120. Id. at 261-66.
121. See also American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va.
1980) (merger negotiations material even though agreement never consummated).
122. Rogen, 361 F.2d at 266.
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took the process seriously enough to engage in actual give and take negotiations over a licensing agreement.' 23 Moreover, the imposition of liability on
Ilikon for nondisclosure would do little more than require the company to
pay to plaintiff the true value of his shares and deprive the company of unfairly obtained profits. Involving only a single plaintiff that sold shares directly to the issuer, the amount of damages was limited and easily calculable.
Later decisions in this area would confront more difficult facts. With the
advent of "fraud on the market" and the evisceration of the reliance requirements under the antifraud provisions, 124 courts faced class action suits
brought by large numbers of shareholders, shareholders that did not buy or
sell directly to the company but had engaged in transactions in the open
market. Companies were therefore exposed to the possibility of substantial
liability in situations where they neither traded directly with the injured
shareholders nor received any direct pecuniary benefit from the omission or
misstatement. While in theory, the materiality analysis should not vary as
the disclosing company's financial exposure increased, nonetheless, subsequent courts seemed influenced by the awareness that a finding of materiality
might lead to the imposition of substantial liability.
B.

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.

List and Rogen presaged the seminal standard for determining the materiality of speculative information articulated by the Second Circuit in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 125 In that case, Texas Gulf Sulphur conducted exploratory drilling in eastern Canada. Early cores indicated a rich ore strike.
Aware of the initial drilling results, a number of corporate insiders
purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock. In response to rumors about a major
ore strike, the company issued a press release stating that the results of drilling to date had not been conclusive and had uncovered only small or marginal ore deposits. In an enforcement proceeding brought by the Commission,
the defendants argued that their trading did not violate the antifraud provisions because the information about the rich ore strike was speculative and
"remote" and, therefore, not material.
The Second Circuit rejected that argument and reasoned that the mere
fact that information was speculative did not automatically render it immaterial. Instead, materiality depended "at any given time upon a balancing of
both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
123. Id. at 267.
124. See Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 435 (1984).
125. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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'26
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity."'
Applying that balancing test, the court concluded that the information relating to the ore strike, although speculative, may well have been material:
"[K]nowledge of the possibility, which surely was more than marginal, of
the existence of a mine of the vast magnitude indicated ... would certainly
have been an important fact to a reasonable, if speculative, investor in decid' 27
ing whether he should buy, sell, or hold."'
Although not addressing the materiality of ongoing negotiations, Texas
Gulf Sulphur did announce a test broad enough to reach ongoing negotiations. In the context of ongoing negotiations, the reasoning in Texas Gulf
Sulphur required a balancing of the magnitude of the final agreement against
the probability of a final agreement. Such an analysis is necessarily factintensive. Materiality, the court stated, "must be determined on a case-tocase basis according to the fact pattern of each specific transaction."12'
The difficulty with the balancing test lies not in its formulation, but in its
application. Reflecting discomfort with the disclosure of speculative information, some courts' 29 have placed substantial, if not exclusive, weight on
the probability that the agreement will occur.' 3 ° To the extent the final
agreement is speculative or remote, the tendency of these courts has been to
find the ongoing negotiations immaterial, regardless of the magnitude of the
agreement under discussion. While the speculative nature of the final agreement is obviously quite relevant, Texas Gulf Sulphur did not make that factor the entire test. The stage of the negotiations must still be balanced
against the importance of the final agreement.
With the notable exception of a line of cases from the Third Circuit,' 3 ' the
decisions that followed Texas Gulf Sulphur have in general implicitly or explicitly applied the balancing test to determine the materiality of negotiations. They did so in the contexts of both insider trading cases and cases
involving misleading corporate disclosures.

1. Insider Trading Cases
Courts addressing the materiality of ongoing negotiations in insider trading generally have applied the Texas Gulf Sulphur balancing test rigorously
126. Id. at 849.
127. Id. at 849-50.
128. Id.
129. See Greenfield v. Heublein, 742 F.2d 751, 753, 758 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1189 (1985); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1204 (3d Cir. 1982).

130. See Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 253 (6th Cir. 1985) (speculative information such
as projections and appraisals only material if "reasonably certain to hold").
131. See infra notes 161-87 and accompanying text.
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and accurately. To some degree, these cases present circumstances that facilitate the materiality analysis. The mere fact that insiders or their tippees
traded on the basis of the information supports a finding of materiality.
Moreover, the unfair trading advantage that accrues to the insider acquiring
and using the information is often readily apparent. Corporate insiders
aware of ongoing negotiations concerning a major development are in a position to acquire shares before the information generally becomes known to
the market and to benefit from any increase in stock price when an agreement is consummated and becomes public information. Indeed, even if the
negotiations end inconsequentially, insiders sometimes can benefit by selling
their shares into the rising market that invariably occurs during the period
preceding a major corporate development, perhaps as a result of leaks or
'
rumors about the negotiations. 32
Recognizing these unfair advantages,
courts have routinely concluded that merger negotiations can be material at
an early stage, typically once both sides have expressed serious interest and
some actual discussions over principal terms have taken place.
SEC v. Shapiro 3' 3 is illustrative of the treatment of ongoing negotiations
in insider trading cases. Defendant, a director of Ridge Manor Development
Company, purchased shares in the company. At the time of the purchases,
defendant knew that officials of Ridge Manor had (1) hired persons to arrange for merger discussions with a prospective acquiror, (2) supplied financial information to the acquiror indicating that a merger of the two
companies would result in a sharp increase in earnings, (3) made a merger
proposal to the acquiror that had been rejected, and (4) met with a director
of the prospective acquiror who agreed to propose a merger to the board. 34
'
Applying the Texas Gulf Sulphur balancing text, the court conceded that
the negotiations were at a formative stage but nevertheless found them to be
material in light of the importance of the resulting merger agreement. As
the court noted, "[a]lthough the negotiations had not jelled to the point
where a merger was probable, the possibility was not so remote that, when
considered in the light of a projected increase of at least 600% in [the acquiror's] earnings per share, it might not have influenced a reasonable
investor."' 3 5
Similarly, in SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 136 the Second Circuit again
addressed the materiality of ongoing merger negotiations in the context of an
insider trading case and concluded that negotiations in the early stages were
132. See infra note 200.
133. 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
134. Id. at 1304.
135. Id. at 1306-07.
136. 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
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material. Geon Industries had hired an investment banker to arrange negotiations over a possible merger with a British oil company. Following preliminary discussions, Geon supplied the British company with various
nonpublic forecasts and financial data. After digesting the information, the
oil company indicated interest in a possible acquisition and Geon's president, Neuwirths, traveled to England to pursue the matter.
Before voyaging to England, Neuwirths informed a business associate
about the possibility that Geon might be involved in a merger. On his return
to the United States, Neuwirths spoke to a broker, who promptly began buying shares of Geon on behalf of the broker's wife and clients.1 37 About a
month later, Geon publicly announced the merger negotiations with the
British oil company and, shortly thereafter, disclosed a merger agreement.
The agreement provided for the paythent to Geon shareholders of a substantial premium over market price.
The Commission brought an enforcement action to enjoin Neuwirths
from illegally tipping information about the merger negotiations to others.
Among other things, Neuwirths argued that the information tipped was immaterial because the merger negotiations were in an "embryonic stage [to
which] no reasonable man would attach importance." 13 The Second Circuit, however, disagreed. Although acknowledging that "the mortality rate
of mergers in such formative stages is doubtless high," the court emphasized
an9
that under the Texas Gulf Sulphur balancing test, the probability of 13
agreement still had to be weighed against the magnitude of the agreement.
The importance of a merger agreement to the target company was beyond
peradventure. As the court stated:
Since a merger in which [a company] is bought out is the most
important event that can occur in a small corporation's life, to wit,
its death, we think that inside information, as regards a merger of
this sort, can become material at an earlier stage than would be the
case as regards lesser transactions .
137. Id. at 43.
138. Id. at 47.

139. Id. In both Geon and Shapiro, the Commission took the position that the materiality
of the information should be determined under the Texas Gulf Sulphur test. See Brief of the
Commission at 36, SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974) (No. 72-1927); Brief of the
Commission at 38, SEC v. Geon, 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976) (No. 74-2614).
140. Geon, 531 F.2d at 47. See Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 550 (1st Cir. 1978)
(although terms of possible merger not yet discussed, duty existed to disclose negotiations to
selling shareholder; court noted that "we find it inconceivable that a reasonable shareholder
would not think that the merger information concealed in this case was important and, therefore, material."). It bears reminding that, although these cases are correct, they do not stand
for the proposition that negotiations are always material at such an early stage. That the
persons traded acquired shares in a target was critically important. The result might have been
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Based upon the importance of the prospective merger agreement, the court
concluded that the negotiations between Geon and the British oil company
had advanced sufficiently to have crossed the materiality threshold.'4
Its holding notwithstanding, the court in Geon was clearly troubled by the
potential impact of its decision and admonished that its analysis was limited
to insider trading cases: "In cases of the disclosure of inside information to a
favored few, determination of materiality has a different aspect than when
the issue is, for example, an inaccuracy in a publicly disseminated press re'
lease." 142
While the negotiations at issue in Geon were material for purposes
of insider trading cases, the court indicated doubt whether they
would be
1 43
material for purposes of the Commission's filing requirement.
different had the focus been on an insider purchasing or selling shares of the bidder. See supra
note 103.
141. More recently, in SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,004, at 90,977 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1985), the court held that merger negotiations
were material. The court noted that discussions had advanced "beyond the exploratory stage
to the establishment of preconditions, the existence of proposals . . . concerning price per
share, and the existence of numerous meetings between [the two companies]." Id.
142. Geon, 531 F.2d at 48.
143. Id. The court indicated that "the [nonpublic] information takes on an added charge
just because it is inside information." Id. At least one commentator has more or less taken the
same position that the materiality threshold is lower where the information is used by insiders.
See Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 622 n.32
(1967). Although superficially appealing, the "added charge" language seems inconsistent
with the longstanding and conventional analysis used to determine materiality. In determining
materiality, courts have focused upon the importance of the information to the mythical "reasonable" shareholder. See supra note 100. By using a more objective reasonable shareholder
standard, courts need not perform a subjective inquiry into the particular knowledge of each
person receiving the nonpublic information. The court in Geon would deviate from the reasonable shareholder standards by taking into account the individual's status as an insider in determining materiality. Doing so arguably introduces subjective elements into the analysis,
making an already elusive determination more difficult.
To contend that the "added charge" language in Geon was wrong, however, does not render
irrelevant the fact that an insider made use of the information. Insiders, who have a more
complete understanding of the company, may be quicker to appreciate the value of particular
information. As a result, courts have recognized that the use of the information by insiders
may be one indication of materiality. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); General Portland, Inc. v. LaFarge Coppee
S.A., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,148 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28,
1981).
At least one case in a different context has repudiated the argument that the standard of
materiality is different where insiders are involved. See Pavlidis v. New England Patriot Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227 (1st Cir. 1984). That case involved allegations that a proxy
statement was materially misleading. In determining the materiality of certain misstatements
and omissions, plaintiffs urged that "the standard of materiality should be less stringent in
cases involving insiders." Id. at 1231. The court rejected that approach, reasoning that "the
fact that a proxy statement is drafted by insiders acting in their own interest does not change
the standard of materiality. A fact does not become more material to the shareholder's decision because it is withheld by an insider, or because the insider might profit by withholding it."
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The court cited no direct authority for the conclusion that the materiality
of negotiations could vary depending upon whether the case involved insider
trading or affirmative misrepresentations. Indeed, the analysis leads to
anomalous, if not analytically indefensible, results. Admittedly, the materiality of information may depend in part upon the particular type document
containing the disclosure. Information material in one type of document or
filing may not be material in another. For example, information necessary to
prevent a proxy statement from being misleading may not be necessary in a
periodic filing, such as a quaterly or annual report. A proxy statement provides shareholders with information necessary to decide whether to execute
a proxy. Information necessary in determining whether to execute a proxy
may not be necessary to a prospective shareholder deciding whether to
purchase the company's stock. Thus, a proxy statement proposing antitakeover charter amendments would be required to contain greater discussion of
these provisions than may be required in other types of filings or disclosures. " The materiality of information, therefore, will in part depend upon
the particular disclosure document at issue and that document's purpose.
This is not, however, the type of reasoning employed by the Second Circuit in Geon. The court indicated that the materiality of the information
depended upon whether the case involved insider trading or involved misleading disclosures. Both actions are typically brought under rule lOb-5.
Geon, therefore, arguably stands for the proposition that the standard for
materiality can vary in actions brought under the same provision of the securities laws. The decision neither points to any solid authority for that
Id. The court did not, however, consider the role of the insider in preparing the proxy state-

ment to be irrelevant:
This is not to say, however, that court [sic] must ignore the interest of the parties
who drafted the proxy statement in deciding whether they have met their obligation
to disclose material facts. Certain facts might be material in the context of a one-

sided transaction that would not be material in the context of an adversarial transaction. Therefore, although the same standard of materiality would apply to both
kinds of transaction, the standard might identify different facts as material in each

transaction. In addition, when the interests of the management conflict with those of
the shareholders (and we note that this may happen in a hostile takeover, where the
management seeks to preserve its endangered jobs, as well as in an uncontested
merger), the court is entitled to regard the management's disclosures with a certain

skepticism, and to resolve doubts in favor of the shareholders. Thus, although
§ 14(a) requires any party soliciting proxies, regardless of his status or interest in the
transaction, to disclose all material information, a self-dealing insider may have a
"heavier burden of disclosure" in the sense that he will find it more difficult to con-

vince the court that he has met the requirements of § 14(a).
Id.
144. See Disclosure in Proxy and Information Statements, Exchange Act Release No.

15,230, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

81,748 (Oct. 13, 1978).
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proposition nor provides any compelling reason for this conclusion. 14 5
Moreover, at least one subsequent decision took precisely the opposite tact

and concluded that the standard for materiality was lower in misrepresenta-

tion cases and, ipso facto, higher in insider cases. 146
What concerned the Second Circuit apparently was not the violation, but
the remedy.' 47 As is typical in insider trading cases brought by the Commis-

sion, the sanction imposed on defendant in Geon was an injunction and a
possible disgorgement of profits. 4 8 A company issuing a misleading press
release, however, is subject to greater exposure. Under a fraud-on-the-market theory, a company may be liable to any person trading in the market at
the time of the misleading statement, even if the company was not buying or
selling its own shares or otherwise directly profiting from the misstate145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). In at least one instance, the Supreme Court has rejected arguments that a securities law violation depends upon the nature of the parties or upon
the relief sought. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court
held that scienter was a necessary element of an antifraud violation under § 10(b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) and rule lOb-5 in actions brought by private parties. The
Commission took the position, however, that scienter was not necessary in Commission actions brought under the same provisions. The agency based its interpretation both on the
nature of the relief sought-Commission actions typically involve injunctive relief and not
damages-and on its special role as the agency designated to enforce the securities laws. In
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980), the Supreme Court rejected that reasoning concluding that "scienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5, regardless
of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought."
146. See Levinson v. Basic, 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 2516 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1987) (No. 86-279). Admittedly, insiders often have a superior knowledge and understanding of a company's operations and they will be better able than other investors to recognize the importance, and take advantage of, nonpublic information. Indeed, empirical
evidence indicates that investors recognize the superior knowledge of insiders. Trading by
insiders often generates an increase in volume and price, as other investors purchase in their
wake. See Givoly & Palmon, Insider Trading and the Exploitation of Insider Information:
Some Empirical Evidence, 58 J. Bus. 69, 86 (1985) ("the results also show that a significant
abnormal return is produced in the wake of the trades [by insiders] themselves, lending support to the conjecture that (outside) investors accept the superior knowledge and follow the
footsteps of insiders.").
147. As the Second Circuit noted in Geon, "[w]hether such a violation [trading while in
possession of material nonpublic information] would support relief more extended than that
requested here-an injunction against future misconduct and a 'disgorgement' of profits-is a
different question." 531 F.2d at 48.
148. The potential liability for an insider trading has become substantially greater since the
Second Circuit's decision in Geon. At the urging of the Commission, Congress enacted the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.). As a result of that legislation, insiders now may be liable in Commission actions for up to three times the profits gained or losses foregone. See Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(l) (1982); see also Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983, Hearing on H.R.
559, Before the Senate Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The Commission obtained a penalty of $50 million under
the Act from arbitrageur Ivan Boesky. See infra note 202.
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ment.' 4 9 This spectre of large scale liability no doubt influenced the court's
reasoning.
Varying the materiality standard on the basis of the potential exposure is,
however, not a concept that finds support in the securities laws. While liability for misleading statements may often seem harsh, a company can generally avoid such a result either by not making any public pronouncement or
by making certain that the disclosure is accurate. 5 ° Finally, the scienter
element will obviate liability for misleading statements by companies unless
such statements were recklessly or knowingly made.
2. Misleading Disclosure
Geon and Shapiro were, in essence, omission cases. In both decisions, the
courts determined that insiders had contravened the duty to disclose the information or to abstain from acquiring shares before the information had
become public. The materiality of ongoing negotiations also has been extensively litigated where companies engaged in negotiations have issued statements denying that any material developments are taking place. Publicly
traded companies often receive inquiries, particularly from an exchange or
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) whenever their stock
undergoes unusual increases in price and/or volume. If a company is unaware of a reason for the increase, it will typically issue a statement to the
effect that it knows of "no developments" that would explain the unusual
stock activity. If, at the time the "no developments" statement is issued,
negotiations are taking place, the statement can be characterized as accurate
only if the negotiations have not yet crossed the materiality threshold. Concomitantly, a "no developments" statement in the face of ongoing negotiations that are material will be misleading and violate the antifraud
provisions.
In Schlanger v. Four-PhaseSystems, Inc., 151 for example, discussions between Four-Phase and Motorola over a possible merger commenced in late
August and continued throughout the fall. Over the period, Four-Phase
supplied Motorola with "increasingly detailed information regarding [the
company], its finances, and its business projections."' 5 2 Both Four-Phase
149. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 458 U.S.
1105 (1982); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816

(1976).
150. See infra notes 229, 270-71 and accompanying text; see also Michaels Memorandum,
supra note 11, at 2.
151. 582 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

152. Id. at 131.
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and Motorola retained investment bankers to assist in the negotiation
process.
The stock in Four-Phase began to undergo dramatic activity, with price
increasing almost six points in a single day and volume jumping from 39,800
shares the previous trading day to over 300,000. Officials of the New York
Stock Exchange contacted Four-Phase to ascertain whether the company
knew of any reason that would explain the unusual activity. A corporate
spokesperson for Four-Phase issued a statement disseminated over the Dow
Jones wire denying awareness "of any corporate developments which would
affect the market of [sic] its stock."' 53 Eight days later, Four-Phase and
Motorola announced a merger agreement.
Plaintiff sold shares between the time Four-Phase issued the "no developments" statement and the time the merger was announced. Plaintiff asserted
that negotiations with Motorola over a possible merger would have explained the unusual activity in Four-Phase's stock, thereby rendering the
"no developments" release materially misleading. Defendants moved for
summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that no material omission
or misstatement had occurred.1 54 Emphasizing that Motorola had not made
a firm offer, defendants argued that, at the time the "no developments" release had been issued, the negotiations were not material. In declining to
grant the motion, the district court concluded that the materiality of the
negotiations was a factual matter which could not be decided on a motion
for summary judgment. Moreover, if material, defendants could be liable for
the misstatement.
While the federal securities laws do not impose a general duty
upon an issuer to disclose material facts or new developments
when it is not trading in its own securities, it does have a duty to
make certain that any statement it does issue is truthful and complete, and does not materially misrepresent the facts existing at the
time of the announcement .... In this case, defendants did make
an announcement, intended to be relied on by purchasers and sellers, and therefore had a duty to make a statement which was both
and not misleading in light of the facts
truthful insofar as it1 went,
55
known at that time.
153. Id. at 129.
154. Id. at 130.
155. Id. at 133 (citations omitted). See also Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 77-C-2837 (N.D.
Ill.
June 3, 1986) ("Nonetheless, the rule entitling an issuer to keep silent about preliminary
merger negotiations does not logically extend to the situation where a duty to disclose arises
from other affirmative misstatements of a party or its agents."). The district court in Schlanger
distinguished Reiss, see infra note 183, and Staffin, see infra notes 161-68 and accompanying
text, by noting that these cases concerned whether the issuers had an affirmative duty to dis-
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Implicitly refusing to follow the Second Circuit's suggestion in Geon that
the standard for materiality could differ depending upon the nature of the
offense, the Schlanger court in no way intimated that cases involving misleading press releases somehow necessitated a more rigorous materiality
analysis than that employed in insider trading cases. If anything, the facts in
Schlanger may have facilitated the materiality analysis. In insider trading
cases, courts must assess the materiality of omitted information, a sometimes
difficult and assiduous task. In Schlanger, however, Four-Phase did not
omit information as much as it affirmatively misled the market through false
disclosures. Bluntly speaking, Four-Phase lied and was seeking the district
court's imprimatur for its actions. No matter how sympathetic a court may
be to the sensitivity of the negotiations or the almost punitive liability that
can result from misstatements, it cannot afford to absolve completely a company that affirmatively had misled the market, particularly when a more
carefully worded announcement would have prevented the problem.
The reasoning employed in Schlanger also carried the day in Etshokin v.
Texasgulf, Inc.156 In that case, Canada Development Corporation owned
thirty-five percent of the outstanding stock of Texasgulf. Following unusual
activity in Texasgulf's stock and rumors about an impending takeover, an
official from Dow Jones called Canada Development for information about
the unusual activity. Canada Development's public relations director responded in a statement carried over the Dow Jones wire that "the company
hasn't [any] intention of selling its 35% interest in TEXASGULF," and that
51 7
he was unaware of any reason that would explain the activity.
Before the announcement, however, another company considering the acquisition of Texasgulf entered into discussions with Canada Development
concerning the terms that would induce Canada Development to sell its Texasgulf shares in the event of a tender offer. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that
the statement by the public relations manager was misleading. They contended that, as a result of the negotiations with the prospective bidder, Canada Development knew of reasons that would explain the unusual activity in
Texasgulf's stock. In addition, the negotiations demonstrated, in contrast to
the company's denial, that Canada Development in fact had an intention of
selling its interest in Texasgulf. Although the district court did not treat the
close the existence of the negotiations rather than whether they had issued misleading disclosures. That these decisions may be distinguished so readily is not altogether certain. At the
time of the decision, the district court in Schlanger did not have the benefit of the Third Circuit's reasoning in Greenfield v. Heublein, 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1189 (1985). In commenting on the district court's opinion in that case, however, the
Schlanger court abjectly labeled the decision "wrong." Schlanger, 582 F. Supp. at 132.
156. 612 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. 11. 1985).
157. Id. at 1227.
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materiality of the omitted information at length, it did agree that a factual
question existed as to whether the negotiations had been material at the time
the company issued the release denying any intent to sell its interest in
Texasgulf.

158

Etoshkin demonstrates the breadth of the disclosure requirements under
the antifraud laws and the dangers that can befall persons or companies only
tangentially connected to the acquisition process. In a change of control
context, most cases addressing the materiality of negotiations have involved
alleged omissions or misstatements by either the target or the bidder company. Canada Development was neither; it was simply a large shareholder
of the target. 159 The size of Canada Development's interest, however, more
or less dictated that any prospective bidder first approach the company to
ascertain its willingness to sell and at what price.
Given this situation, it was perhaps unsurprising that, following rumors of
a takeover and the unusual activity in Texasgulf's stock, Dow Jones personnel turned to a substantial shareholder for information about the developments. At that point, Canada Development was confronted with the stark
choice of either revealing that discussions were underway or issuing a "no
comment" statement, a statement arguably tantamount to an admission that
negotiations were taking place. Instead, Canada Development opted for a
third course. The company provided misleading information to the market
by issuing a blanket denial of any knowledge of developments about the unusual activity in Texasgulf. For this, the district court held the company
could be liable under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
158. Id. at 1228.
159. An earlier case involving someone not affiliated with the target or the bidder arose in
Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972). In that case, defendant
purchased 6500 shares of Technical Research Group, Inc. (TRG) from plaintiff, Radiation
Dynamics. Shortly thereafter, TRG agreed to merge with another company, generating substantial profits for the defendants. Plaintiff alleged that defendants were aware of the TRG
negotiations and that they had a duty to disclose the information before purchasing the shares.
The Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that the defendants had not apparently been aware
of the negotiations. Id. at 886. Even had defendants been in possession of information about
the negotiations, it is not at all clear that they would have been under a duty to disclose to
Radiation Dynamics. The decision predates Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), and Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), which established that silence may be the basis for
liability only if a duty to disclose exists. As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he duty to disclose
arises when one party has information 'that the other party is entitled to know because of a
fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence between them.'" Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). It does not appear that
the defendants in Radiation Dynamics had any duty toward plaintiff that required disclosure.
Absent the requisite duty, defendants could have been liable only if they had received a tip
about the negotiations from a TRG insider and the insider obtained a benefit from tipping the
information. See id. at 277 (tippee liability arises "from their role as a participant after the fact
in the insider's breach of fiduciary duty"); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986).
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The standard for assessing the materiality of speculative information
adopted in Texas Gulf Sulphur and subsequently accepted by courts suffers
from an obvious difficulty. Because the balancing test involves a fact-intensive analysis, it provides practitioners and issuers with little certainty or
comfort. Given the sensitivity of ongoing negotiations and the potential liability for inaccurate statements or omissions, this lack of certainty is a genuine cause for concern. A number of recent decisions-particularly in the
Third Circuit-have attempted to assuage this concern by applying a more
certain analysis. Deviating significantly from, and often without mention of,
the test articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur, these decisions have replaced the
balancing test with a bright-line test that largely obviates the need to perform a case-by-case, fact-intensive analysis.
The Third Circuit first delved into these uncharted waters in Staffin v.
Greenberg.161 In that case, Bluebird Corporation commenced a self tender
offer for a portion of its outstanding shares.162 Under the duty to abstain or
disclose, Bluebird's acquisiton of its own shares triggered a duty to disclose
all material developments.' 63 During the pendency of the self tender offer,
the chief executive officer of Bluebird contacted an official at Northern
Foods, Ltd., to inquire about a possible merger. The two companies had
previously explored a possible business combination.' 64 After the self tender
offer closed, the two companies engaged in merger negotiations and ulti65
mately executed a merger agreement.'
Plaintiffs, representing the class of shareholders selling shares during the
self tender, argued that Bluebird had violated the antifraud provisions by
failing to disclose the contacts with Northern Foods. The Third Circuit rejected that contention, concluding that a single contact with a prospective
merger candidate that had not been authorized by the board of directors was
immaterial. 1 66 Not content with this narrow holding, however, the court
160. Etshokin, 612 F. Supp. at 1228; see Whitbread-(US) Holdings, Inc. v. Rothschild, 630
F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
161. 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982); see Nutis v. Penn Merchandising Corp., 610 F. Supp.
1573, 1579 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (merger plans subject to disclosure only if "concrete"), aff'd mem.,
791 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1986).
162. 672 F.2d at 1199-1200.
163. Id. at 1200.
164. Id. at 1199.
165. Id. at 1201.
166. Id. at 1206-07. A single isolated contact between two companies generally would not
be treated as "negotiations" and would not be considered material. See, e.g., Bucher v. Shum-

1986]

Corporate Secrecy

provided additional analysis to support its decision. The court expansively
concluded that "preliminary merger discussions" were "immaterial as a
matter of law."' 67 Thus, the materiality threshold
would be crossed only if
"an agreement in principle has been reached." 168
way, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,142, at 96,302 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
("The law imposes no obligation upon defendants to disclose mere inquiries or contacts made
by those interested in acquiring the corporation or its stock."), aff'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 65
(D.N.J. 1974) (no obligation to disclose mere "overture" or "casual inquiry"). Staffin involves
a much harder case. The facts in Staffin did not involve an isolated contact or inquiry. Northern and Bluebird had explored a possible business combination on a number of occasions, but
had been unable to reach mutually acceptable terms. At a minimum, the chief executive officer
of Bluebird knew that Northern would be receptive to the renewed possibility of acquiring
Bluebird. Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1201.
167. Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1206; accord, Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 690
(E.D. Pa. 1985); Sulzer v. Associated Madison Cos., [1985 Tranfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,053, at 91,247 (M.D. Fla. May 10, 1985) ("Preliminary discussions do not fall into
the category of firm offers and are, therefore, not material."). The Commission has expressly
rejected the court's conclusion that negotiations preceding an agreement in principle are immaterial as a matter of law. See infra text accompanying notes 258-59.
The Staffin court cited a number of decisions interpreting the disclosure requirements in
item 4 of Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1986) as support for the conclusion that
negotiations preceding an agreement in principle are immaterial, including Missouri Portland
Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter, 535 F.2d 388, 398 (8th Cir. 1976); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am.
Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1084-86 (5th Cir. 1970). These cases, however, are inapposite.
Item 4 of Schedule 13D requires disclosure of, among other things, certain "plans or purposes"
concerning the issuer, including any plans for a merger. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1986).
Most courts, including Missouri PortlandCement and Susquehanna, have concluded that only
those plans and proposals relatively certain or "fixed" must be disclosed under item 4. See
Missouri PortlandCement, 535 F.2d at 398; see also Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington
Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 1973); Susquehanna, 423 F.2d at 1084-86; Issen v. GSC
Enters., 508 F. Supp. 1278, 1295 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Purolator, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 510 F.
Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1981). As a result, prospective plans and negotiations about a possible
merger need not be disclosed in a Schedule 13D unless they are far advanced and likely to
occur. See Missouri Portland Cement, 535 F.2d at 398; Susquehanna, 423 F.2d at 1084-86.
These courts do not purport to apply the general standard for materiality under the antifraud
provisions, but instead are interpreting a specific disclosure requirement imposed by the Commission. Their relevancy to cases interpreting the antifraud provisions is, therefore, minimal.
168. Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1207. The holding, however, did not apply where the discussions
"have not reached an agreement in principle but are in some sense the functional equivalents."
Id. In a similar vein, a number of earlier cases concluded that negotiations were immaterial
absent a "firm offer." See South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669
F.2d 1265, 1273 (9th Cir. 1982) (no duty to disclose in proxy statement "inquiries or indications of interest that do not fall within the category of firm or definite offers."); Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294-95 (2d Cir. 1973) (failure to disclose "firm offers"
may render proxy statement misleading); Berman v. Gerber Prods., Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310,
1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978) ("because such overtures [concerning a possible merger] were not
firm offers they should not be deemed material information"); Scott, 386 F. Supp. at 65 (single
telephone call constituted a "casual inquiry" and not a firm offer subject to disclosure in a
proxy statement).
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Staffin, taken at face value, excludes from the realm of materiality all negotiations preceding an agreement in principle. Under this reasoning, irrespective of the importance of the final agreement, negotiations preceding a
talismanic agreement in principle would never be subject to required disclosure under the antifraud provisions. Absent such an agreement, Staffin not
only obviates liability for a "no developments" statement issued while negotiations are taking place but arguably would allow corporate insiders involved in the negotiations to trade while in possession of the information and
tip the information to others who trade without violating the antifraud
provisions.
Staffin represented only part of the Third Circuit's efforts. The decision
left open the definition of "agreement in principle." That issue was taken up
in Greenfield v. Heublein. "69 The Third Circuit in Heublein concluded that
an agreement in principle existed in the context of a change of control only if
the parties had agreed to the acquisition price and the post-acquisition corporate structure. 7 ° In adopting the "price-structure" standard, the Third
Circuit essentially opted for a rigid, bright-line test for determining the existence of an agreement in principle.' 7 '
In Heublein, General Cinema Corporation acquired almost nineteen percent of Heublein's outstanding shares. 72 Unable to get General Cinema to
agree to a standstill agreement and fearing a hostile takeover attempt, Heublein entered into negotiations with R.J. Reynolds, a prospective white
knight. A meeting between high level officials of both companies to discuss
Reynold's acquisition of Heublein, however, did not result in any understanding or agreement.' 7 3 Five days later, General Cinema informed Heublein of the expected sale of certain assets; sales that would generate the
funds necessary for General Cinema to resume open market purchases of
Heublein's shares. That same day, Heublein's stock underwent a dramatic
increase in volume and price.1 74 In response to a call from the NYSE, a
Heublein spokesperson issued a release carried by Dow Jones stating that it
"was aware of no reason that would explain the activity in its stock in trading on the NYSE today."' 75 The following day, another meeting occurred
between the management of Heublein and Reynolds. Approximately two
169. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985).
170. Id. at 756-57.

171. Id. at 757.
172. Id. at 753.
173. Id. at 753-54.
174. Id. at 754. The volume increased from 32,500 shares on July 13, 1982 to 242,500
shares on July 14, 1982. The price during the same period increased from $40.25 to $43.00.
Id. at 754 n.1.
175. Id. at 754.
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weeks after the "no developments" announcement, Heublein and Reynolds
announced a merger agreement that provided for the payment of a premium
76
for Heublein's shares of thirty percent over market price.1
Plaintiff alleged that the "no developments" release was materially misleading."7 In a somewhat obtuse and confusing opinion, a divided Third
Circuit panel agreed with the district court that Heublein had not violated
the antifraud provisions. The court first concluded that Heublein had no
independent duty to disclose the negotiations until an agreement in principle
had been reached.' 78 An agreement in principle arose only when the acquisition price and the post-merger structure had been agreed upon. Since no
agreement on these terms existed at the time of the "no developments" release, no duty to disclose the negotiations existed.' 7 9
With no independent duty to disclose, the Third Circuit turned to whether
the "no developments" release was misleading. The majority appeared to
conclude that the negotiations were immaterial absent an agreement in principle. Since no such agreement had been reached at the time of the "no
developments" release, their omission did not render the statement misleading. 8 0 The court also emphasized that plaintiffs had not established a causal
connection between the unusual stock activity and leaks about the merger
discussions. Thus, "[w]hile ...Heublein executives[,] clearly knew of information that might have accounted for the increase in trading, there was no
indication that any of this privileged information had been leaked ... ,,81
As the dissent cogently noted, the majority confused the duty to disclose
with the prohibition on misleading disclosures.'8 2 To the dissent, whether
176. Id. at 754-55.
177. Id. at 755.
178. Id. at 756; see Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
("the Third Circuit has held that there exists no obligation ... for a 'target' corporation to
disclose the status of offers or negotiations ... until an 'agreement in principal'. . . has been
reached"). The Heublein analysis has been followed by at least one state case. See Eldridge v.
Tymeshare, Inc., 186 Cal. App. 3d 767, 230 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1986). In Eldridge, the court
relied upon the Third Circuit cases to conclude that directors of a corporation did not breach
their fiduciary duty to shareholders by failing to disclose the existence of ongoing negotiations.
"Accordingly, we conclude that as a matter of law corporate directors are under no duty to
make a public disclosure of merger negotiations until an agreement in principle has been
reached." Id.
179. Heublein, 742 F.2d at 756-57.
180. Id. at 758-60.
181. Id. at 759.
182. Id. at 760-61 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The majority seemed to confuse those
issues throughout the opinion. The distinction is, of course, critical. A duty to disclose material information essentially casts aside corporate secrecy and requires companies to reveal undisclosed material developments to the public. Once the duty attaches, the discretion of
corporate officials to determine the timing and contents of the disclosure is greatly circum-
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Heublein had a duty to disclose the existence of the negotiations was not at
issue. Rather, the only issue confronting the court was whether the "no
developments" statement by Heublein was materially misleading. Heublein
simply could not deny knowledge of any developments that would explain
the unusual activity while engaging in merger negotiations with Reynolds
and when aware of the actions of American Cinema. The absence of either a
duty to disclose the negotiations or evidence that the information had leaked
to the public did not in any way alter the misleading nature of the "no devel183
opments" statement.
scribed. Unsurprisingly, courts generally have evidenced an unwillingness to intrude into corporate affairs in order to avoid expanding the instances in which the securities laws impose a
duty to disclose material nonpublic information.
The prohibition on misleading disclosures, however, falls into a different category. Whether
a duty to disclose exists is immaterial. Simply put, the prohibition on misleading disclosures
proscribes false and misleading statements. See supra note 29. The focus, therefore, is not on
the duty to disclose, but on the accuracy of the disclosure. It makes no difference whether the
disclosure occurred because of a duty or was made voluntarily. Once a statement is made for
any reason, accuracy and completeness are required.
183. Id. at 763. In addition to Staffin and Heublein, Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711
F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983) is often cited for the proposition that preliminary merger negotiations
are immaterial as a matter of law. See, e.g., Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, 631 F. Supp.
1259, 1264 (S.D.N.Y 1986); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems, 582 F. Supp. 128, 131-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Reiss, Pan American authorized a call of convertible debentures at 110%
of face value. The debentures were redeemable in cash or stock. Reiss, 711 F.2d at 12. On the
day Pan Am's board approved the call, it also authorized negotiations with National Airlines
over a possible merger. Id. at 13. Eight days after negotiations were authorized, Pan Am
announced that it had made an offer for National. Id. Debenture holders that responded to
the call before the announcement alleged that Pan Am had a duty to disclose the merger
negotiations. Id. The Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that the failure to disclose the
negotiations did not violate the antifraud provisions. Id. at 14.
The reasoning of the Second Circuit is not altogether clear. The court apparently concluded
that no material negotiations had taken place between the time the debenture call occurred and
the date Pan Am and National announced the offer. The court acknowledged, however, that
negotiations did take place following the call for debentures. Id. at 13. Pan Am also obtained
a loan commitment from Citibank to acquire National. Id. at 12-13. These facts, along with
the Pan Am board's resolution authorizing negotiations with National, indicated a serious
interest on Pan Am's part to acquire National. Prior Second Circuit decisions had found
negotiations at even more rudimentary stages to be material. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus.,
531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
What distinguishes Reiss from Shapiro and Geon was not the stage of the negotiations, but
the materiality of the underlying agreement. In both Geon and Shapiro, the courts had to
ascertain the materiality of merger negotiations to the target's shareholders. The result in
those case seems obvious. A merger that causes the demise of the target would almost certainly be material to that target's shareholders. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
The materiality of a possible merger to the bidder, however, is less clear. Particularly for
acquisition-oriented companies, a tender offer for another company may be just another transaction in the ordinary course of business. Moreover, on the average, the bidder's share prices
increase only minimally following an acquisition. Studies show minimal or no increase in the
bidder's share prices following the announcement of an offer, see supra note 103, compared
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The courts in Staffin and Heublein, as well as their progeny, provided two
principal justifications for their conclusions.' 84 First, they were concerned
that disclosure of negotiations would unnecessarily interfere with corporate
secrecy, possibly jeopardizing the continuation of negotiations.' 8 5 Second,
they feared that disclosure would harm or mislead shareholders. As one
court stated: "The need to protect shareholders from potentially misleading
disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations . ..outweighs the right of

shareholders to have notice of corporate developments important to their
investment decision."' 8 6 The apparent logic of both lines of reasoning does
not withstand close scrutiny. 187
with a much greater increase for the target's share prices. See supra note 102. Pan Am's
negotiations with National may not, therefore, have been material to its debt holders.
184. See Heublein, 742 F.2d at 756; Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1205-07.
185. See Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1205-07; As one commentator noted:
The good served by disclosure must be weighed against other values to be preserved
by silence, or against injuries to be inflicted by disclosure ....Disclosure obligations
are curtailed in at least two kinds of circumstances-first, when disclosure of the
information would harm the corporation because it would prevent the consummation
of an advantageous transaction, and second, when by reason of the indefiniteness of
the available information about existing conditions or uncertainty about the future
occurrence of significant events, disclosure would cause uncertainty and confusion in
the minds of security holders-and bring about market reactions for which there
may ultimately turn out to have no justification.
Brudney, supra note 143, at 621.
186. Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797
(1985); Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 77-C-2837 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1986) ("the policy underlying
this rule [of nondisclosure] is not that merger negotiations are unimportant to investors but
that until price and structure are agreed upon the disclosure of a tentative merger is likely to
mislead the market."); see Heublein, 742 F.2d at 756. As the Second Circuit concluded in
Reiss:
It does not serve the underlying purposes of the securities acts to compel disclosure
of merger negotiations in the not unusual circumstance before us. Such negotiations
are inherently fluid and the eventual outcome is shrouded in uncertainty. Disclosure
may in fact be more misleading than secrecy so far as investment decisions are
concerned.
711 F.2d at 14 (citations omitted). The Commission has suggested that the reasoning in Reiss
should be limited to its particular facts. See Michaels Memorandum, supra note 11, at 5 n.4.
Other courts also have indicated their belief that disclosure of ongoing negotiations could
"mislead" investors. See Sulzer v. Associated Madison Cos., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,053, at 91,247 (M.D. Fla. May 10, 1985); Bucher v. Schumway,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,142, at 96,302 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11,
1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Berman v. Gerber
Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co., 411 F.
Supp. 1208, 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 65 (D.N.J.
1974); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906, 912-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d
457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
187. In addition to the questionable materiality analysis, the decision in Heublein can be
faulted on another score. Both Heublein, 742 F.2d at 756, and Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1207, held
that once an agreement in principle is reached, a duty to disclose arises. See Jordan v. Duff &
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With regard to the fear of misleading shareholders, shareholders and
other investors admittedly may sometimes overreact to the disclosure of
speculative information such as ongoing negotiations. Yet, to suggest that
speculative information would mislead is also to suggest that disclosure
might violate the antifraud provisions.' 88 Prohibiting disclosure seems to be
a dubious, if not improper, method of addressing the problems associated
Phelps, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,724, at 93,517 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1986)
("When at least one of the parties to acquisition negotiations is a publicly traded company, an
agreement in principal [sic] to the acquisition by both corporations must occur before either
corporation has a duty to disclose the fact of negotiations to a stockholder."); Revlon, Inc. v.
Pantry Pride, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 804, 809 (D. Del. 1985) (quoting language in Staffin that a
duty to disclose exists once agreement in principle reached). Until these decisions, no court
had ever held that the existence of an agreement in principle automatically triggered a duty to
disclose.
The rationale for the Third Circuit's conclusion is not readily apparent. At its most extreme, the court may have concluded that companies have a general duty to disclose all material developments. Because negotiations become material upon execution of an agreement in
principle, the duty to disclose would only arise at that point. Such a holding would essentially
subject companies to a general duty to disclose, something completely inconsistent with the
trend in the case law. See supra notes 16, 19. More likely, the Third Circuit intended something far less expansive. The court may be attempting to create another exception to the rule
that companies have no general duty to disclose material developments. Given the importance
of a possible merger to target shareholders and other investors, the Third Circuit may have
concluded that once negotiations reached an agreement in principle, disclosure should be required. Why this information is subject to required disclosure when other, equally material
information, is not, is unclear.
A third possibility is that the Third Circuit considered disclosure required under the corporate duty to disclose or abstain, although nothing in the opinion indicates that this is what the
court intended. When a company trades in its own shares, there is a duty to disclose all
material developments. See supra note 25. The definition of purchase or sale under the securities laws has been interpreted expansively. See supra note 27. For a purchase or sale to occur,
there need not be an actual settlement or transfer of title of the securities. A contract to
purchase or sell constitutes a "purchase" or "sale" for purposes of the securities laws. See
International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 181 n.18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
941 (1979); Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286, 1289 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976). Conceivably, the execution of an agreement in principle to merge constitutes a sale of securities, giving rise to a duty
to disclose all material developments and an immediate duty to disclose the agreement may
therefore arise. Moreover, if the bidder can be characterized as a temporary insider of the
target once an agreement in principle is reached, the bidder, as well as the target, may be
subject to the duty to disclose. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983). Of course,
the final possibility is that the court had no underlying rationale and was simply incorrect in its
reasoning.
188. Incredibly, at least one court has suggested that disclosure of preliminary negotiations
may itself violate the securities laws. See Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 92,828, at 94,029 (N.D. I11.July 12, 1985). While many, including the Commission, see supra note 4, have on occasion expressed qualms about the disclosure of certain types
of speculative information, such disclosure has never been equated with a securities violation.
As long as the disclosure is accurate and complete, including a full explanation of the speculative nature of the information, it is difficult to see how it would contravene the antifraud
provisions.
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with over-reliance on speculative information. More in keeping with the
purposes of the securities laws, shareholders could be adequately protected
through accurate and complete disclosure; that is, disclosure accompanied
by cautionary admonitions attesting to the speculative nature of the negotiations. 8' 9 In this manner, investors obtain the information and can independently assess the risk of a particular investment.1 90
While not totally clear, the Third Circuit may be taking the position that
even with a cautionary admonition, reasonable shareholders would still be
unable to appreciate fully its speculative nature and would, therefore, be
misled. This interpretation would effectively treat the information as inherently or substantively misleading, something that smacks of merit regulation, a concept antithetical to the intent of, and specifically rejected by,
Congress in adopting the securities laws.1 91 Such "protection" of shareholders is inappropriate. By concluding that disclosure of speculative informa189. See Michaels Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7.
190. See South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1277
(9th Cir. 1982) ("The [issuer's] board could have alleviated any concern that the shareholders
might be misled or that the intent of the disclosure might be subverted simply by qualifying
disclosure.., with the same sort of language of disclaimer used to dissuade shareholders from
placing undue reliance .... ); see also Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 600
(5th Cir. 1974) ("Prompt disclosure helps to ensure... that investors are provided a continuing opportunity to make 'knowing, intelligent decisions.' "); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1973) ("A reasonable stockholder, once informed
of the contingency, can then determine whether to assume the risk of its occurrence or nonoccurrence in accepting or rejecting the tender offer.").
191. In enacting the Securities Act, Congress declined to approve a regulatory scheme that
called for a system of merit review, which would have enabled the Commission to keep some
speculative offerings off the market. Instead, Congress enacted a system of regulation based
upon disclosure. As long as the risks of an investment were set forth in the registration statement, the securities could be sold, no matter how speculative. See, e.g., FederalSecurities Act.:
Hearing on H.R. 4314, Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 53-55, 143-44 (1933). Thus, given adequate disclosure, stock could be sold in a
company that intended to extract gold from salt water. Id. at 57-58 (statement by Rep. Pettengill) ("Suppose somebody took out a patent to get gold out of sea water. You and I and
everybody here and everybody on the commission might think that the idea and the patent
were worthless, utterly worthless. But if they tell the truth about it when they offer it to the
public and say, this is a speculation, then as I understand there would be nothing here to
prevent that from being done."). The extraordinarily speculative nature of some new issues
recently generated concern in Congress. See Fraud and Abuse in the "Hot Issues" and "Penny
Stock" Markets. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing,and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Senator D'Amato described some of
the more speculative stocks.
In one penny prospectus, the company said that it planned to engage in research,
although, "the company has no research facilities nor does it intend to acquire such
facilities." Another company had a successful offering despite admitting that it
"does not know what business it will engage in, has no plan or operation other than it
will not engage in the exploration of oil and gas, and owns no assets."
A third company's prospectus revealed that it had failed to file tax returns since

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 36:93

tion may be misleading, the courts place themselves in a position of
determining what information can be disseminated to, and considered by,
shareholders in making investment decisions. The potential effect of this judicial posturing is to deny shareholders important information necessary for
informed and intelligent investment decisions.
Moreover, the reasoning ignores the numerous other instances where investors are required to assess speculative information. For example, the acquisition of registered securities in an initial public offering can be an
exceedingly speculative investment. Companies going public often have little or no operating history, rendering a reasonable prediction about future
success well-nigh impossible.192 Yet, with adequate disclosure of the risks,
these types of speculative investments can be sold without violating the securities laws.' 93 Adequate disclosure allows investors to assess the risks associated with the offering and to determine whether to acquire shares. It
seems disingenuous, therefore, to suggest that investors can assess the speculative nature of an initial public offering while reaching the opposite conclusion with respect to ongoing negotiations.
Not only did the Third Circuit employ reasoning that could deprive shareholders and other investors of information necessary for intelligent investment decisions, but it also articulated a rationale that allowed companies
affirmatively to mislead. As Judge Higginbotham noted in his dissent in
Heublein:
Although the majority's approach makes it easier to put together
corporate deals and mergers, I do not believe that the holding of
the majority protects sellers or purchasers of stock. If anything, it
subjects the investing public to future voluntary misrepresentations
by corporations in the midst of allegedly confidential merger
discussions.' 9 4
1971, did not know whether its officers would be able to devote sufficient time to the
company, and that it might not be able to continue as a going concern.
Id.at 3. While acknowledging the highly speculative nature of many offerings, Chairman of
the Commission, John Shad, testified that the Commission had no authority to assess the merits of an offering but was limited to ensuring complete and accurate disclosure. Id. at 16-19.
192. See Stern & Bornstein, Why New Issues Are Lousy Investments, FORBES, Dec. 2, 1985,
at 152; see also supra note 191.
193. Item 503 of Regulation S-K requires registrants to disclose risk factors associated with

the offering. A company must set forth "under an appropriate caption, a discussion of the
principal factors that make the offering speculative or one of high risk." 17 C.F.R. § 299.503
(1986); see Woodland Oil & Gas, 38 S.E.C. 485, 493 (1958) ("We conclude, therefore, that full

and accurate disclosure requires that the speculative features of [a] registrant's business and
securities be set forth in summary fashion in one place in the early part of the prospectus under
an appropriate heading.").
194. Greenfield v. Heublein, 742 F.2d 751, 763 (3d Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., dissent-

ing), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1189 (1985).
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The more cogent concern evidenced by Staffin and Heublein in adopting a
restrictive test for determining the materiality of ongoing negotiations was
the belief that disclosure could have a chilling effect on merger negotiations. I95 Arguably, for example, premature disclosure of merger negotiations might cause increases in the price of a target company's stock, thereby
making the acquisition more expensive and dooming the deal. While sometimes valid, however, this type of concern is often overstated.
To induce shareholders to tender shares in a tender offer or to vote shares
in favor of a merger proposal, a bidder must generally offer to buy shares at
a substantial premium over market price. 19 6 Aware of the possibility of such
a premium, investors learning about the negotiations will often enter the
market and acquire the target company's shares, thereby increasing demand
and driving up the share price. As a result, to pay the same premium (measured as a percentage of the share price) would require substantial additional
expenditures by the bidder, expenditures that could render the acquisition
prohibitively expensive.

197

There are problems with this scenario, however. First, speculative frenzies that drive the price of stock upward would seem more likely where the
market is fueled by rumors and leaks and has inadequate hard information
195. Courts have often acknowledged the need for secrecy to prevent disclosure of information that would jeopardize a legitimate business objective. See, e.g., State Teachers Retirement
Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981) (premature disclosure could jeopardize major
contract); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (premature
disclosure of major ore strike could interfere with corporation's ability to acquire land for mine
sight), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
196. See supra note 102.
197.

See THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR

STUDY, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 2828 (1971) ("The advantages of
secrecy are obvious: Public announcement of any intention to acquire a substantial position in
a target company would almost certainly increase the market price of the target's shares, making a bid more costly.").
In connection with its acquisition of Campbell Taggert, Inc. (CTI), Anheuser Busch had
alleged that premature disclosure of negotiations or an impending offer forced it to pay more
than originally intended for the company. Paul Thayer, a director of Anheuser Busch, told a
broker about Anheuser Busch's plans concerning CTI. The broker purchased shares for himself and his clients and tipped the information to others. Between June 28 and August 3, CTI's
share prices increased from $24 to $30. Anheuser Busch ultimately made an offer for CTI for
$37 per share. See SEC v. Thayer, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,718 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1984). Anheuser Busch filed suit against Thayer and others, alleging that as a result of Thayer's disclosures, the company was forced to pay more for CTI than
it otherwise would have. See Anheuser Busch Cos. v. Thayer, CA3-85-0794-R (N.D. Tex.).
The Commission has taken the position that "[s]o long as the corporation defrauded by the
misappropriator's scheme otherwise satisfies the standing requirement for a private action ... a
private cause of action should be available." Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Amicus Curiae at 27-28, Anheuser Busch Cos. v. Thayer, CA-3-85-0794-R
(N.D. Tex.).
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to determine the correct price of a company's stock. Because the rumors
may be inaccurate, the resulting value placed on a company by the market
may likewise be inaccurate.' 98 Public disclosure that negotiations are taking
place as well as the price range under discussion might actually prevent speculative frenzies by providing the market with information needed to accurately value the shares. Indeed, disclosure, particularly of the approximate
bid price, will often have a sedative influence on an upward, speculativedriven spiral in stock prices.' 99
Second, the arguments for secrecy ignore the frequency with which information finds its way into the marketplace. A number of recent studies have
shown that takeover announcements are often antedated by dramatic
changes in share price. 2" The thirty-three percent increase in the price of
RCA's shares during the four days preceding General Electric's takeover bid
was described by one influential periodical as "just another in a string of
occurrences known on Wall Street as 'preannouncement run-ups.' ,201 As
one judge noted, "[t]he truth of the matter is that material nonpublic information is leaked to some 'favorites' among the investing public and the suc198. An example of market over-pricing in response to misinformation occurred when rumors flooded the market that the Texaco Board had approved a proposal to acquire Pennzoil
for $100 per share in settlement of a $10.5 billion judgment. See Texaco's Board Meets to
Discuss PennzoilAccord, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1986, at 3, col. 4. In a single day, Pennzoil's stock
jumped 20 points and, for a time during the following day, increased another eight points.
After both companies denied the rumors, Pennzoil's stock declined considerably. See
Pennzoil's Rise: A Case Study, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1986, at G4, col. 1; Behr & Vise, Wall
Street Rumors, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1986, at G1, col. 2.
199. For example, after unusual activity in Key Pharmaceutical's stock in early March
1986, Key disclosed ongoing negotiations over a possible merger with Schering-Plough. The
transaction under consideration involved an exchange of .27 shares of Schering for each share
of Key, an exchange valued at approximately $17 per share. The market was, therefore, made
aware of the negotiations, the identity of the prospective bidder, and the price under consideration. Rather than a frenzied increase in the price of Key shares, the market reacted by falling
one-half point to $15.125. See Ricks & Barnes, Schering Seeks to Acquire Key Pharmaceuticals, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1986, at 8, col. 1.
200. See Templeman, The Epidemic ofInsider Trading, Bus. WK., April 29, 1985, at 79-80.
A study discussed in that article examined 229 takeovers, mergers, or leveraged buy-outs of
exchange-traded companies, and determined that stock prices of the target increased in advance of the official announcement of the transaction in 72% of the cases. The study suggests
that such information leaks into the market before the announcement is made. Indeed, in
adopting the Williams Act, intended to regulate cash tender offers, Congress considered testimony suggesting that even diligent companies cannot prevent selective leaks of information
about impending tender offers. See Full Disclosure of CorporateEquity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids, 1967.: Hearings on S. 510, Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1967) (testimony of Donald
J. Calvin). See also Metz, Use of Inside Data in the Takeover Game is Pervasiveand Can Lead
to Huge Profit, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 12, col. 1; Sterngold, Wall Street Crime and Its
Dividends, N.Y. Times, April 27, 1986, at § 46, col. 3.
201. Sterngold, supra note 200.
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cess of many investors is not because they have the genius of an Einstein but
solely because they have tidbits of information that the general public does
not have." 2 °2 Thus, information about the negotiations may already have
been disclosed to select individuals, with public disclosure to the remainder
of the market often unlikely to cause much additional harm.
Moreover, as a practical matter, companies often disclose the existence of
negotiations, including the terms under discussion, with no apparent untoward harm.2" 3 In disclosing negotiations, a release can be carefully drafted
202. Heublein, 742 F.2d at 764 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). That the word of an impending acquisition often falls into the hands of select individuals that trade on the information has been dramatized by a series of spectacular insider trading cases brought by the
Commission. See, e.g., SEC v. Boesky, Lit. Release No. 11,288 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986)
(injunctive action against arbitrageur Ivan Boesky for trading in securities while in possession
of material nonpublic information about impending mergers and tender offers; as part of settlement of the action, Boesky required to disgorge $50 million and pay a penalty of an equal
amount under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act); SEC v. Reich, Lit. Release No. 11,246
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1986) (injunctive proceeding against Ilan K. Reich, a partner at the law firm
of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz for tipping material nonpublic information "relating to
actual or contemplated tender offers, mergers, leveraged buyouts or other business combinations or extraordinary corporate transactions"); SEC v. Levine, Lit. Release No. 11,095
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1986) (injunctive proceeding against Dennis Levine, managing director of
Drexel Burnham Lambert, for trading while in possession of material nonpublic information
"concerning mergers, tender offers, leveraged buyouts and other extraordinary transactions");
see also SEC v. Levine, Lit. Release No. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1986) (settlement of injunctive
proceeding requiring Levine to disgorge approximately $11.6 million).
203. While there appears to be no authority on point, inferential evidence supports the
conclusion. A cursory review of the Wall Street Journalindicates frequent instances in which
companies, almost as a matter of course, disclose ongoing negotiations or their intention to
enter into such negotiations. Were disclosure so immediately and consistently harmful, it
would seem unlikely that it would occur with such frequency. See, e.g., Ricks & Barnes,
Schering Seeks to Acquire Key Pharmaceuticals,Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1986, at 8, col. 1 (disclosure of discussions between Key Pharmaceuticals and Schering-Plough over possible acquisition; Schering would provide .27 shares for each share of Key); James River May Buy Some of
Crown's Assets, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 1985, at El, col. 1 (Crown Zellerbach disclosed discussions with James River Corp. over sale of Crown assets); Phillips, Baxter Seeks Sale of 2 Units
as Part of Merger Offer, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1985, at 3, col. 3 (acknowledging ongoing discussions to sell certain divisions but not identifying prospective purchaser or selling price);
O'Boyle, National IntergroupIs in Talks To Sell FirstNationwide, Its Big Thrift Unit, Wall St.
J., July 30, 1985, at 2, col. 3 (price and identity of prospective purchaser not disclosed); Buss &
Marcom, Burroughs Said to Set Deadline in Bid for Sperry, Wall St. J., June 17, 1985, at 2, col.
2 (disclosing that Burroughs and Sperry to resume merger discussions but noting that no
agreement had been reached on the terms); Hall & Montgomery, Nabisco Holds Talks with
R.J. Reynolds Amid Speculation Concerns Will Merge, Wall St. J., May 30, 1985, at 2, col. 3
(price and identity of prospective purchaser not disclosed); Landro, Storer Is Willing To Discuss Merger, But Debt Is a Factor,Wall St. J., April 16, 1985, at 22, col. 3 (Storer Communications disclosed that discussions with two companies over possible merger had occurred and
expressed interest in a merger); On the Auction Block, Hughes Aircraft Looks Impressive to
Bidders, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (GM, Boeing, and Rockwell all acknowledged
interest in possibly acquiring Hughes Aircraft); Tharp, Castle & Cooke Is Discussing Merger
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to minimize any potential harm to the negotiation process. Where necessary, companies will sometimes omit particularly sensitive information such
as the identity of the other party or the terms under discussion. 2" The inevitability of these leaks and public disclosures belies the notion that public
disclosure is always harmful.
Third, the disclosure of ongoing negotiations will not necessarily cause
substantial increases in share prices. The market's reaction to the disclosures will normally take into account a number of factors, including the likelihood that the merger will occur, the perceived value of the target company,
and the possibility that other bids will occur. To the extent substantial risk
and uncertainty exists, the price increase in an efficient market should adjust
accordingly.2 ° s The possibility that the negotiations might not culminate in
a preliminary agreement and that a preliminary agreement once reached
might never be consummated often dictates that the market value the target
cautiously.

20 6

Even if share prices increase significantly following the disclosure of negotiations, a bidder will not necessarily be forced to pay a larger premium.
Paradoxically, the increase in price may demonstrate market forces at work
with Another Big Board Company, Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1985, at 14, col. 1 (identity of possible
merger candidate not disclosed).
204. In at least some circumstances, the Commission permits the omission of the bidder's
identity and the terms under discussion. See item 3, Schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101
(1986) (requiring disclosure of negotiations undertaken by the target in response to a tender
offer; such information need not be disclosed where no agreement in principle has been
reached and the board determines that disclosure would "jeopardize" continuation of the negotiations). Companies disclosing the existence of ongoing negotiations often omit discussion
of the terms or identity of the bidder. See SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,004, at 90,971 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1985) (press release acknowledging
preliminary merger negotiations with undisclosed concern; price under discussion "substantially in excess of the current market price."); Johnson, Quotron Discloses Talks with Firm It
Won't Identify, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1985, at 2, col. 3 (disclosing "preliminary" discussions
with a "major corporation" over a possible merger); Isikoff, GeneralFoods Says It Has Takeover Bid, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1985, at Fl, col. 3 (in announcing receipt of unsolicited takeover bid, bidder's identity and price not disclosed); Hall & Montgomery, supra note 203 (price
and identity of prospective purchaser not disclosed); Tharp, supra note 203 (identity of possible merger candidate not disclosed).
205. See Samuelson & Rosenthal, Price Movements as Indicatorsof Tender Offer Success,
41 J. FIN. 481 (June 1986) (price movement in target's shares following announcement of a
tender offer "represent the collective opinion of the market participants as to the success or
failure of the offer."). Of course, there is some dispute that the market is, in fact, efficient. See
Gibson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Kensley, You Won't Find an Efficient Market on Wall Street, Wall St. J., July 18, 1985, at 25, col.
3; see also Rosenberg, Reid & Lanstein, PersuasiveEvidence of Market Inefficiency, J. PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 9 (Spring 1985).

206. See Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 466, 470
(1971).
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that actually facilitate an acquisition. The increase, in the change of control
context, often results from shareholders selling to arbitrageurs and other
speculators. 20 7 By selling in the market to arbitrageurs, shareholders receive
an immediate premium for their shares, and do not have to wait for consummation of the merger or completion of the tender offer, events that may be
months away. Moreover, where an offer is for only a portion of the outstanding shares, shareholders selling to arbitrageurs avoid application of the
pro rata provisions.2 "8 Most important, however, by selling to arbitrageurs,
shareholders avoid the risk that the merger or tender offer will be unsuccessful. Concomitantly, by purchasing the shares, arbitrageurs assume the risk
that the deal will not go through. 20 9 In return for assuming this risk, arbitrageurs receive the spread between the price they paid for the shares and the
bidder's offering price.2 10
As arbitrageurs purchase shares, the increase in demand will typically
207. The increase in share prices following the announcement of a tender offer "is due to
the interest shown by parties known as arbitrageurs, who will attempt to purchase the security
at a price below the tender price, and then make their profit by tendering those purchased
shares." Johnson, Disclosure in Tender Offer Transactions: The Dice Are Still Loaded, 42 U.
PiT. L. REV. 1, 10 (1980). As much as 90% of all trading activity in response to an offer may
be from arbitrageurs. Henry, Activities ofArbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
466, 466 (1971). One early commentator estimated that arbitrageurs generally tendered between 60% and 90% of the shares received by a bidder. See Hamilton, Some Reflections on
Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L. FORUM 269, 294 n.101 (1969).
208. Section 14(d)(4) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982), requires a bidder
to accept all shares tendered during the 10 business days following the announcement on a pro
rata basis. The Commission has adopted a rule extending the pro rata period through the
offering period. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1986).
209. See Henry, supra note 207, at 469; Johnson, supra note 207, at 11; see also A Feastfor
the Arbitrageurs, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 165.
210. See Welles, Inside the ArbitrageGame, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 41, 42 (Aug. 1981)
("The profits in risk arbitrage, of course, derive from the differential or spread between the
price of the stock following the announcement of a reorganization and the value ultimately
realized by shareholders when the transaction is complete."). For example, following a management buyout offer for $68 per share, Macy's stock traded at $66 5/8, a spread of 2.4%.
Arbitrageurs buying shares at that price and tendering them two weeks later when the offer
was expected to close would earn an annualized return of about 27%. See Wall Street's Arbs
on the Hot Seat, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 2, 1986, at 41. While in some instances
arbitrageurs have lost substantial amounts of money, see Wall Street's Risk Takers Roll the
Dice, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 18, 1985, at 60 (reporting loss by one arbitrageur of
$80 million on a single transaction), Smith Barney Sues Goodyear, Goldsmith Charging
Buyback Broke Securities Law, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1986, at 2, col. I (disclosure that the shares
of Goodyear held by the Smith, Barney arbitrage department had decline $8 million in value);
the practice of arbitrage in the change of control context has proved famously profitable. See
Stock Trader Who Shoots for the Moon, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 15, 1985, at 11
(reporting that one arbitrageur made over $100 million on two transactions); Top Arbitrageurs
Are IncreasingCapital,Raising Some Concern as Well as Money, Wall St. J., April 3, 1986, at
10, col. 1 (reporting that in 1985, arbitrage firms paid outside investors a return of 50%).
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cause the spread between the market price and the bid price to decrease.2 1 '
Indeed, shortly before consummation of a merger or completion of a tender
offer, when there is minimal risk that the transaction will collapse, the
spread may all but disappear.2 12 Even with a narrow spread, however, arbitrageurs can still profit by reason of the volume of their transactions.2 13
The disclosure of ongoing negotiations may cause arbitrageurs and other
risk takers to enter the market and begin acquiring shares. As demand for
shares increases, so will the price. The resulting increase, however, does not
necessarily force a bidder to pay more for a target. Arbitrageurs normally
do not hold shares as long-term investments, but typically strive for shortterm profits.2 14 As a result, arbitrageurs have an incentive to sell as quickly
211. See Hamilton, supra note 207, at 294 ("The consequence of arbitrage activity is to
cause the market price of the target corporation's security to rise quickly to approximate the
tender price ... discounted by the possibility that the offer may not succeed."); see also Comment, Should Tender Offer Arbitrage Be Regulated?, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1000, 1005.
212. See Henry, supra note 207, at 470 (noting that shortly before consummation of an
offer, spread is often "negligible"); see also Samuelson & Rosenthal, Price Movements as Indicators of Tender Offer Success, 41 J. FIN. 481 (June 1986) ("If the tender is successful, the
target stock will trade at (or very near) the tender price before being delisted.").
213. See Henry, supra note 207, at 469 (although an arbitrageur's "profits per share on
transactions undertaken at the narrower spread are smaller, he may trade in large volumes,
thus making the overall transaction highly profitable."). Even if the final trading price actually
exceeds the offering price, arbitrageurs can still profit. When H.K. Porter agreed to purchase
all outstanding shares in Fansteel Incorporated for $23.50 per share, the company also offered
brokers a solicitation fee of 45 cents for each share they tendered as an inducement to obtain
the shares. Shortly before the offer closed, Fansteel's share prices climbed above the offering
price to $23.75. Nonetheless, because of the solicitation fee, brokers could purchase the shares
in the market, tender them to Porter, and still make a profit of 20 cents per share. See Ehrbar,
How to Play the Arbitrage Game, FORTUNE, July 1976, at 84.
214. A number of factors militate against long term investments by arbitrageurs. By
purchasing shares in a particular target, arbitrageurs tie up capital which becomes unavailable
for use in other deals. They may also incur certain transaction costs the longer the shares are
held. For example, borrowed funds represent an important source of capital for arbitrageurs.
See Sterngold, Boesky Builds $1 Billion War Chest, N.Y. Times, March 13, 1986, at DI, col. 4
(reporting that Boesky stated in an offering circular that "he could quickly increase the $1
billion [in investment capital] to $3 billion of 'investable funds' through borrowings."). Assuming some type of revolving line of credit, interest charges will be greater the longer the
funds are tied up in a particular deal. See Johnson, supra note 207, at 10.
In addition, raising investment capital from investors rather than through borrowing also
generates costs. Raising such funds may necessitate payment of a fee to a broker or investment
banker. See Anders, Top ArbitrageursAre Increasing Capital,Raising Some Concern As Well
As Money, Wall St. J., April 3, 1986, at 10, col. 1 (reporting that Merrill Lynch was to be paid
annual fee of 1/2 of one percent of funds raised). Capital raised through the sale of high yield
"junk bonds" may also generate considerable costs. See Sterngold, supra (in attempting to
raise a pool of $1 billion, one arbitrageur sold almost $750 million in junk bonds; the bonds
paid either 13% and a portion of the profits or 17% and a smaller portion of profits.). All of
these costs require arbitrageurs to maximize returns. Finally, arbitrageurs need to keep profit
levels high in order to attract sufficient investment capital. See Anders, supra (reporting that
arbitrageur profits in excess of 50% "have made it easy to attract new clients").
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as possible.2"' Consequently, the premium necessary to induce an arbitrageur to sell need not be as high as the premium that must be paid to other
shareholders. As long as the bid price is high enough to induce the remaining shareholders to tender and to create a sufficient spread for arbitrageurs
to earn an adequate profit, the bid price normally will not need to be in2 6
creased, notwithstanding the rising market.
This reasoning raises an obvious question. If disclosure is not generally
harmful, why is secrecy so prevalent? While sometimes detrimental to the
interests of shareholders, secrecy, at least in the change of control context,
can benefit bidders by minimizing the likelihood of competitive bidding.
Disclosure places the market on notice that a particular target is "in play,"
thereby increasing the likelihood of competing offers and an auction market.2" 7 Advanced notice of a possible merger or friendly tender offer not
only provides other prospective bidders additional time to study the viability
of the acquisition and assess any synergistic benefits, but also affords additional time to obtain the resources and financing necessary for a competitive
offer.

21 8

215. See Henry, supra note 207, at 468 ("Even if the defensive tactics [of the target] fail to
block the takeover, the delay and uncertainty created may convince the arbitrageur that his
capital can be more profitably invested elsewhere"); see also Dealersin the Know, THE EcONOMIST, May 24, 1986, at 14-15 ("Since the arbitrageurs will be more ready than the institutions
to sell to the predator at a quick profit, the bid succeeds more easily."). Even a short delay can
have a substantial impact on the profits of an arbitrageur. Had the Macy's offering, see supra
note 213, remained open an additional month, the annualized profits of the arbitrageurs who
purchased in early June at $66 5/8 would decline from 27% to about 13%. See Wall Street's
"Arbs" on the Hot Seat, supra note 210, at 41.
216. For example, Hanson Trust was able to induce arbitrageurs to sell their holdings in
SCM Corporation by offering a premium of about one dollar over market price, notwithstanding a pending offer by Merrill Lynch and SCM's management at an even higher price. In less
than two hours, Hanson Trust acquired, primarily from arbitrageurs, about 25% of SCM's
stock. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985). Had Hanson not
been enjoined by the district court, the company may have been able to acquire an even greater
percentage of SCM's shares.
217. An auction market clearly enhances shareholder wealth. See supra note 102. Some
commentators, however, have argued that competitive bidding is not necessarily beneficial.
See Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of FiduciaryDuty, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 653-56 (1985); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174-80 (1981). This
view, however, has received substantial criticism. See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Casefor Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1175 (1984).
218. Because time works to the detriment of the initial bidder, a target may engage in
dilatory tactics or vexatious litigation, not so much in the expectation of the bidder withdrawing the offer, but in an effort to lengthen the time period of the offer in the hope that other,
more acceptable bidders will enter the fray. See Giammarino & Heinkel, A Model of Dynamic
Takeover Behavior, 41 J. FIN. 465, 466 (June 1986) ("target management resistance is justified
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An auction market is often detrimental to the original bidder's interests.
Either the bidder will be unable to acquire the target or, if successful, will be
forced to pay a higher price. The danger of an auction market to an initial
bidder is not academic; a recent study found that once competitive bidding
commenced, initial bidders failed to acquire control of the target in seventyeight percent of the cases.2 19 Failure to acquire the target deprives the original bidder of the synergistic or other benefits expected from the acquisition.
Moreover, the bidder may be further disadvantaged if the target is ultimately
acquired by a competitor. Finally, the original bidder may also have incurred expenses 22 ° in locating an appropriate target, expenses that may not
be repaid if another bidder is successful.
Of course, even if disclosure is delayed until an agreement in principle has
been reached, some opportunity exists for competitive bidding. In the case
of a merger agreement, a period of time will elapse between the date the
agreement is executed and the date that shareholders vote on the merger.2 2'
as a tactic designed to delay the process and thereby allow time for more bidders to enter the
contest ....");see also supra note 215.
219. Ruback, Assessing Competition in the Market for Corporate Acquisitions, 11 J. FIN.
ECON. 147 (1983). As one commentator concluded, "[t]he statistical evidence is fairly clear
that the first bidder generally loses in a competitive bidding contest." Coffee, supra note 217,
at 1289. A study of 28 attempted buyouts by management found that third parties outbid
management in 11 instances. See Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730,
738 (1985).
220. These costs may be fees paid to an investment banker, expenses associated with obtaining the necessary financing, and time lost by corporate officials and employees in connection with the search. See Bebchuk, Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 32 (1982); see
also Williams, King of the Buyouts Kohlberg Kravis Helps Alter Corporate US., Wall St. J.,
April 11, 1986, at 1,col. 6 (stating that Kohlberg Kravis, an investment banking firm, would
receive a $45 million fee for arranging for Beatrice Company to go private); Stewart & Hertzberg, Investment Bankers Feed a Merger Boom and Pick Up Fat Fees, Wall St. J., April 2,
1986, at 1, col. 6 (noting that First Boston's merger and acquisition department earned approximately $200 million in 1985 and that Drexel Burnham received an estimated $60 million fee
for assisting Pantry Pride in acquiring Revlon).
221. See Brown v. Chicago Rock I.& Pac. R.R., 328 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1964) (third party
tender offer following announcement of a merger). See also supra note 50 (discussing disclosure requirements for merger proxy). Moreover, the announcement of a merger agreement
may, in some cases, actually facilitate another bidder's efforts to acquire control of the target.
Once an agreement is announced, shares will often gravitate toward arbitrageurs, thereby concentrating a high percentage of shares in the hands of a small number of investors. Given the
pressure on arbitrageurs to maximize short term profits, a tender offer by a subsequent bidder
involving a premium over the current market price could succeed. Alternatively, a bidder
could enter the market and acquire control by "sweeping" the arbitrageurs. Cf Hanson Trust
PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985) (offering a premium of about one dollar over
market, Hanson purchased approximately 25% of SCM's shares in less than two hours, primarily from arbitrageurs).
An example where an agreement in principle did not prevent another company from acquiring the target arose in connection with Texaco's acquisition of Getty Oil. Although Pennzoil
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During this period, another bidder conceivably could make a tender offer at
a higher price and acquire control of the target. Similarly, where an initial
bidder seeks to acquire control through a friendly tender offer, the Williams
Act and Commission rules require that the offer remain open for at least
twenty business days.22 2 Thus, once an offer puts a target company "in
play," other prospective bidders have at least the twenty business days to
make a competing bid.2 23
Nonetheless, the earlier the negotiations are disclosed, the more time
other prospective bidders will have to decide whether to make competing
offers. As a result, the initial bidder has an obvious incentive to shorten the
period in which competing offers can occur. Successfully enshrouding negotiations in secrecy will leave other potential bidders unaware that a particular target is in play.224 By withholding information about an impending
tender offer or merger, the parties may also be able to negotiate an agreement containing terms designed to discourage competitive bidding, such as
"crown jewel" and other lock-up options.2 25
and Getty had previously announced an agreement to merge, Texaco made a more lucrative
offer and acquired Getty. See Moffett, Petzinger & Stewart, Courting Disaster How Texaco
Turned Big Victory into BiggerLegal Loss, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 6. Nonetheless,
the existence of an agreement in principle to merge, particularly if coupled with some type of
lock-up option, can toughen considerably the ability of an interloping bidder to acquire the
target. Moreover, the legal difficulties incurred by Texaco in the wake of its acquisition of
Getty have been said to have made some bidders wary of making an offer for a target once an
agreement in principle has been announced. See Waldman, Cautious Talks, Texaco-Pennzoil
Case Makes First CarefulAbout Merger Moves, Wall St. J., April 15, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
222. Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986). Shareholder withdrawal rights extend
throughout the offering period. See rule 14d-7(a), 17 C.F.R. § 2140.14d-7(a) (1986); see also
Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,016, at 88,196-97
(July 11, 1986) (amending rule 14(d)-7(a) to extend withdrawal rights throughout offering
period). As a result, as long as the initial bidder's offer is open, even shareholders that have
already tendered can withdraw the shares and tender them to a competing bidder.
223. Once an offer is made, the risk of competitive bidding is substantial. The Commission's Office of the Chief Economist conducted a study of the 148 successful tender offers from
1981 through 1983 and found that competitive bidding occurred in 62 cases. See supra note
102. Once competitive bidding begins, the initial bidder often loses. See supra note 219.
224. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it is often the bidder that insists on secrecy. See, e.g., In re
Carnation, Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,801, at 87,593 (July 8, 1985) (prospective bidder, Nestle, informed target Carnation that discussions would cease if Carnation publicly disclosed negotiations); see also State
Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1982) (party awarding
contract to Fluor placed "embargo" on publicity until specified date).
225. A lock-up may take the form of an option to buy a certain percentage of the target
company's shares. See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984) (court upheld lock-up option issued by Datatab, the
target, to a competing bidder to buy unissued shares equivalent to 200% of Datatab's outstanding shares). A lock-up may also involve an option to buy important assets of the target,
i.e., the crown jewels. See Mobile Oil Co. v. Marathon, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
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While secrecy is often in the interest of the bidder, secrecy may not necessarily be in the best interest of target shareholders. Shareholders gain from
an auction market through increases in the offering price. To the extent that
secrecy inhibits the auction market, therefore, shareholders may be forced to
tender their shares at prices lower than would otherwise have been the case.
The debate on the need for secrecy aside, it can be conceded that at least

in some instances, disclosure of the ongoing negotiations will prevent a particular transaction from going forward. The increase in share prices beyond
the offering price may result from the market's perception that the target is
worth more than what the bidder is willing to pay. The market thus expects

either the open market price of the shares to increase or another bidder to
offer a higher price.22 6 If the market expects other bids and none materialdenied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982) (In an effort to defeat a tender offer by Mobile Corp., Marathon
gave U.S. Steel an option to buy its crown jewel, a 48% interest in oil and mineral rights in the
Yates Oil Field, an option that could be exercised only if a third party acquired control of
Marathon.). Whether in the form of an option to purchase stock or an option to purchase
assets, lock-ups may make the target sufficently unattractive so as to deter other bidders from
making an offer. Of course, a crown jewel option may sometimes be insufficient to block a
determined bidder, at least where the courts are cooperative. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d 264
(2d Cir. 1985).
As a general matter, fully disclosed lock-up arrangements do not raise concerns under the
Williams Act. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (rejecting Sixth
Circuit's reasoning in Marathon, that a fully disclosed lock-up arrangement can violate § 14(e)
of the Williams Act); Kademian v. Ladish Co., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,764, at
93,745 (7th Cir. May 28, 1986) (concluding that after Schreiber a fully disclosed lock-up arrangement did not violate securities laws); see also Lerner & Schwartz, Commentary---LockUps and Lock-Ins, 51 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1103 (1985). Lock-ups issued during the pendency
of contested takeovers have, however, been successfully challenged under state law. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1985) (crown jewel option issued to
Merrill Lynch declared invalid); see also MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon,
Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 505 A.2d 454 (Del. 1985) (per curiam) (enjoining lockup options issued by Revlon).
In addition to lock-up options, a merger agreement can foreclose other prospective merger
agreements by including a clause that expressly prohibits a target from selling assets or otherwise executing a merger agreement with other companies. In Jewel Cos., v. Pay Less Drug
Stores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit upheld an exclusive
merger agreement in which the target agreed not to enter into merger agreements with other
companies. Of course, such a prohibition does not prevent a third party from blocking the
merger through a tender offer for the target.
226. See Samuelson & Rosenthal, Price Movements as Indicatorsof Tender Offer Success,
41 J. FIN. 481, 498 (June 1986) ("in competitive takeover bidding, it is common for the current
stock price to rise about the initial tender offer in anticipation of (or in response to) higher
competitive bids."). Where the market expects a competing offer, the trading price often exceeds the offering price. On September 19, 1985, Unilever announced that it was increasing
the offering price for Richardson-Vicks, Inc. from $54 to $60 per share. Within several days
after the announcement, Richardson-Vicks' stock price had jumped 10 points to over $63 in
apparent expectation that a white knight would make a higher offer. See Vise, RichardsonVicks Stock Soars on Rumor of Sale, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1985, at B1, col. 4. True to form, on
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ize, the target's shares will often fall back below the bidder's offering
price.227 Both expectations suggest the inadequacy of the original offering
price and that preventing the initial merger agreement may be in the best
interest of shareholders.
Even accepting the premise that increased disclosure will have a chilling
effect on some negotiations in a manner detrimental to shareholders, a blanket rule of nondisclosure is not justified. The effect of cases such as Staffin
and Heublein is to allow companies to issue false "no developments" press
releases without fear of liability, a result antithetical to the purposes of the
securities laws.22 While those favoring nondisclosure dwell on the potential
harm to companies, they typically fail to address, or even to acknowledge,
the harm to investors in the market. Nondisclosure allows companies to
deprive investors of material information. This result conflicts with the
October 1, Richardson-Vicks announced that it had accepted an offer from Proctor & Gamble
at $69 per share. See Williams, Waldholz & Soloman, Vicks Board Accepts Friendly Bid from
P & G Totalling $1.24 Billion, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1985, at 3, col. 1; see also Gilman & Tharp,
MAXXAM Plans Bid to Acquire Pacific Lumber, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1985, at 2, col. 2 (when
MAXXAM Group, Inc. disclosed an impending tender offer for Pacific Lumber Co. for $36
per share, Pacific Lumber's stock price increased six points to $39, reflecting the market's
reaction to the expectation that another company would top the MAXXAM bid). The market
price may also exceed the offering price where the market believes that the initial bid is too low
to succeed.
A higher bid may be necessary to entice a shareholder to sell and/or to win the support of
the target's management. After Burroughs Corp. announced its intention to make an offer of
$70 per share for Sperry Corp., Sperry's share prices jumped over 13 points in a single day to
$71.25. See Buss, Hertzberg & Marcom, BurroughsProposes to Buy Sperry Corp., Create New
No. 2 Computer Maker, Wall St. J., May 6, 1986, at 3, col. 1. The price exceeded Burroughs'
offering price amid speculation that Burroughs would be forced to offer more in order to overcome the opposition of Sperry's management. See Hertzberg & Marcom, Sperry's Shares
Surge to $71.25 on Speculation, Wall St. J., May 7, 1986, at 2, col. 2. After Burroughs raised
the offering price to $76.50 per share, Sperry's board of directors acquiesced to the acquisition.
See Buss, Hertzberg & Marcom, Sperry Agrees To Be Acquired By Burroughs, Wall St. J., May
28, 1986, at 2, col. 2.
227. For example, on July 1, 1986, Loral Corp. made an offer of $50 per share for Sanders
Assocs. Lockheed Corp. followed with an offer for Sanders at $60 per share. In response to
the second offer, Sanders' share price climbed more than two points above the Lockheed offer.
The market apparently expected Loral to top the Lockheed offer. When Loral instead announced that it was withdrawing its bid, the share price slid back below Lockheed's offering
price. See Hertzberg, Loral Withdraws Its $980 Million Offer for Sanders, Clearing Way for
Lockheed, Wall St. J., July 15, 1986, at 10, col. 1.
228. As the Commission has noted:
The importance of accurate and complete issuer disclosure to the integrity of the
securities markets cannot be overemphasized. To the extent that investors cannot
rely upon the accuracy and completeness of issuer statements, they will be less likely
to invest, thereby reducing the liquidity of the securities markets to the detriment of
investors and issuers alike.
In re Carnation, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8,
1985).
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overall purpose of the securities laws to encourage disclosure.229 Interference with ongoing negotiations and the prospect of harm does not justify
complete absolution from liability for fraudulent misstatements by
companies. 230
Moreover, a finding of materiality at relatively early stages does not ineluctably lead to the conclusion that disclosure of negotiation will occur with
heightened frequency. As noted, an obligation to disclose material developments generally arises only in certain instances, such as when a company
trades in its own stock or makes a public disclosure that would otherwise be
misleading but for the disclosure of the negotiations. Companies, therefore,
largely can prevent application of the duty to disclose by refraining from
trading in their own shares or by remaining silent during the pendency of the
231
negotiations.
In summary, requiring an agreement between the target and bidder on
price and post-merger corporate structure as a precondition to a finding of
materiality does not comport with the balancing test articulated in Texas
Gulf Sulphur,2 32 appears inconsistent with the overall disclosure philosophy
229. See supra note 2.
230. As the Commission has noted, even if requiring disclosure might inhibit certain
merger negotiations, "[iln the final analysis, however, this concern cannot justify deceptive
conduct." Michaels Memorandum, supra note 11, at 9.
231. As the Commission has indicated:
[T]he concern [of the Heublein Court] is, in effect, that it is impossible for a corporation accurately to disclose the existence of preliminary likelihood of success of
merger negotiations, and that such disclosure would thus itself be misleading. The
Commission does not agree with this reasoning. It should in fact be a relatively
simple matter for a corporation to disclose that it is engaged in preliminary talks
toward a possible merger, that there is no agreement to merge, and that the results of
the talks cannot be predicted.
Michaels Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7. In some ways, the Texas Gulf Sulphur analysis
leads to an almost Hobson's choice. In response to inquiries, companies often have little
choice but either to remain silent or to disclose otherwise nonpublic information. Moreover,
silence may be tantamount to an affirmative disclosure. Nonetheless, the difficult choice does
not justify a third alternative, a misstatement. As one court concluded:
Imposing a duty on [the target] in these circumstances may, at first blush, appear
unfair. Once [the bidder]approached[the target], [the target]'s choices were limited.
"Should we have refused to speak with [the bidder]?" [the target] may ask. However,
[the target]'s quandry [sic] was a foreseeable consequence of the scheme upon which
it had embarked. This far-reaching consequence of its alleged wrongdoing evokes
little sympathy. [The target] could have said nothing and avoided the difficulties
entirely. It chose instead to speak in furtherance of its own interests and must suffer
the consequences of its actions.
Whitbread-(US) Holdings, Inc. v. Rothschild, 630 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (emphasis added).
232. Not only is the Staffin-Heublein line of authority a departure from the more conventional, longstanding analysis for determining the materiality of speculative information, but it
also represents a departure from the type of analysis employed by the Third Circuit for other
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of the federal securities laws and is derived from faulty reasoning. While the
probability of an ultimate agreement may be particularly speculative during
the period preceding an agreement in principle, the magnitude of the underlying agreement still must be considered. As noted, mergers result in the
demise of the target company and, therefore, have been characterized as
"the most important event" in at least a small corporation's life.2"3 Mergers
also often involve substantial premiums, a fact of no small importance to
reasonable investors.23 4 Under the Texas Gulf Sulphur balancing test, the
magnitude of a possible merger weighs heavily in favor of materiality, even if
the negotiations have not yet advanced to the level of a preliminary
agreement.

The reasoning employed by the courts in Heublein and Staffin to support
the price-structure test does not withstand scrutiny.23 5 Moreover, by permitting and perhaps even requiring companies to withhold information
about negotiations preceding the price and structure determinations, the
courts have adopted a position that is fundamentally inconsistent with the
goal of the securities laws of ensuring full disclosure. Finally, while the Heublein-Staffin courts may have been motivated by the laudatory goal of bringing certainty to an uncertain area, certainty has a cost. A bright-line test is
more susceptible to abuse. Companies far advanced in the negotiations process may be able to avoid disclosure by intentionally leaving elements of the
price term or post-merger structure undecided until the last moment.236 The
types of speculative information. In Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enter., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984),
the court employed a Texas GulfSulphur type analysis to determine the materiality of asset
valuations. As the court noted, materiality had to be determined: "on a case by case basis, by
weighing the potential aid such information will give a shareholder against the potential harm,
such as undue reliance if the information is released with a proper cautionary note." Id. at
988. But see Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703, 710 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1987) (No. 86-860) (declining to find a duty to disclose financial
projections under facts of case but noting that "[w]e do not hold that there is no duty to
disclose financial projections under any circumstances."); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772
F.2d 231, 242 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the analysis in Flynn for determinimg materiality of
asset valuation), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986). The analyses in Staffin-Heublein and
Flynn are difficult to reconcile.
233. SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 1976).
234. See supra note 102.
235. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
236. The adoption of a bright-line test has enticed at least one court to extend the StaffinHeublein reasoning to what may be its logical extreme. In Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 92,724 (N.D. I11.
Mar. 17, 1986), the court concluded not
only that agreement as to price and structure had to be reached, but that the agreement had to
be approved by the board of directors of both the target and the bidder before it would be
material. As the court stated, "[a]lthough the negotiators may have agreed before December
31, 1983, the corporations did not agree until action by their Boards of Directors or other
authorized agents." Id. at 93,517 (emphasis in original). This type of reasoning ignores the
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bright-line test would, therefore, enable companies to structure negotiations
in a way that deprived shareholders of information of unquestionable
materiality.23 7
IV.

POST-HEUBLEIN. THE COMMISSION VIEW

The Commission did not participate in the Heublein appeal. The Third
Circuit, therefore, confronted the materiality of ongoing negotiations without a clear expostulation of the Commission's views. Since that decision,
however, the Commission has had a number of opportunities to articulate its
views on the issue. The agency has addressed the issue in enforcement cases
and amicus briefs. Through these pronouncements, the Commission has expressly disagreed with the Third Circuit's reasoning in both Staffin and
238
Heublein.
The Commission's first recent comments in this area arose in In re Carnation Company,2391
'9 a report issued under section 2 1(a) of the Exchange Act. 24
Officials of Carnation and Nestle commenced discussions about a possible
fact that approval by the board is often little more than a formality. There is no sound reason
why an essentially complete agreement must await such approval before becoming material.
237. Perhaps an action could still be maintained against companies that intentionally
delayed completion of the price-structure negotiations in order to avoid disclosure. Such cases,
however, would be extraordinarily difficult to prove as they would require a detailed examination of the entire negotiation process and an analysis of the reasons and motivations of the
parties in failing to agree sooner upon price or corporate structure.
238. See infra notes 247, 257-60, 262-63, and accompanying text.
239. In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801 (July 8, 1985).
240. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982). Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act authorizes the Commission to "publish information concerning any such violations [of the 1934 Act]." Id; see Commission's Practice Relating to Reports of Investigations and Statements Submitted to the
Commission Pursuant to Section 21(a), Exchange Act Release No. 15,664, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,014 (Mar. 21, 1979). The section also authorizes the
Commission to "permit any person to file with it a statement in writing." 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)
(1982). The Commission will normally do so "where it appears to be appropriate in the public
interest and the special circumstances of the case." Exchange Act Release No. 15,664, supra
at 82,014. Section 21(a) reports are often used by the Commission to put the securities markets on notice that certain types of conduct violate the securities laws. See, e.g., In re Carnation, Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,801 (July 8, 1985); In re Howard Bronson & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 21,138, 30
SEC Docket 1113 (July 12, 1984); In re Fidelity Financial Corp., Exchange Act Release No.
18,927, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,239, at 85,240 (July 30, 1982).
The Commission's authority to issue reports under § 21(a) rarely has been litigated. In
Kakatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court, in an opinion written by then Judge Burger, held that § 21(a) provided the Commission with "ample
statutory authority" to publish the list of companies on the Canadian Restricted List. See
Securities Act Release No. 4802 (Sept. 23, 1965) (replacing Canadian Restricted List with
Foreign Restricted List).
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merger. Representatives of both companies met in mid-July, with Carnation
agreeing to provide Nestle with certain information about its international
operations. In early August, Carnation's stock began undergoing unusual
activity, jumping over four points in a single day. In response to inquiries,
of any "corCarnation's treasurer issued a statement disclaiming knowledge 24
porate developments that would account for the stock action." '
Negotiations between the two companies continued throughout August.
At a meeting held on August 9, Nestle officials suggested a price of $75 per
share, a price characterized by Carnation officials as "not in the ball
park."2' 42 Meanwhile, the price of Carnation's stock continued the inexorable trend upward, hitting a twelve-month high on August 21. Again confronted by inquiries about the unusual activity, Carnation's treasurer issued
a statement expressly denying that Carnation was negotiating with Nestle,
and in fact stating that "[w]e are not negotiating with anyone. ' '243 At the
time of the denial, Carnation's president and chief financial officer were in
Switzerland actively negotiating with officials from Nestle. 2 ' Approximately two weeks after the second "no developments" release, Carnation
and Nestle announced a merger agreement at $83 per share.
Following an investigation, the Commission issued a release characterizing Carnation's press releases of August 7 and 21 as "materially misleading"
and "materially false and misleading," respectively. In both cases, Carnation knew of reasons that would explain the unusual activity in its stockthe discussions with Nestle. Issuing a blanket "no developments" statement
was misleading and, at a minimum, should have been corrected. 245 As the
Commission stated:
Whenever an issuer makes a public statement or responds to an
inquiry from a stock exchange official concerning rumors, unusual
241. In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,592 (July 8, 1985).
242. Id. The $75 was in fact "in the ball park." Nestle ultimately purchased the shares for
$83. Id. at 87,594.
243. Id. The Dow Jones news wire study stated the following:
Malone [the corporate spokesman and treasurer] said he had been informed of rumors in the market that Carnation is about to be acquired by Nestle S.A. or be taken
private in a leveraged buyout by Kohlberg Kravis Robert. "But to the best of my
knowledge there is nothing to substantiate either one of them" said Malone. "We are
not negotiating with anyone."

Id. Malone had not been informed of the negotiations with Nestle. Following the statement,
Malone was told to respond "no comment" to any further inquiries. Id. at 87,594-95.
244. Id. at 87,594. Stories in the press had also speculated about a possible merger between
Carnation and Nestle. Id. at 87,594.
245. Id. at 87,596. The Commission made clear in the report that the existence of a duty to
disclose was not at issue. The only question was whether Carnation's disclosures were misleading. Id.
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market activity, possible corporate developments or any other matter, the statement must be materially accurate and complete. If the
issuer is aware of nonpublic information concerning acquisition
discussions that are occurring at the time the statement is made,
the issuer has an obligation to disclose sufficient information concerning the discussions to prevent the statements made from being
materially misleading ..

.

. Thus, in the Commission's view, an

issuer statement that there is no corporate development that would
account for unusual market activity in its stock, made while the
issuer is engaged in acquisition discussions, may be materially false
and misleading.24 6
To the extent that the Third Circuit's decision in Heublein indicated a contrary result, the Commission concluded "that Heublein was wrongly
24 7
decided."
246. Id. The Commission's pronouncements in Carnation were widely reported. See
Merger Talk, FORTUNE, Aug. 5, 1985, at 9; The SEC: Don't Mislead in Mergers, Bus. WEEK,
July 22, 1985, at 74; SEC Report on Carnation, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1985, at 21, col. 1; SEC to
Require Some Disclosure of Merger Talks, Wall St. J., July 9, 1985, at 3, col. 1. Some criticized
the release, including a former General Counsel of the Commission, mostly on the ground that
it would unnecessarily chill merger negotiations. See Hertzberg & Leefeldt, SEC's MergerDisclosure Ruling May Add to Stock-Price Volatility, Wall St. J., July 10, 1985, at 31, col 1; see
also Lunzer, No Comment, FORBES, Sept. 16, 1985, at 31 (noting that "the SEC seems to have
acted hastily with a ruling that could conceivably sabotage a lot of worthwhile mergers");
Olson, Usual SEC Restraint Absent in Takeover Releases, Legal Times, Sept. 2, 1985, at 12;
But What Does It Mean?, FORBES, Aug, 12, 1985, at 12. Others generally discussed the release
in favorable terms, noting that it essentially did little more than reiterate the longstanding
prohibition on misleading statements. See Greene, Public Disclosure of Merger Negotiations,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 1985, at 1 (Carnationrelease "do[es] not reflect any major change of law.");
Kilpatrick, SEC Tells Companies Not to Lie About Acquisition Talks, Birmingham Post-Heraid, Sept. 14, 1985, at B7, col. 1; Poser, Surprise! The SEC Says You Shouldn't Tell Lies About

Merger Negotiations, INVESTMENT

DEALERS

DiG., Aug. 26, 1985, at 36.

The concern that arose from the legal principles enunciated in the release was unfounded.
As the General Counsel to the Commission, Daniel L. Goelzer, explained in a letter to the
Wall Street Journal:
Your July 10 second-front-page article describing the SEC's recent Carnation Co.
release cited commentators who characterized the Commission's position as "impractical," and speculated that the release would "force more public disclosure about
secret merger talks." In fact, the Commission's release breaks no new ground and
imposes no additional disclosure obligations.
The Commission's release simply reiterates a well-settled proposition. The antifraud provisions of the securities laws prohibit companies from making materially
false or misleading statements to the public-during merger negotiations or at any
other time. While the release encourages companies to respond promptly to market
rumors, it also makes clear that, in appropriate circumstances, a "no comment" response to press inquiries is permissible. These principles are hardly novel; rather.
they are axiomatic.
Wall St. J., July 24, 1985, at 21, col. 1.
247. In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8, 1985). Critics of the Carnation release

1986]

Corporate Secrecy

The report contained no explicit discussion of the materiality of the negotiations; materiality was apparently presumed. The materiality of the August 21 negotiations seems beyond peradventure. By this time, Carnation
had provided Nestle with financial information, the companies had been
talking for over a month, officials of the companies had held a number of
high level meetings, and price negotiations had begun.
The materiality of the negotiations on August 7 presents a more interesting case. Officials of the two companies had met only once, although another meeting was to be held in a few days. Telephone calls had been
exchanged and Carnation officials knew that the company's largest shareholder was interested in selling its shares. No merger price, however, had
been suggested. Despite the formative state of the August 7 negotiations, the
Carnationrelease treated them as material. Rumors over a possible acquisition of Carnation by Nestle even at this early stage apparently caused Carnation's stock price to jump. Thus this case provides a telling example of how
early in the process negotiations can be material.
Also interesting is the Commission's treatment of the need for secrecy. At
one point, Nestle officials threatened to terminate the negotiations if public
disclosure occurred. That Nestle would terminate discussions with a viable
merger candidate simply because negotiations were publicly disclosed must
questioned the propriety of an administrative ruling that expressly disagreed with the holding
of a federal appellate court. Others asserted that the Commission was attempting to force
earlier disclosure of merger negotiations, something that would hinder such negotiations.
Neither criticism, however, is particularly well-founded. While the Commission historically
has not made widespread use of § 21(a) reports to expressly disagree with an appellate decision, nothing precludes it from doing so. Other administrative agencies such as the Internal
Revenue Service routinely acquiesce or disagree with decisions in the federal courts. See J.
GRAUER & M. ROTHKOPF, FUNDAMENTALS OF TAX RESEARCH 3-29 (1977); see also Note,
Agency Nonacquiescence: Implementation, Justification, and Acceptability, 42 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1233 (1985). The § 21(a) report simply placed issuers on notice about the Commission's interpretation of Heublein. The less satisfactory alternative would be for the Commission to articulate its view through the medium of an enforcement action, an alternative
particularly unpalatable to the subjects of the investigation. The Carnation release at least
provided advance warning, allowing issuers to modify their actions in a way that will avoid
conflict with the Commission's interpretation and a possible enforcement action.
The second claim that the Commission was seeking to obtain earlier disclosure of merger
negotiations is equally misplaced. In its bluntest terms, Carnation stands for the unremarkable
proposition that a company cannot lie to the public. Carnation's spokesman denied that negotiations with Nestle were taking place. Had the Carnation spokesman said nothing or responded "no comment," there would have been no duty to reveal the existence of the
negotiations with Nestle. The release does not expand the disclosure requirements under the
federal securities laws; it simply restated the longstanding prohibition on misleading disclosures. Those decrying the Commission's position are, therefore, supporting the view that companies may issue misleading disclosures about merger negotiations without fear of an
enforcement action. This view, rather than the Commission's, represents a radical departure
from long established principles of the federal securities laws.
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be viewed with some skepticism, although whether Nestle would have done
so of course is unknown. Admittedly, publicity might have made the acquisition of Carnation more expensive to Nestle by either accelerating an upward trend in share prices or by attracting other bidders. Nestle, therefore,
did stand to benefit from continued secrecy. Even with the ban on public
disclosure, however, Carnation's stock price increased significantly, apparently without affecting the merger. In any event, Nestle's threat to terminate
the negotiations received little attention in the Commission's opinion. Nothing in the release suggested that Nestle's threat of terminating the negotiations had any impact on Carnation's duty to correct the misstatement.
Although the Commission concluded that both press releases were misleading, the report left unclear the precise nature of the antifraud violations.
Arguably, Carnation violated the antifraud provisions ab initio by issuing
the misleading press releases. To prevent such misstatements, Carnation arguably had a duty to keep its public spokesman apprised of all major developments, thereby ensuring the accuracy of releases when issued.
Alternatively, Carnation should have had a system in place requiring preclearance from the appropriate corporate official before a public statement
was made. Such policies would reduce the opportunity to disseminate false
information, particularly when responding to calls from investors and analysts. Carnation also could have implemented a policy of responding "no
comment" to all inquiries about merger negotiations or rumors, thereby
avoiding the problem of misleading statements without necessarily revealing
the negotiations to the corporate spokesman.2 48
Alternatively, the antifraud violation may have been Carnation's failure to
correct the misleading releases. 249 A statement by the corporate spokesman
is typically treated as a statement on behalf of the company. To the extent
that the spokesman's statements are false and not the views of the corporation, prompt correction, or at least prompt disavowal, would seem to be
required. Perhaps a public statement indicating that the spokesman's statement was unauthorized and not necessarily the views of the company would
have been sufficient. 250 Absent any such action, the corporation may fairly
248. In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8, 1985). The Commission made clear,
however, that a "no comment" response to inquiries would not always be appropriate. Inquiries about rumors attributable to an issuer or prior statements that become incorrect or misleading might require a statement of the true state of affairs, rather than a noncommital "no
comment" response. The release seems to take the position that a "no comment" response will
be inappropriate where there is inaccurate information in the marketplace and the source of
the information was the issuer.
249. Id.
250. See Cole, Home Shopping Weighs Purchases, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at D4, col. 5
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be treated as having ratified the corporate spokesman's misleading
statement.25 1
Finally, the release raises questions about the role of the corporate spokesman. Carnation's treasurer knew about rumors concerning a merger between Nestle and Carnation. Indeed, speculation about such a merger
appeared in a number of publications. Given the unusual activity in Carnation's stock and the speculation concerning a possible acquisition by Nestle,
the company's spokesman was arguably on notice about a possible development. Not to have investigated internally before issuing such emphatic denials to inquiries about the rumors may have been reckless. Had the
spokesman made such inquiries, one of the other officers might have prevented the misleading denials. The Commission's release did not address the
possible recklessness of the spokesman, however.
A more extensive analysis of the materiality of ongoing merger negotiations was undertaken in briefs filed as amicus curiae in Michaels v.
Michaels2 2 and Levinson v. Basic, Inc. 253 In Michaels, the parties owned a
family business. Filial relations being less than harmonious, plaintiff decided
to terminate his involvement and sell his interest back to the company.
Before execution of the sales agreement, defendants, all relatives of plaintiff,
contacted a broker about the possible sale of the business. The broker indicated that a number of companies might be interested in acquiring the business, including one that had previously shown interest in doing so. Plaintiff
was not informed of these developments. Approximately six months after
plaintiff agreed to sell his shares, defendants executed an agreement to sell
the company at a substantial profit.25 4
Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the nondisclosure of the negotiations violated the antifraud provisions and successfully obtained damages.2 55 De(following quote over Dow Jones by spokesman that company knew of no reason to explain
unusual stock activity, company "said the statement on the ticker had been reported incor-

rectly.") From a purely mechanical point of view, corporations seeking to disavow a spokesman's statement may have trouble disseminating the information. In Etshokin v. Texasgulf,
Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. I11. 1985), the spokesman for Canada Development denied that
the company had any intent to sell its shares in Texasgulf. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. According to the defendants, the company attempted to retract the statement but had

been unable to do so. Dow Jones refused to issue the disavowal unless Canada Development
was taking the position that the prior statement was false, something Canada Development
refused to do. Notwithstanding these efforts to correct the statement, the district court refused
to dismiss a suit alleging that the statement violated the antifraud provisions.
251. See, e.g., State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir.
1981).
252. 767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986). See supra note 11.
253. 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cii. 1986). See supra note 11.
254. Michaels, 767 F.2d at 1192.
255. Id. at 1191.
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fendants appealed, contending that the information about a possible
acquisition was immaterial as a matter of law. Noting that Heublein involved public shareholders, the Seventh Circuit agreed that disclosure of
ongoing negotiations might mislead shareholders in the open market. The
court therefore agreed that ongoing negotiations for publicly traded companies were immaterial absent an agreement on price and structure. Where,
however, a publicly traded company was not involved, the possibility that
disclosure might mislead shareholders was less of a concern. Negotiations
could, therefore, be material prior to an agreement on price and structure.2 56
Because the company in Michaels was not publicly traded, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Heublein was not controlling and held that the omitted
negotiations were material.
Defendants sought a rehearing. In connection with the petition, the Commission took the opportunity to comment on the Seventh Circuit's reasoning. The Commission filed a Memorandum, as amicus curiae, arguing that
the Seventh Circuit's analysis concerning the materiality of ongoing negotiations for publicly traded companies should be treated as dictum and be deleted from the opinion.25 7 More to the point, the Commission took the
position that the court's dictum on the issue was incorrect. Specifically, the
Commission disagreed that the standard for materiality depended upon
whether the negotiations involved a public or private company. Instead, for
both publicly and privately traded companies, negotiations could be material
well before the price and post-merger structure had been determined. The
Commission pointedly criticized the Third Circuit's attempt to render negotiations preceding an agreement in principle immaterial, noting that the
"Commission disagrees with the statement in Staffin that merger negotiations never become material prior to an agreement in principle."2 5 The
Commission also labelled the price-structure test in Heublein as "far too
rigid... [and] inconsistent with prior decisions in this area." The test would
"deprive shareholders in publicly traded companies of important information relevant to their investment decisions., 259 Eschewing a bright-line test
for determining the materiality of ongoing negotiations, the Commission endorsed the case-by-case balancing test espoused in Texas Gulf Sulphur.
Although denying the petition for rehearing, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless issued an amended opinion. While not expressly adopting the Commission's reasoning, the court did delete the dictum endorsing Heublein.2 6 °
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 1195-97.
Michaels Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1-2.
Id. at 2 nI.
Id. at 2.
Michaels, 767 F.2d at 1196.
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Instead, the court took note of the contrary views, including those espoused
by the Commission, and declined to take a position as to the proper test.
The materiality analysis employed by the Third Circuit in Staffin-Heublein and initially supported by the Seventh Circuit in Michaels, provided
the Commission with a relatively easy target to criticize. While a bright-line
test had the advantage of certainty, the Heublein-Staffin decisions contained
analysis completely at odds with existing case law and conventional notions
of materiality. Indeed, the facts in Heublein illustrated the weaknesses in the
Third Circuit's analytical approach. A bright-line "price-structure" test permitted Heublein to issue a "no developments" release notwithstanding the
ongoing merger negotiations, thereby affirmatively misleading the market, a
result inconsistent with the purposes of the federal securities laws. Furthermore, a bright-line test could be susceptible to manipulation. Companies
might intentionally delay final agreement on either the price or structure
until the last moment in an effort to avoid crossing the materiality threshold.
Levinson v. Basic, Inc., another case involving an allegedly misleading "no
developments" statement, presented a somewhat more difficult situation.
Analysing the materiality of ongoing negotiations, the district court repeated
the Third Circuit's conclusion that negotiations preceding an agreement in
principle were immaterial. But, rather than adopt the price structure test
espoused in Heublein, the Levinson court concluded that an agreement need
be only "reasonably certain" for negotiations to be considered material. 2" 6 '
The reasonable certainty test proposed by the district court in Levinson
was arguably less rigid than the "price-structure" test and more amenable to
flexible interpretation. A determination as to whether an agreement in principle was reasonably certain would have required a fact-intensive analysis,
including an analysis of the particular stage of negotiations. Thus, the test
did not completely disregard the Second Circuit's admonition in Texas Gulf
Sulphur that materiality was to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Nonetheless, while perhaps more flexible than the Staffin-Heublein "pricestructure" test, the district court in Levinson did seem to contemplate that
negotiations would be material only in the most advanced stages. Under the
Texas Gulf Sulphur test, however, negotiations can be material in less advanced stages where the resulting agreement was particularly important.
The reasoning in Levinson, therefore, was inconsistent with Texas Gulf
Sulphur and a substantial body of case law.
On appeal, the Commission, for a second time in a brief amicus curiae,
261. Levinson v. Basic, Inc., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,801, at 90,043 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 1984), rev'd, 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted,
54 U.S.L.W. 2516 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1987) (No. 86-279).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 36:93

took the opportunity to express its views on the proper test for the materiality of ongoing negotiations. The Commission again objected to what it saw
as another attempt to impose a bright-line test. The amicus brief argued that
"[t]he correct test of materiality, and the one long accepted by other courts,
is that the importance of preliminary merger negotiations to investors depends on the probability of a merger being concluded and the significance
the merger would have for the company. '2 62 Given the importance of the
merger under discussion, the Commission asserted that the negotiations
could be material "well before there is a reasonable certainty of
263
agreement."
Reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit in Levinson agreed that
merger negotiations could be material before an agreement in principle had
been reached. The court concluded that a "no developments" release and a
release denying that negotiations were taking place were both misleading.
Further, the court had little patience with Basic's contention that the contacts with the bidder had not risen to the level of negotiations. "The average
investor does not necessarily know the technical and legal definition of [negotiations] . . . . A statement that 'no negotiations' were occurring could
reasonably be read to state that no contacts of any kind whatsoever regarding merger had occurred., 264 Recognizing that its reasoning conflicted with
the reasoning employed by the Third Circuit, the court acknowledged that
265
Heublein contained a holding "with which we are in disagreement.,
The Sixth Circuit agreed that the district court's analysis was incorrect
and correctly declined to adopt the faulty reasoning in Heublein. Had the
opinion stopped there, the Levinson decision would have represented an unremarkable but accurate expostulation of the law. Unfortunately, the court
went on to add yet another questionable wrinkle to the materiality analysis.
The court made clear that its materiality analysis applied only to misleading
statements, not to cases such as Staffin involving affirmative obligations to
disclose.
In analyzing whether information regarding merger discussions is
material such that it must be affirmatively disclosed to avoid a violation of Rule lOb-5, the discussions and their progress are the primary considerations. However, once a statement is made denying
the existence of any discussions, even discussions that might not
have been material in absence of the denial are material because
262. Levinson Brief, supra note I1,at 7.
263. Id..
264. Levinson, 786 F.2d at 747.

265. Id. at 748.
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they make the statement made untrue. 266
The conclusion that a denial could somehow make immaterial information
material is unsound. When Basic issued the "no developments" release, the
company was implicitly denying that any material developments were taking place. So long as the negotiations were immaterial at the time Basic
made the statement, the statement was accurate. It is difficult to see how a
denial of material developments could change the result. This reasoning
gives rise to a Catch-22 of sorts. Any time a company truthfully denies that
material developments are taking place, it runs the risk that the denial itself
will somehow cause developments to become material.26 7
The Sixth Circuit's reasoning conflicts with reasoning employed by the
Second Circuit in Geon. There, the court took the position that materiality
might be easier to establish in abstain or disclose cases and more difficult in
cases involving misleading disclosures.2 6 The Sixth Circuit's reasoning in
Levinson suggests the precise opposite; materiality is easier to establish in
misleading disclosure cases. As a result, those who engage in insider trading
have greater immunity than those issuing misleading statements that do not
result in any direct pecuniary gain, an anomalous result at best.
Discontent with the results in the Sixth Circuit, Basic filed a petition for
certiorari.2 69 Basic argued in its brief that Levinson and Heublein were in
direct conflict and urged the Court to resolve the division among the circuits. Basic contended that the agreement in principle analysis employed by
the Third Circuit best comported with the TSC Northway test for determining materiality.2 7 °
The Supreme Court requested the views of the United States on whether
266. Id. at 749; see SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
("Here ... there is an affirmative misstatement rather than a non-disclosure. Had there been
no falsity involved, the situation might have been different.").
267. The Sixth Circuit's curious reasoning in Levinson may have been motivated by a desire
to avoid a conflict with the holdings in Starkman v. Marathon Oil, 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986) and Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986). In those cases, the Sixth Circuit had to determine the test
for ascertaining the materiality of asset appraisals and other soft information. The court rejected the case-by-case balancing test articulated by the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur
in favor of a restrictive test, more closely resembling the type of reasoning employed by the
Third Circuit in Heublein. In Radol, the Sixth Circuit held that appraisals of the target's
assets were material in a tender offer only if the underlying projections were "substantially
certain to hold." 772 F.2d at 252-53; see Starkman, 772 F.2d at 241 (appraisal material if
underlying projections "virtually as certain as hard facts").
268. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
269. Levinson v. Basic, 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 2516 (U.S. Feb.
23, 1987) (No. 86-279).
270. Petition of Petitioner, Basic Corporation, for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 107 S. Ct. 267 (1986) (No. 86-279).
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the petition should be granted. The request gave the Commission a specific
opportunity to comment on the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Levinson and a
more general opportunity to comment upon the correct standard for determining the materiality of speculative information such as ongoing negotiations. The Commission recommended in its brief that the Court grant the
petition.2" 7 ' The agency acknowledged that a split existed among the circuits
and agreed that the materiality of ongoing negotiations represented "an issue
of great importance to companies involved in such negotiations." 2'72
In analyzing the issue, the Commission submitted a tightly reasoned, cogently drafted brief. The brief first made clear that the case did not involve a
corporation's duty to affirmatively disclose negotiations. Whether Heublein
or Basic had an affirmative obligation to reveal that negotiations were underway was not at issue. Instead, the only issue was whether, by omitting mention of the negotiations, the companies had issued materially false and
misleading statements. "While the federal securities laws do not impose
upon a company any general obligation to issue a statement [revealing material developments], even in the face of unusual trading activity, a company
that chooses to speak cannot make a materially false or materially mislead27 3
ing statement about ongoing negotiations.
Consistent with its prior pronouncements, the Commission reiterated that
the proper test for determining the materiality of ongoing negotiations was
the "probability/magnitude" standard espoused by the Second Circuit in
Texas Gulf Sulphur. The Commission also reiterated that the agreement in
2 74
principle standard adopted in Heublein was inconsistent with this test.
Turning to Levinson, the Commission expressed disagreement with the Sixth
Circuit's reasoning. Allowing negotiations to become material "by virtue of
the statement denying their existence,"275 according to the Commission, "has
no basis under Northway, and would appear to render any false statement,
276
regardless of how trivial, per se material.9
271. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 20,
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 107 S. Ct. 267 (1986) (No. 86-279).
272. Id. at 5-6.
273. Id. at 7.
274. Id. at 10-13.
275. Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 748 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 2516
(U.S. Feb. 23, 1987) (No. 86-279) (emphasis in original).
276. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 14,
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 107 S. Ct. 267 (1986) (No. 86-279). The parties and the Commission
all agreed that the materiality of ongoing negotiations was controlled by the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Northway. Id. at 9-10 n. 11. Thus, the probability/magnitude test was not in lieu
of the Northway formulation, but was simply the test for determining the materiality of speculative information such as ongoing negotiations under Northway. See supra note 107.
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The Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case.277 Levinson represents an
appropriate vehicle for clarification of the issue. With three circuits having
weighed in on the issue,2 7 ' and a fourth taking the issue under consideration,27 9 the standard for determining the materiality of ongoing negotiations
has become a morass of confusion.28 0 In some respects, the real conflict is
between the fact specific, "probability/magnitude" standard of the Second
Circuit and the more certain, "price/structure" standard of the Third Circuit. Each attempts to balance the harm of premature disclosure of negotiations against the need to protect the integrity of the marketplace. Under the
price/structure test, the Third Circuit is, in order to protect perceived concerns about the negotiating process, willing to absolve from liability under
some circumstances companies that mislead the market by issuing incorrect
statements. The Second Circuit standard, on the other hand, errs on the side
of ensuring accuracy in the marketplace, even if, as a result, there may be
some incidental adverse impact upon the negotiation process.
The Sixth Circuit, perhaps trying to thread 4 line between the two tests,
adopted something that bears no resemblance to conventional materiality
analysis. Nor does the standard have any commending policy justifications.
Moreover, if the problem with the "probability/magnitude" test is uncertainty, the Sixth Circuit's test exacerbates the problem. The Sixth Circuit
standard does not obviate the need for a corporation to make the difficult
determination as to whether (and under what test) negotiations are material.
Instead, the Levinson court imposes the additional hurdle that even if negotiations are determined to be immaterial, they may be rendered material if a
company expressly denies that negotiations or other material developments
are taking place.
277. 54 U.S.L.W. 2516 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1987) (No. 86-279). In 1985, the Supreme Court aad
an opportunity to decide the appropriate standard for determining the materiality of speculative information such as projections and appraisals in another Sixth Circuit case. See Radol v.
Thomas, 772 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3727 (1986). In commenting on
the cert. petition, the Commission suggested that the case was an inappropriate vehicle for
deciding the issue. See supra note 107. Levinson does represent a cleaner set of facts than
Radol. Perhaps more importantly, the harm and uncertainty that may result from leaving the
Levinson decision intact is likely to be far greater than in Radol.
278. The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have all decided cases on this issue. See supra
notes 133, 136, 161, 169, 253.
279. The Seventh Circuit expressly left the issue open in Michaels. See supra note 260 and
accompanying text. More recently, the issue has again come before the court. See Jordan v.
Duff & Phelps, Inc., Nos. 86-1611/1727 (7th Cir. 1986). The Commission filed a Memorandum as Amicus Curiae recommending that the Seventh Circuit reject the district court's adoption of the Staffin-Heublein test for determining the materiality of ongoing negotiations. See
Memorandum of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., Nos.
86-1611/1727 (7th Cir. 1986).
280. See supra notes 99-124 and accompanying text.
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For the sixteen years following Texas Gulf Sulfur, there was little controversy over the proper standard for determining the materiality of speculative
negotiations such as ongoing negotiations. The 1984 Heublein decision represented an aberration that disagreed with a substantial and longstanding
body of law without ever once mentioning Texas Gulf Sulphur or its progeny. The course of the case law could readily be returned to its proper path,
the confusion could largely be alleviated through a brief decision by the
Supreme Court affirming the probability/magnitude test and unequivocally
stating that the Levinson and Heublein variations are inconsonant with the
test.
V.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

What advice can be given to corporate officials concerning the materiality
of ongoing negotiations? First, until either an edict from the United States
Supreme Court or a greater unanimity among the circuit courts, a company
that adheres to the Staffin-Heublein analysis does so at great peril. The legal
reasoning in those cases is dubious; the policy arguments are suspect. Other
courts, including lower courts in the Third Circuit, have already begun to
disagree with and limit the holdings in these cases. 281' The likelihood of
other circuits or the Supreme Court adopting the Third Circuit standard
appears questionable.
Prudence, therefore, dictates that companies assess the materiality of negotiations under the more longstanding and conservative standard espoused
in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Thus, a company must weigh the magnitude of the
resulting agreement against the probability that an agreement will occur. By
following the Texas Gulf Sulphur approach, the materiality analysis necessarily will be undertaken on a case-by-case, fact-intensive basis.
Second, notwithstanding dictum to the contrary, the standard for materi281. See, e.g., Powell v. American Bank & Trust Co., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,916 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 13, 1986). Even in the Third Circuit, some district courts have been
troubled by the reasoning in Heublein and have endeavored to interpret the case restrictively.
In Paul v. Berkman, 620 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. Pa. 1985), plaintiff, a 21% shareholder of Associ-

ated Communications Corp. (ACC), sold his shares back to the corporation. Before the stock
purchase agreement was signed, ACC began discussing the sale of 11 radio stations to another
corporation. Following the announcement of an agreement to sell the stations, ACC's stock
price more than doubled. Plaintiff alleged that ACC had a duty to reveal the existence of the
negotiations and that failure to do so vitiated the stock purchase agreement. Defendants, relying on Heublein, argued that the negotiations were not material. The district court determined
that Heublein was not dispositive, concluding that the reasoning in Heublein applied only to
merger discussions. "Heublein does not, even arguably, address when the duty to disclose
arises in the context of negotiations for the sale of assets." Id. at 642. The court also emphasized that unlike in Heublein, disclosure of the negotiations would not have "thwart[ed] the
transaction." Id.
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ality remains the same for all cases brought under the antifraud provisions.
Geon and Levinson aside, whether a case involves the duty to abstain or
disclose, or involves a misleading statement filing, the standard for materiality does not vary. Consequently, in assessing materiality, prudence again
dictates that substantial attention be accorded to those insider trading cases
that found negotiations to be material at relatively early stages. In examining the materiality of the negotiations for purposes of a release or filing, a
company should attempt to decide whether knowledge of the same negotiations would impose upon insiders the duty to "abstain or disclose." If the
answer is in the affirmative, the negotiations are likely to be material in other
contexts.
Beyond these generalities, a few specific conclusions are in order, although
given the case-by-case, fact-intensive analysis, little can be ventured with absolute certainty. As is typical, the ends of the spectrum are relatively easy to
identify. Certainly, "the law does not require that private dreams, musings,
aspirations and other remote hopes of the buyer of stock be disclosed to the
seller."2'82 Moreover, primal steps toward an agreement typically will not be
material. Mere inquiries, isolated contacts, or expressions of interest, without more, generally will not cross the materiality threshold.2 83 Such information would be of little or no use to shareholders or other investors in
making investment decisions. Indeed, disclosure of mere inquiries could
flood the market with a morass of extraneous information which might actually obscure more important and material matters.
At the other end of the spectrum, discussions over an important agreement will be material where the parties have negotiated all material terms
and only actual consummation of the agreement remains. Essentially, this is
what the Staffin-Heublein cases hold. The difficulties arise with situations
falling somewhere between the two extremes.
Discussions beyond limited or isolated contacts can be material. For certain highly important agreements, e.g., merger agreements or agreements involving substantially all of a company's assets, negotiations often will be
material at a very early stage. Materiality, at least in the context of merger
negotiations, would therefore seem triggered whenever the target and bidder
have expressed sufficient mutual interest to begin actual bargaining, whether
directly or through intermediaries. Although the prospect of a merger may
still be highly speculative, at least some possibility exists that it will occur.
The knowledge that both companies appear seriously interested in a business
282. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698, 717 (D.N.J. 1974).
283. See supra note 166.
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combination would seem relevant and material to those shareholders deciding whether to retain or to sell their shares.
Given the lack of certainty in this area, companies can institute a number
of procedures designed to preserve secrecy by minimizing the likelihood that
disclosure of the negotiations will be required. First, to reduce the risk of a
misleading disclosure, corporate communications should be centralized. A
company should have a spokesperson who acts as the sole authorized individual to respond to inquiries from the press, public, shareholders, analysts,
and stock exchanges. Typically, a corporate spokesman frequently is not an
attorney and, therefore, will not be familiar with all the nuances of the securities laws. Moreover, he or she frequently will not have the most current
information about every corporate development, particularly highly sensitive
ones. Therefore, a company should consider a set of written guidelines or
instructions for the corporate spokesman. Such instructions might provide
that inquiries, particularly from the press, about any major development
should not be answered without first consulting relevant personnel inside the
company. The corporate spokesman in Carnation incorrectly denied that
negotiations with Nestle were taking place. While he no doubt thought his
denial was accurate, efforts to contact the appropriate officers within Carnation to determine the proper state of affairs probably would have prevented
the misleading release. Such a policy effectively would place the responsibility for proper disclosure in the hands of high level corporate officials.
In some circumstances, instructions might provide for a canned response
to certain types of inquiries. Instructions regarding questions about market
rumors should require that the spokesperson automatically give a "no comment" response. 2 " Absent a preexisting, consistently applied policy, however, a "no comment" response to inquiries about rumors sometimes may be
tantamount to an admission that negotiations are taking place.28 5 Moreover, a "no comment" response in certain circumstances will not always be
284. See, e.g., Cole, Unocal Stock Surges on Takeover Rumors, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1984,
at 37, col. 1 ("Unocal, following its standard procedure, said it never comments on rumors
dealing with mergers and acquisitions."); Hull, Unocal Stock Rises on Unconfirmed Report that
Indiana Standard Will Make a Bid, Wall St. J., July 16, 1984, at 6, col. 2 (when asked to
comment on rumors that Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) intended to make tender offer for Unocal,
a "spokesman for Indiana Standard said that, as a matter of policy, it refused to confirm or
deny the rumors.").
285. A policy of responding "no comment" to inquiries about mergers sometimes may be
tantamount to an admission that negotiations are taking place, particularly where no such
policy existed previously. See Vise, Richardson- Vicks Stock Soars on Rumor of Sale, Wash.
Post, Oct. 1, 1985, at B1, col. 4 (where Richardson-Vicks had previously denied any plans to
be acquired, sudden refusal to respond to questions or return phone calls interpreted by analysts to mean white knight negotiations were taking place).
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appropriate and sometimes may contravene the securities laws.2 86
Perhaps most importantly, a company should adopt a forthright policy
that errs on the side of more rather than less disclosure. Whether ongoing
negotiations are material and whether they must be disclosed are issues
laden with uncertainty and confusion, with little likelihood of any improvement in the near future. Given the uncertain state of the law, companies
should, when in doubt, favor disclosure.
In addition to a policy of forthright disclosure, companies seeking to minimize exposure under the securities laws should also strive for far greater
precision in drafting disclosures. For example, in cases where preliminary
contacts between prospective merger partners have occurred, a company
may decide that the contacts do not rise to the level of negotiations and, in
response to inquiries, may give a blanket denial of any ongoing negotiations.
An enterprising plaintiff, however, may later argue that the contacts did rise
to the level of negotiations and that the release was, therefore, misleading.
The easiest way to prevent such a suit is to issue an accurate release in the
first instance. A frank admission in the release that contacts occurred but
that negotiations have not yet commenced will make a subsequent challenge
more difficult because it will be harder to prove that such release was misleading and that corporate officials acted with the requisite scienter.
Additionally, companies should endeavor to make public disclosures time
specific. Open-ended releases (e.g., "we have no intention of entering into
negotiations at this time") arguably may give rise to a duty to correct or
update in the event negotiations subsequently commence. To minimize the
duty to correct, a release might state that as of 5:00 p.m. on the date of issue,
no negotiations have commenced. Such a press release is less likely to be
"alive" and subject to a duty to update.
In summary, the materiality of ongoing negotiations represents an area of
continued ferment. The elusiveness of the concept coupled with murky legal
reasoning has resulted in substantial confusion. Nonetheless, Texas Gulf
Sulphur provides the essential framework for determining materiality.
Notwithstanding the case-by-case, fact-intensive nature of the test, the substantial body of case law analyzing the materiality of ongoing negotiations
provides some degree of assurance in determining whether negotiations are
material.

286. In re.Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, (1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,801, at 87,595 n.6 (July 8, 1985).

